

# Propaganda Analysis

*A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda*

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

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## The War Comes

IT STARTED at 11 minutes past 5 o'clock on the morning of September 1. The word that launched what may become the second World War was spoken by a man who was a corporal in the first. Bombs fell on Crakow, Katowice, Tczew and Czesochowa, and there were grave faces at dinner tables in Melbourne and Milwaukee. The youth who had fallen on his knees and thanked Heaven from an "overflowing heart" when the first World War broke out prepared to leave in the same joyous spirit for the Eastern Front, this time as commander-in-chief. Adolf Hitler, one among millions of simple soldiers maneuvered on the bloody chessboards of 1914-1918, did not bring the training of a Ludendorff or a Hindenburg to his new task. He brought equipment no less important for a long modern war, the skills of a master propagandist. These he had perfected not on the battlefield but in the Sportpalast on his way to power, and in the comfortable prison cell in the fortress of Landsberg on the Lech where in 1924 the unsuccessful leader of a Beer Hall putsch had time and leisure to think things over.

Machiavelli gave his prince no lessons in Name-calling or Glittering Generalities. In the day of mercenary armies, war was a payroll, not a propaganda problem. But in an age when the bludgeon of war falls on whole populations and the difference between soldier and civilian is imperceptible from a bombing plane, propaganda can be as important as petroleum. The heart, too, must have its combustibles; the engine that is man must be stocked with hatreds

and accelerated by devotions. Indispensable to the maneuvers of the armies are the maneuvers of the propagandists, and here the new commander-in-chief has found new scope for his genius. Here there is World War, and long before the German armies began to curse the bad roads of Poland, rival battalions of propagandists, through press and radio, were already fighting for mastery of public opinion in the mightiest of the neutrals, the United States of America.

Adolf Hitler did not declare war. "War"—the name—has been out of fashion since the Kellogg Pact. He issued a proclamation to the army, and in that proclamation he illustrated the propaganda principle he has always applied: "As soon as by one's own propaganda even a glimpse of right on the other side is admitted, the cause for doubting one's own right is laid." Or, as the late Tex Guinan put it, "Never give a sucker an even break." Hitler said the Poles had "refused my efforts for a peaceful regulation of neighborly relations." Hitler declared the Poles had "appealed to weapons." Hitler asserted that there was "a bloody terror" against the Germans in Poland. He did not charge border violations. He assumed them: "The series of border violations, which are unbearable to a great power, prove that the Poles no longer are willing to respect the German frontier." Hitler said he had no alternative left but "to meet force with force."

In this proclamation, as in the British propaganda Hitler so much admired in the last war,

<sup>1</sup> *Mein Kampf*, edition cited, p. 237.

<sup>2</sup> *Mein Kampf*, by Adolf Hitler, Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1939, p. 210.

<sup>3</sup> See dispatch by Otto D. Tolischus from Berlin, *New York Times*, September 1, 1939.



"There were really no half measures which perhaps might have given cause for doubt."<sup>4</sup> Hitler looking back over the war from his prison cell at Landsberg felt that "the proof" of the brilliance of British war propaganda lay in its use of atrocity stories and in pinning the war guilt upon Germany, "a lie, the unsurpassed, impudent, and biased stubbornness of which and how it was brought forth took into account the sentimental and extreme attitude of this great people and therefore gained credance."<sup>5</sup> Hitler has been applying the lesson ever since. Last August and September the German press was full of stories of border violations and atrocities by the Czechs, this year by the Poles. The Hitler proclamation echoed the fateful statement issued by an unnamed German general on September 8, 1938,<sup>6</sup> "We will never make war on the Czechs, but if the lives of our German brethren are not safe, the day may come when we shall consider that the Czechs have started a war with us. In such a case we shall remember that an attack is the best method of defense."

#### *Hitler and Versailles*

It has often been said that Hitler and Nazism are the fruits of Versailles. From a propaganda point of view Hitler has been the beneficiary at home and abroad of the Versailles "diktat." Whatever Germans might think of his anti-Semitism, his queer "national socialism," his glorification of brutality and force, on this one point none could differ with him. In the sphere of foreign politics the injustices, real or imaginary, provided the springboard for his successes, the crucial element in the propaganda campaigns that made these victories possible. Though the Versailles treaty was mild compared to the treaties imposed by Imperial Germany on Russia at Brest-Litovsk and on Rumania at Bucharest, the West nevertheless had a guilty conscience about Versailles. The replies to Hitler always contained a fatal "but," that "glimpse of right on the other side"—in Hitler's words—that undermined the confidence of his opponents. On October 14, 1933, Hitler left the disarmament conference. On March 16, 1935, he reintroduced universal mili-

tary conscription in defiance of the treaty. On March 7, 1936, his troops marched into the demilitarized Rhineland. On March 12, 1938, he seized Austria. On October 1, 1938, his armies carved away the "Germanic" sections of Czechoslovakia. In each case deadly admissions weakened the propaganda against him—and all of them ultimately went back to the peace settlement. "Equality of rights" and "self-determination," "the injustices of Versailles" and the supposed desire of the German-speaking peoples to be reunited, set the worm of doubt at work in the anti-Hitler camp. "Propaganda's task," Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*,<sup>7</sup> "is . . . not to evaluate the various rights, but far more to stress exclusively the one that is to be represented by it. It has not to search into truth as far as this is favorable to others, in order to present it then to the masses with doctrinary honesty, but it has rather to serve its own truth uninterruptedly." The crucial difference between the Hitler propaganda and the anti-Hitler propaganda in these crises was that the former admitted no pros and cons. The iniquities of Versailles and "self-determination" were again Hitler's cry in his campaign for Danzig and the Corridor. History displays no greater irony than that the words of Woodrow Wilson, who set out to make the world safe for democracy, should echo in the slogans of Adolf Hitler.

#### *Bombshells and Olive Branches*

Hitler did not confine himself to adopting Wilson's Glittering Generalities as his own. He also presented himself as a man of peace. Schuman describes von Neurath's diplomatic memorandum of March 7, 1936, on reoccupation of the Rhineland as "a bombshell garlanded with olive branches."<sup>8</sup> All the Hitler moves in the field of foreign affairs have been similarly adorned. The day Germany withdrew from the disarmament conference, Hitler was on the air saying, "If the world decides that all weapons are to be abolished, down to the last machine gun, we are ready to join at once in such a convention."<sup>9</sup> The day Hitler declared universal military service in defiance of the Versailles treaty he issued a proclamation in which he said, "In this hour the German Government renews before the entire world its assurance of its determination never to proceed beyond the

<sup>4</sup> *Mein Kampf*, edition cited, p. 237.

<sup>5</sup> *Mein Kampf*, edition cited, p. 238.

<sup>6</sup> See Associated Press dispatch by Louis P. Lochner quoted in *Europe On The Eve*, by Frederick L. Schuman, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1939, p. 402.

<sup>7</sup> Op. cit., p. 236.

<sup>8</sup> Schuman, op. cit., p. 212.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted by Schuman, op. cit., p. 46.



safeguarding of German honor and freedom of the Reich, and especially does it not intend in rearming Germany to create any instrument for warlike attack, but, on the contrary, exclusively for defense and thereby for the maintenance of peace."<sup>10</sup> The day Hitler sent his troops into the demilitarized Rhineland, Hitler told the Reichstag, "Now, more than ever, we shall strive for an understanding between European peoples, especially for one with our western neighbor nations . . . We have no territorial demands to make in Europe."<sup>11</sup>

The attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia, like that on Poland, were preceded by pledges of peace. Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*<sup>12</sup> "German-Austria must return to the great German motherland," and on July 25, 1934, Dollfuss was murdered by Nazis in an unsuccessful attempt at a putsch. But Hitler told the Reichstag on May 21, 1935, during the furore created in Europe by his reintroduction of conscription, "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an Anschluss";<sup>13</sup> and on July 11, 1936, in an Austro-German Accord, Hitler recognized "the full sovereignty of the Austrian Federal State."<sup>14</sup> On March 12, 1938, the German army occupied Austria. "In Vienna German nationals are being grossly maltreated," the German press and radio declared just before the annexation.<sup>15</sup> While the German army was moving into Austria, Goering and von Neurath assured Czechoslovakia that Germany had no designs on the Republic.<sup>16</sup> Less than seven months later, on October 1, the German army seized the Sudeten areas of Czechoslovakia. A few days before in a speech at the Sportspalast, Hitler had declared, "If this problem is solved there will be no further territorial problems in Europe for Germany . . . We do not want any Czechs." Frederick T. Birchall, reporting the speech,<sup>17</sup> said: "Herr Hitler addressed soothing phrases to the Poles, the Ukrainians, the Slovaks, the French, the British, and even Hungarians, all of whom he reminded of his manifested desire to seek no quarrel with them . . . Twice he asserted that if the Sudeten

territories were ceded, this would be the last territorial demands Germany would make in Europe." On March 15, 1939, the German army was in Prague, and Bohemia and Moravia were declared a German "protectorate."

#### "Self-Determination" Is Out

"The masses . . . with their inertia," Hitler writes in *Mein Kampf*,<sup>18</sup> "always need a certain time before they are ready even to notice a thing, and they will lend their memories only to the thousandfold repetition of the most simple ideas." After Prague, repetition had begun to make the whole world aware that the protestations of peace with which Hitler ended each of his advances and conquests did not keep him from embarking on new adventures. German propaganda, in other words, began to encounter the law of diminishing returns. Prague also represents the beginning of a new stage in German propaganda. For the first time Hitler, despite his "We do not want any Czechs" of the preceding September, had taken non-Germans into his new empire. He could no longer rest his case on "self-determination" or appeal to the aspirations of the German peoples for union. German propaganda began now to speak of Germany's need for "living room." The phrase is clever, for it evokes the picture of a cramped man stretching out for more room. But it does not have the same appeal as "self-determination," since it also implies taking other people's "living room" away from them. Both phrases are examples of the propaganda device we call Glittering Generalities, since they transfer to German territorial aims the ideas of fairness and justice that we associate with the rights to "self-determination" and room-in-which-to-live. But the fallacies in "living room" are closer to the surface.

It was not in the field of German propaganda alone that Prague marked a new period. After Prague, "appeasement" became overwhelmingly unpopular in England and France, for more and more people began to doubt that Hitler could be "appeased." To many in the democracies, conscience-stricken by the injustices of Versailles, appeasement had meant not surrender but pacification, as when one appeases a hungry animal with food or an angry man with soft words. But Hitler's continued demands soon made it appear that he was unappeasable, that peace could not be attained

<sup>10</sup> Quoted by Schuman, op. cit., p. 121.

<sup>11</sup> Speech quoted by Schuman, op. cit., p. 214.

<sup>12</sup> Op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>13</sup> Schuman, op. cit., p. 143.

<sup>14</sup> Schuman, op. cit., p. 302.

<sup>15</sup> Schuman, op. cit., p. 327.

<sup>16</sup> Schuman, op. cit., p. 367.

<sup>17</sup> See New York Times, September 27, 1938.

<sup>18</sup> Op. cit., p. 239.



by any retribution. From a Glittering Generality that the Chamberlain government could use with the British electorate as evidence of its desire for peace, "appeasement" soon became an effective bit of Name-calling that the opposition could exploit to picture Chamberlain as a silent partner of Hitler. Changed opinion moved Britain's Tories to open negotiations—sincerely or insincerely—for an alliance with their old bugbear, the Soviet Union, and Hitler took up again the propaganda cry of "encirclement." The cry was effective with Germans, because it reawakened memories of the blockade that starved the armies of the Kaiser to submission in 1918. It reawakened memories of the "iron ring" that French diplomats forged around Germany after Versailles. It meant political and economic strangulation.

#### *"Blood Calls to Blood"*

The German propaganda campaign against Poland began and continued in an atmosphere of international alarums. Danzig Nazis on March 17 postponed new elections for the Diet indefinitely and Warsaw regarded this as another blow at the Constitution of the Free City, since, under the terms of that charter, elections were to be held in May.<sup>20</sup> On March 22 Lithuania yielded Memel to Hitler. On March 23 Hungarian troops invaded Slovakia. On March 25 the official organ of the Polish army ran an editorial headed, "We Are Ready," and *Diplomatische Korrespondenz*, organ of the German Foreign Office, sought to dispel Polish fear with a statement declaring that Germany "considers the existence of a strong national Poland as a political necessity."

As the crisis developed, Nazi propaganda pursued several different lines, each adapted to a particular need. There was one propaganda campaign for Danzig, another for the outside world, still another for Poland. In Danzig the slogans were "blood calls to blood" and "home to the Reich," Glittering Generalities designed to outweigh the solid considerations that militated against union with Germany. For, as the August 26, 1939 issue of the London *Economist* showed in a comprehensive survey of Danzig's history and trade from 1308 to the present day, "The city has never prospered without Polish goodwill." "After twenty years of Polish supervision," the *Economist* reported, "Danzig is a

greater city than ever before in its history." In the Reich it is but one among many ports. As a Free City it had only Gdynia to compete with it for Polish trade." The 1935 elections failed to give the Nazis a majority and on October 10, 1937, Danzig Nazi Leader Foerster "admitted that only one-tenth of the population belonged to the party." In the Reich itself propaganda represented Germany as the injured and aggrieved party, the press stressed alleged mistreatment of Germany in Poland and atrocities. German obligations to "our blood brothers in Poland" were cited. The German need for "living room," advanced to justify Nazi ambitions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, played its part in the appeals. Later, as a "peace front" slowly began to form against the Reich, the cry of "encirclement" was raised. Propaganda on the other side had a ready answer. "The Germans speak of encirclement," Major George Fielding Eliot, American military expert said in a broadcast from London on September 2,<sup>21</sup> "but it is interesting to observe how they have used this method of encirclement themselves. They first encircled and then destroyed Czechoslovakia. Now they are encircling and attempting to destroy Poland. The final preliminary move in Poland's encirclement was the assumption by Germany of the military protection, so called, of Slovakia a few days ago."

#### *Goebbels Stacks Cards*

For the outside world, German propaganda harped on "self-determination" and the injustice of a Corridor splitting the Reich into two parts. Propaganda postcards were received from Danzig in many American cities showing the Polish Corridor on one side, and on the same scale, a map of the Northeastern States with a corridor from Canada to Boston, cutting Maine off from the rest of the country. Hitler's letter to Daladier of August 26<sup>21</sup> raised a similar question: "May I now take the liberty of putting the question to you, Herr Daladier: how would you act as a Frenchman if, through some unhappy issue of a brave struggle, one of your provinces were severed by a corridor occupied by a foreign power. And if a big city—let us say Marseilles—were hindered from belonging to France, and the Frenchmen living in this area were persecuted, beaten, and maltreated, yes, murdered, in a bestial manner?"

<sup>20</sup> See dispatch from Warsaw, New York Times, March 18, 1939.

<sup>20</sup> See New York Herald Tribune, September 3, 1939.

<sup>21</sup> See newspapers of August 29.



The Poles declared that Danzig and the Corridor were necessary to guarantee an outlet to the sea and that Danzig, at the mouth of the Vistula, could shut off Poland's one important river. "The Baltic seacoast, Pomorze (Polish name for the Corridor), and our two ports, Gdynia and Danzig," Pr sident Moscicki of Poland declared on June 29,<sup>22</sup> "are the air and sun of our national life and the basis of our political life and independence." On July 10 in the House of Commons, Chamberlain said, "Another power established in Danzig, could, if it so desired, block Poland's access to the sea, and so exert an economic and military stranglehold upon her."<sup>23</sup> Nazi propaganda had anticipated this argument and Goebbels in a speech on May 19,<sup>24</sup> had provided a clever riposte. "It is strange logic for the Poles," he said, "to claim Danzig because it lies at the mouth of the Vistula—we are not claiming Rotterdam because it lies at the mouth of the Rhine." This was Card-stacking. Goebbels overlooked the fact that Germany had other outlets to the sea, and that even her trade on the Rhine was in no danger of aggressive action by Holland. The Nazis also claimed that the Lansing Note of November 5, 1918 was the basis of the Armistice, and that while it guaranteed Poland "free and secure access to the sea," it also "provided for nothing more."<sup>25</sup> Polish propaganda replied that Poland could not have "secure" access to the sea if Danzig were reunited with the Reich and the Corridor cut off.

#### *Snow in August?*

Finally, in so far as Poland was concerned, Nazi propaganda sought to provoke trouble and to undermine the will to resist. The first motive is evident in a series of pin pricks, demonstrations, violations of the Free State Constitution in Danzig. As recently as January 25 of this year von Ribbentrop had declared at a banquet in Warsaw that "a firm understanding with Poland is an essential element of the Fuehrer's policy," but exactly a month later, on February 25, public places in Danzig were hung with the first placards declaring, "No admittance for Poles, dogs and Jews."<sup>26</sup> Calculated to weaken the will to resist was the use made by German propaganda of every new sign of "ap-

peasement" on the part of Chamberlain, of British haggling over the Polish defense loan, of the long delays and final failure to obtain Russian adherence to the peace front, and finally of the Russo-German "non-aggression consultation pact," as Hitler called it in his speech to the Reichstag on September 1.

For a time the terror against Poland followed the same pattern as that against Czechoslovakia. First were the "atrocities." As early as March 27 the German News Bureau reported that women and children had been beaten in the streets of Bydgoszcz for speaking German.<sup>27</sup> In April, the German press began to carry stories of German refugees from Polish persecution.<sup>28</sup> Atrocity stories reached a ludicrous climax in August. On the 26th of that month<sup>29</sup> a correspondent reported from Vienna that pictures of the supposed terror then raging in August showed snowstorms. "Fugitives," he reported, "are shown in mid-August bundled up in heavy coats and wearing overshoes . . . To make the 'terror' worse the Poles presumably covered the ground with snow." The Poles were accused of "brazen and insane chauvinism" by the German press for claiming equality as a power,<sup>30</sup> and of "Criminal War Agitation."<sup>31</sup> Every incident was magnified by the German press, as in the killing of a German butcher in Danzig by the chauffeur of the Polish Commissioner while investigating a customs house riot. Foerster visited Berlin as had Konrad Henlein, the Sudetenland Nazi leader, before him, and there were repeated rumors of a coup. On April 15 the Associated Press reported from Berlin that "German troops might help themselves bloodlessly to Danzig next Wednesday to give Chancellor Hitler a triumphant present for his 50th birthday" and on July 1 the *New York Times* reported: "Hitler Plans Danzig Visit as Step Toward Regaining the City in 'Peaceful Coup.'" There were attempts to use first Danzig League of Nations Commissioner Burckhardt and then a mysterious Professor Riley as a Lord Runciman.

The long haggle between London and Moscow provided German propagandists with the material they needed to spread fears of a new

<sup>22</sup> See *New York Times*, June 30, 1939.

<sup>23</sup> Kuhn, *New York Times*, July 11, 1939.

<sup>24</sup> See *New York Times*, May 20, 1939.

<sup>25</sup> Tolischus, *New York Times*, August 17, 1939.

<sup>26</sup> See *London Times*, August 29, 1939.

<sup>27</sup> See *New York Times*, March 28, 1939.

<sup>28</sup> See *New York Times*, April 13, 1939.

<sup>29</sup> See *New York Times*, August 27, 1939.

<sup>30</sup> See *New York Times*, May 3, 1939.

<sup>31</sup> See *New York Times*, August 31, 1939.



Munich in Poland. When Moscow on March 20 suggested a conference among Russia, France, Britain, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey to take steps against German aggression, Britain countered with a proposal for a Russo-Franco-British joint declaration condemning the seizure of Bohemia and Moravia. "Such a declaration," Ferdinand Kuhn reported from London in the *New York Times* of March 21, "would contain a warning against German aggression, although at the present stage it would hardly entail a specific pledge to fight against Germany." On March 31 Chamberlain declared in the Commons, "In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish government considered it vital to resist with the national forces, His Majesty's government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their power." On April 13, similar pledges were extended to Greece and Rumania. The guarantees, as Lloyd George was later to say in the Commons,<sup>32</sup> were "reckless" without Soviet aid. Nevertheless, pact negotiations dragged on. While the Opposition grew more and more restive and the entire British press called for the pact, the Chamberlain government cited one alleged obstacle after another. It was hoped that Mussolini would withdraw his troops from Spain if no Anglo-Soviet pact were signed.<sup>33</sup> It was feared that Spain, Portugal and the Vatican might be offended.<sup>34</sup> It was thought that the pact would "'unnecessarily' irritate Germany" and "permanently alienate Japan."<sup>35</sup> It was felt that certain South American countries might be antagonized.<sup>36</sup> Chamberlain was said to be impressed by the Duke of Alba's warning that Franco would make an alliance with Germany and Italy if the pact went through.<sup>37</sup> Polish opposition, the hostility of the Baltic States to a guarantee and the proper definition of "indirect aggression" were each in their turn put forward to explain the failure to obtain the pact.

The use made of this delay by Nazi propaganda and a possible clue to the reasons for the

protracted negotiations may be seen in a dispatch sent to the *New York Times* from Berlin by Guido Enderis under date of July 21. He said the German government still expected the peaceful and unconditional return of Danzig through pressure on the Poles by the British. "The other alternative," Enderis went on, "in the unofficial German view is based on the conviction that Britain, failing to conclude a pact with the Soviet, would be in an even stronger and less prejudicial position to intervene in the Danzig crisis. Freed of automatic entanglements by a tri-power pact, Britain, so runs the private German thesis—could with greater freedom proceed to convince Poland of the futility of her stand on Danzig by warning Warsaw that it was confronted with the specter of Russo-German rapprochement, or, at any rate, with a neutral or negative military factor in Russia, leaving her at the sole mercy of a powerfully armed opponent in Germany. Such a development, it is believed here, would considerably enhance Britain's prospect of influencing Warsaw . . ."

But the German propagandists who sought to spread the impression in Poland that Warsaw had better surrender on Danzig and the Corridor or face the threat of encirclement by a Russo-German entente did not have to rely solely on rumors and speculations. On March 11 Stalin opened the Eighteenth All-Union Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow by warning that the Soviets would not pull other people's chestnuts out of the fire for them and accused enemies of the Soviet Union of trying to foment war between Russia and Germany. "In its emphasis upon a lack of any genuine basis for war between Germany and Russia," the Associated Press report from Moscow said, "his speech sounded almost like a rapprochement between these two countries." On May 8 Tolischus reported from Berlin<sup>38</sup> that the German press had been ordered not to attack Russia "and to go lightly even in the 'holy crusade' against Bolshevism . . . According to all indications, before proceeding to a settlement of her account with Poland, Germany has decided to await the signing of the alliance with Italy, which is expected at the end of the month, and the outcome of her efforts respecting Russia." But on May 9 the United Press from Berlin said, "There was speculation that the rumors (of a Russo-German rapprochement) might

<sup>32</sup> See *New York Times*, May 9, 1939.

<sup>33</sup> See dispatch of Pertinax from Paris, *New York Times*, April 12, 1939.

<sup>34</sup> Kuhn, *New York Times*, May 2, 1939.

<sup>35</sup> Ralph W. Barnes, *New York Herald Tribune*, May 3, 1939.

<sup>36</sup> See dispatch from London, *New York Herald Tribune*, May 6, 1939.

<sup>37</sup> Pertinax, *New York Times*, May 20, 1939.

<sup>38</sup> See *New York Times*, May 9, 1939.



have been started by Nazi leaders themselves, or at least supported by them, in an effort to hamstring the anti-aggression negotiations under way between Great Britain and the Soviet Union . . . Russian quarters in Berlin . . . described the rumors as childish." The rumors seemed less childish after Molotoff's speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 31. While Chamberlain was fishing for trout in Hampshire as the guest of the retired diplomat, Sir Francis Lindley, known as anti-Russian and pro-Japanese,<sup>30</sup> Molotoff rejected new British proposals, reported that recent trade talks with Germany had been broken off, but said, "To judge by certain signs, it is not out of the question that the negotiations may be resumed."<sup>40</sup>

On the night of August 19, while Poland rushed troops to all but her Soviet frontier, the Moscow radio broadcast two announcements, one that a trade agreement had been signed in Germany, the other (quoting the Paris correspondent of a Danzig newspaper) that "Prime Minister Chamberlain waited impatiently for the adjournment of Parliament in order to effect a second Munich."<sup>41</sup> The non-aggression pact followed. It was signed on August 24. On August 27 Gedye reported from Moscow<sup>42</sup> that the Soviet government informed the French ambassador that the Franco-Soviet pact had been rendered invalid by the German-Soviet non-aggression pact.

#### *Effects of the Pact*

The non-aggression pact—Hitler called it a "non-aggression consultation" pact — threw consternation into both the camps of anti-fascism and anti-Communism. Hitler's claim to be a "bulwark against Bolshevism" had won him support in his fight to establish a dictatorship, and support abroad in his campaign for German expansion. Typical of those who had accepted this Hitler propaganda at face value is Dr. Frank Buchman, leader of the "Moral Re-armament" movement. "I thank Heaven," Dr. Buchman said in an interview with the New York *World-Telegram* on August 26, 1936, "for a man like Adolf Hitler, who built a front line of defense against the anti-Christ of Communism . . . Of course, I don't condone everything

the Nazis do. Anti-Semitism? Bad, naturally. I suppose Hitler sees a Karl Marx in every Jew." Typical of those who had accepted Comintern propaganda at face value were the 400 leading American intellectuals who signed a manifesto opposing the lumping of Moscow and Berlin on the ground, among other things, that the U.S.S.R. was an ally of the democracies against fascism. Hitler seems to have thought Poland would surrender when the Russo-German non-aggression pact was signed. He intensified his propaganda campaign of terrorization. On Tuesday, August 22, Tolischus reported to the New York *Times* from Berlin that the German military staff had orders for immediate military action Thursday "according to usually well informed sources." "These, perhaps," Tolischus wrote, "are not unintentional revelations." The same day Roosevelt addressed a peace appeal to Hitler, Moscicki and King Victor Emmanuel asking Berlin and Warsaw to solve their dispute by negotiations, conciliation or arbitration. On the same day the Pope also appealed for peaceful negotiation. Moscicki sent a favorable reply. There was no answer from Hitler. Some may have hoped that the appeal, like Roosevelt's appeal before Munich, would lead to further "appeasement," for a significant statement appears in Kuhn's dispatch from London in the New York *Times* of August 26: "Others, like President Roosevelt, may yet urge the Poles to give way for the sake of peace, but for Mr. Chamberlain to do so is politically impossible, even if he wishes to exert 'pressure.'" Tolischus from Berlin, in a dispatch dated August 26, wrote that as a result of diplomatic efforts, "German quarters professed the conviction at midnight that a general European war had been averted, but that a 'little war' between Germany and Poland was still a possibility unless Poland surrendered to the German demands newly framed."

A "little war" rather than a new Munich seems to have become the aim of German propaganda at this stage. The Sunday papers of August 27 carried the news that Hitler demanded that the British abandon the alliance with Poland and give him Danzig and a "corridor across the Corridor" before he would negotiate "on other matters." That night Daladier's office issued a communiqué in Paris on an exchange of letters with Hitler in which the Fuehrer deplored that French and German blood might be spilled because of what was happen-

<sup>30</sup> Kuhn, New York *Times*, June 1, 1939.

<sup>40</sup> See dispatch of Harold Denny, New York *Times*, June 1, 1939.

<sup>41</sup> G. E. Gedye, New York *Times*, August 21, 1939.

<sup>42</sup> See New York *Times*, August 28, 1939.



ing in Poland. Hitler's letter stressed his friendly feelings toward France, his peaceful intentions toward Europe, his inability to see any "way of persuading Poland, which feels herself as unassailable, now that she enjoys the protection of her guarantees, to accept a peaceful solution." This last was to be elaborated into a curious theory of war guilt. Thus on September 2, before the British had declared war, the German official news bureau issued a statement in Berlin that "England did not play fair. When one considers that England, through unconditional support of the Polish standpoint, immediately removed every possibility of German-Polish understanding, and the strange diplomatic attitude of England during the last days, then one realizes that England wants a European war and intentionally prepared it . . . The only real aggressor, therefore, from the political and historical viewpoint is Great Britain, while the Polish government functions only as a sub-worker."

#### *White Paper and War Guilt*

The White Paper made public by the British government in London on September 1 for the first time placed on the record the last minute exchanges which had been going on since August 22 between Chamberlain and Hitler. These bear strong similarities to the exchanges which took place before Munich. Britain insisted that direct discussions proceed on the basis of "safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and securing of a settlement by an international guarantee." To which Hitler replied that he "never had any intention of touching Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State." Hitler made one qualification. "In the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland," the Germans could not bind themselves or give guarantees "without the U.S.S.R. being associated with them." On this basis Hitler agreed "to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. They count on arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, August 30, 1939." Five frantic messages went from London to Berlin on August 30, but not until the fourth message, at 6:50 p.m. did the British government decide "We cannot advise the Polish gov-

ernment to comply with this procedure . . . which is wholly unreasonable." On midnight, August 30, Sir Neville Henderson presented the final reply of the British government suggesting a truce, but von Ribbentrop's answer, according to the White Paper, was to read him a long document in German, containing a 16-point German program as basis for negotiations. When Sir Neville asked for a copy of the proposals, "Herr von Ribbentrop said it was now too late as the Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived in Berlin by midnight as had been demanded by the German government."

#### *Adolf Hitler's 16 Points*

The British contend that the 16 points were put forward purely for propaganda effect, since there was no time to act on them. They provided for return of Danzig to the Reich and a plebiscite in the Corridor in which all who lived there on January 1, 1918, or had been born there before that date would be eligible to vote. Gdynia was to be excluded from the vote. If the Germans won the Corridor, they would have the right to exchange Poles living in it for Germans in Poland. If the Germans lost, they would have the right to a corridor across the Corridor. Chamberlain in the Commons on September 1 declared these proposals were never submitted to the Poles at all. At 5:11 o'clock in the morning of that day Hitler ordered the German armies to march.

The 16 points were Berlin's final move in the propaganda maneuvers over war guilt before hostilities began. Chamberlain, releasing the White Paper in London, said "Now that all the relevant documents are being made public, we shall stand at the bar of history knowing that the responsibility for this terrible catastrophe lies on the shoulders of one man." Others, remembering Munich, and the part played by Britain, first under Stanley Baldwin and then Chamberlain, in permitting German rearmament, treaty violation and expansion were not so sure. The masses in every country certainly gave every evidence of a desire for peace, but whether the responsibility for war rested on the German Fuehrer alone or on those who had made his rise possible was left for history to decide.



# Propaganda Analysis Worksheet

You can imagine what a bitter blow it is to me that all my long struggle to win peace has failed.

Yet I cannot believe that there is anything different that I could have done that would have been more successful.

THESE sentences were part of the calm proclamation which came to Englishmen over their radios at 10 o'clock, September 3, as Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain declared that "this country is now at war with Germany."

Americans who had read *The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page* recalled the description of a similar scene on August 4, 1914. The American Ambassador in London visited Sir Edward Grey, who wept and paced up and down the room as he told of the ultimatum to Germany. He saw King George V who "declaimed at me for half an hour and threw up his hands and said, 'My God, Mr. Page, what else could we do?'"<sup>1</sup>

A survey of memoirs and diaries reveals the fact that this sentiment was expressed or implied by most of the statesmen of Europe as hostilities opened in 1914. Twenty-five years later historians who had studied carefully the documents in the archives of the Great Powers suggested that they could have avoided war in several ways.<sup>2</sup>

As the events in Europe since 1919 await the objective study of future historians, Americans turn to the immediate problem of our relationship with the European combatants. Twenty-five years of education in international affairs, including participation in the World War and the Peace Conference, has taught Americans that their role in a general war cannot be that of disinterested spectators. The President voiced this feeling in his address to the nation on September 4th: "Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought does affect the American future."

The situation calls for an American mobilization no less complete, and more difficult than the massing of armies and material which the

European powers have completed: a mobilization of all agencies of public information and all citizens for the purpose of forming a public opinion which will express America's interests in a changing world. The President placed a heavy responsibility for self-education on the citizens of a democracy when he said:

It is of the utmost importance that the people of this country, with the best information in the world, think things through. The most dangerous enemies of American peace are those who, without well-founded information on the whole broad subject of the past, the present and the future, undertake to speak with authority, to talk in terms of Glittering Generalities, to give to the nation assurances or prophecies which are of little present or future value.

... it is of the highest importance that the press and the radio use the utmost caution to discriminate between actual verified fact on the one hand and mere rumor on the other.

I can add to that by saying that I hope the people of this country will also discriminate most carefully between news and rumor. Do not believe of necessity everything you hear or read. Check up on it first.

## I NEWSPAPER AND RADIO STUDY

### *Channels of Communication in Wartime*

In 1914 censorship was clamped down suddenly; in 1939 it has arrived by slow degrees. Russia, Germany, Italy, and smaller totalitarian states placed restrictions on news which compelled correspondents to work under wartime conditions. (See PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, October 1, 1938, *News from Europe*.)

Review the second bulletin of the Institute, *How to Detect Propaganda*, November, 1939. In your scrapbook collect examples of the use of as many devices as possible. In the last war Name-calling was used to make the German Kaiser the most hated man in the world. Transfer brought many Americans to believe that American humanitarian interests were the same as the war aims of the Allied Powers. Card-stacking was used in expressing war aims and placing war guilt, etc. (See Harold D. Lasswell's *Propaganda Technique in the World War*.)

Make a list of news items which are later denied or reported unconfirmed. From this list rate the news agencies which serve you by

<sup>1</sup> Hendrick, Burton J., *The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page*, Doubleday-Page, Garden City, N. Y., 1922, Vol. I, p. 309.

<sup>2</sup> Carl Becker, *Modern History*, Silver, Burdett and Co., New York, p. 675.



press and radio according to the degree of reliability.

Americans are discussing the question of amending the present neutrality act. What attitude does your newspaper take on this issue? Examine a newspaper which takes the opposite side. Consider:

1. Do the headlines in these papers show the bias of the editorial page?
2. Are certain words and phrases used in writing the accounts which carry emotional overtones and which show the bias of the editors? (See PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, December, 1937, *Some ABC's of Propaganda Analysis*.)
3. Are certain stories which confirm the point of view of the editor played up while others which do not uphold it are buried in small notices inside of the paper?
4. Are public men who disagree with the editor denounced?
5. Do you agree with the editor? How long have you read this paper? Has he been doing your thinking on foreign policy for you or have you been making your own decisions with the facts from his news items?
6. Beware of the Testimonial device. Every man on the air with a military title is not an expert on modern warfare. Casual travelers in Europe are not authorities on complex European problems. Be skeptical about authorities.

Dorothy Thompson has said:

The spoken word is probably far more inflammatory than the written word. The human voice is a more potent conveyor of emotion than is the printed page; it is less likely to appeal to reason; it is more capable of being misunderstood; from time immemorial it has been used to sway and control masses, and this possibility has been incalculably augmented by the radio and the power of reaching millions.<sup>a</sup>

1. What are your reactions when you listen to the radio?
2. Do you listen to shortwave broadcasts, from Poland? France? Germany? England?
3. Compare the reception from these countries. Which broadcasts give the most complete accounts? Use the best English?

See PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, June, 1938, *Propaganda on the Air*.

<sup>a</sup>"On the Record" by Dorothy Thompson, New York *Herald-Tribune*, September 6, 1939.

The first World War drew American correspondents to Europe and hundreds of news gatherers penetrated every corner of the world in the twenty years following the Armistice. News reels and photographic service sent other Americans and the radio finally added its component of news men and commentators. The American public has met many of these men through their autobiographies. Have each member of the group read one of the books on the list which follows. After the reading, carry on a group discussion around these questions:

1. What bias does the writer have on war? On politics? Have certain experiences which he relates built prejudices against men or countries now at war?
2. What are the difficulties of getting news in foreign countries as related by these writers? Have they ever been dissatisfied with the editing of news which they wrote in newspaper offices at home?
3. Use the accounts of these men to fill out the framework of the bulletin. How many news columns have you read which have been signed by some of the correspondents listed below? How many of them have you heard on the radio? Has your work in the group raised any questions when you listened after reading the autobiography?

*Personal History* by Vincent Sheehan, Doubleday, Doran, and Co., New York, 1935.

*Not Peace but a Sword* by Vincent Sheehan, Doubleday, Doran, and Co., New York, 1939.

*Inside Europe* by John Gunther, Harper and Bros., New York, 1937.

*Inside Asia* by John Gunther, Harper and Bros., New York, 1939.

*Duranty Reports Russia* by Walter Duranty, The Viking Press, New York, 1934.

*I Write As I Please* by Walter Duranty, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1935.

*I Found No Peace* by Webb Miller, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1936.

*Immortal Italy* by Edgar A. Mowrer, D. Appleton Co., New York, 1922.

*Germany Puts the Clock Back* by Edgar A. Mowrer, W. Morrow and Co., New York, 1933.

*Journalist's Wife* by Lilian T. Mowrer, W. Morrow and Co., New York, 1937.

*Red Star over China* by Edgar Snow, Random House, New York, 1938.

*Betrayal in Central Europe* by G. E. R. Gedy, Harper and Bros., New York, 1939.

*Plot and Counterplot in Central Europe* by M. W. Fodor, Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1937.



*South of Hitler* by M. W. Fodor, Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1939.

*Two Wars and More to Come* by Herbert L. Matthews, Currick and Evans, Inc., New York, 1938.

*Union Now, a Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic* by Clarence Streit, Harper and Bros., New York, 1939.

*The Way of a Transgressor* by Negley Farson, Harcourt Brace and Co., New York, 1936.

*Days of Our Years* by Pierre Van Paassen, Hillman-Curl, Inc., New York, 1939.

## II GROUP WORK PROJECT

### *Limits to Partisanship*

"And at this time let me make the simple plea that partisanship and selfishness be adjourned; and that national unity be the thought that underlies all others." (President Roosevelt's address to the nation, September 3, 1939.)

Democracies find the problem of separating foreign policy from domestic policies difficult. The campaigns of Mayor Thompson for the mayoralty of Chicago on a platform of hatred for Great Britain is the best known of a number of similar cases. The "Red Hunt" of 1919 was another legacy which the World War left to American domestic politics. On the other hand Americans are impatient of domestic groups with foreign connections working for a program written in a European capitol, or domestic groups which collaborate with such organizations for the purpose of private gain in the sale of war materials. The revolutionary nature of both fascism and Communism have added new elements to the situation since 1917. Rauschnig, discussing the Nazi program of "universal unsettlement," describes a conference of Nazi leaders in which he participated in 1933:

Someone said that in every State discord should be stirred up to such an extent that the State could easily be brought down. Objections were raised, but it was contended that it was all a question of money and organization. It cost more in the West than in the East that was the only difference. There were no convictions in democracies, real convictions, for which men would stake their existence.<sup>4</sup>

The questions which your group may want to consider are:

1. Can America extend to totalitarian groups engaged in world programs of "universal unsettlement" the democratic privileges of freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly?

<sup>4</sup> *The Revolution of Nihilism* by Herman Rauschnig, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1939, p. 249.

2. Can we deny to such groups these privileges without destroying our own democracy by violating these fundamental privileges?
3. Can America solve this problem by educating the public to detect propaganda and by working for a conviction within the framework of democracy which will render such groups harmless?

Review the issues of PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS listed below in the light of the new general war:

1. March 1, 1939, *Communist Propaganda, U.S.A.*, 1939 Model.
2. January 1, 1939, *The Attack on Democracy*.
3. May 1, 1938, *Propaganda Techniques of German Fascism*.

## III GROUP STUDY PROJECT

### *Toward What? And How?*

On April 20, 1915, Woodrow Wilson said: "The basis of neutrality is not indifference; it is not self-interest. The basis of neutrality is sympathy for mankind."

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

40 EAST FORTY-NINTH STREET, NEW YORK CITY

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*Note:* By its charter the Institute is a non-profit corporation organized to assist the public in detecting and analyzing propaganda, but it is itself forbidden to engage in propaganda or otherwise attempt to influence legislation.

The Institute does not have all the answers: it lays no claim to infallibility. It will try to be scientific, objective, and accurate. If it makes mistakes, it will acknowledge them. It asks those who receive its letters to check its work.



In his address of September 3, Franklin Delano Roosevelt likewise spoke of America's duty to mankind.

In spite of spreading wars (he said), I think that we have every right and every reason to maintain as a national policy the fundamental moralities, the teachings of religion and the continuation of efforts to restore peace—for some day, though the time may be distant, we can be of even greater help to a crippled humanity.

Under Woodrow Wilson, America went to war, placed a prominent part in the Peace Conference. Since then, we have watched another World War develop, in part because of many of the same problems that caused the first, in part because of new problems created by the peace. Can we today see more clearly than in 1917 the duty of America "to a crippled humanity"? Are we capable today of helping more expertly?

1. Do we have enough knowledge of what is going on behind the scenes in Europe, Asia, and Latin America?
2. Do we have enough perspective in history to interpret the events of today?
3. Do we have enough geographical knowledge to understand the economic needs of industrial and agricultural nations in terms of resources and living standards?
4. Why did we finally enter the last war?
5. How will our domestic problems, social and economic be affected by the war?

The new purpose, if it is to emerge, should be founded on reason as well as emotion. Groups reading, talking and thinking together may examine the false hopes, defeated pro-

grams, lost opportunities of the last forty years. The first question many Americans will want to answer is: Shall we help all humanity or shall we restrict our efforts to that part of humanity living in the Western Hemisphere?

Our historians have been less than successful in determining the causes for America's entrance into the last war. The following books have been the center of controversy and have contributed points of view to the problem:

*Imperialism and World Politics*, by Parker T. Moon, Macmillan, New York, 1928.

*The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 6 vols., edited by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, Harper and Bros., New York, 1925.

*Background for War*, by the editors of *Time* magazine, New York, 1939.

*Road to War, America, 1914-1917* by Walter Millis, Houghton, Mifflin Co., Boston, 1935.

*American Diplomacy During the World War* by Charles Seymour, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1934.

*Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies* by Alex Mathews Arnett, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1937.

*Why We Went to War* by Newton D. Baker, Harper and Bros., New York, 1936.

*War Memoirs of Robert Lansing*, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York, 1935.

*The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page* by Burton J. Hendrick, Doubleday Doran and Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1922-25.

*The Memoirs of Williams Jennings Bryan*, The John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia, 1925.

*How We Advertised America* by George Creel, Harper and Bros., New York, 1920.

*The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* edited by Charles Seymour, Houghton, Mifflin Co., Boston, 1926-28.



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# Propaganda Analysis

*A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda*

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

40 EAST FORTY-NINTH STREET : NEW YORK CITY

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## Mr. Roosevelt's Foreign Policy

HISTORIANS may deny that history repeats itself, although the man in the street will continue to roll the words glibly from his tongue; and only the sophist can insist that nothing is new under the sun. Yet, to anyone who lived through 1914, it must, at times, seem that what is happening in the world today all happened before. Differences there are between '14 and '39. One, at least—the great question mark that hangs over the Soviet Union—may some day become of crucial importance. Still, the similarities are many and bewildering. Twenty-five years ago it was the Kaiser who summoned Germany to war; yesterday it was the Fuehrer; but the cry is the same—the cry of “encirclement.” Twenty-five years ago the Allies went forward to “hang the Kaiser.” They fight now to “smash Hitlerism.” For “Kaiserism” substitute “Hitlerism,” for “Prussianism” substitute “National Socialism,” and much of the pro-Ally propaganda of the last war sounds exactly like the propaganda of this one. Now, as then, we are told by the Allies that our democracy, too, may perish if Germany is victorious. Now, as then, both sides anxiously eye the United States, for, by withholding or granting materials and men, we may again decide the conflict.

Not the least of the resemblances between 1914 and 1939 is that once again there sits in the White House an eloquent spokesman of democracy, capable of stirring mass enthusiasm the world over. In 1914 the White House occupant was the late Woodrow Wilson. In 1939 the occupant is one who has many links with the Wilson Administration, whose ideas on

world affairs invite comparison and contrast with those of the Founding Father of the League of Nations. As eloquent as Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt seems, if anything, the better propagandist. “Quarantine,” with its touch of panic and its appeal to safety; “Good Neighbor,” as homey as hot biscuits—these are metaphors even more effective than Wilson's loftier phraseology.

Here in the United States, where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution to participate in the legislative process, and where he must occasionally even initiate legislation, Presidents must be propagandists—or else their effectiveness will disintegrate. And this is especially true because the President of the United States is also the leader of his party; and politics is propaganda. Year in, year out, since George Washington, the Presidents of the United States have sent messages to Congress describing the “state of the nation.” Perhaps it would not be entirely correct to call these documents “propaganda.” Yet, in one sense, at least, they are—for the Presidents have written them in order to convince the Congress, and to convince the people of the United States of the wisdom of their policies.<sup>1</sup> Year in, year out, Presidents have vetoed acts of Congress, and with their vetoes they have issued explanations. Again these have involved propaganda, for they have been written in the hope of convincing the people of the folly of what Congress has done.

On foreign affairs, the President alone

<sup>1</sup> See October, 1937 issue of PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, *Announcement*.



speaks for the nation, sometimes personally, sometimes through his Secretary of State. He does so partly to broadcast our policies to Europe and the world, but partly to justify those policies before the world. Moreover, there are times when he speaks *to* the American people, rather than for them — when he propagandizes for changes in our foreign policy, as when Mr. Roosevelt asked the Congress to revise the Neutrality Act.

Herein lies the difficulty of analyzing the propaganda of any President of the United States, and especially that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who, because of the radio, has been able to carry on his propaganda far more extensively (and no less effectively) than any other President in our history. For no sharp line can be drawn between the President's speeches as Chief Executive and his speeches as leader of the Democratic Party. Nor can it always be determined when his requests for changes in foreign policy become policy in themselves. Moreover, propaganda, by definition, is "designed to influence opinion . . . with reference to predetermined ends." So complex is any President's role in our democracy, however, so involved does he become in the passions of politics that who but the partisan can always say what his predetermined ends may be? Complicating the problem even further is the fact that international maneuvers are carried on secretly, often sprung upon the world almost without notice, as were the recent treaties between Germany and the Soviet Union. "Open covenants, openly arrived at" are today no less an ideal than in Woodrow Wilson's day.

#### *Is "Wilsonian" Name-calling?*

Still, we cannot hope to analyze Mr. Roosevelt's propaganda on foreign policy unless we first determine what his foreign policy is. Unless we can at least guess at his predetermined ends, his words have only surface meaning. And for that we must go back to Woodrow Wilson. Earlier in this issue of PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS it was implied that Mr. Roosevelt could, in certain respects, be compared to Woodrow Wilson. Some who know Mr. Roosevelt say that he dislikes the comparison. And that may well be true. For the débâcle of the League and the strong isolationist temper of the country since 1920 has made "Wilsonian"

an epithet in present day politics. However, just as nobody could study Mr. Roosevelt's New Deal without going back to its forerunner, Wilson's New Freedom, so must any survey of Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy begin with the fact that he entered the national scene as President Wilson's Assistant Secretary of the Navy. In 1920, when he ran for the Vice-Presidency, the Democratic platform called for U. S. adherence to the League of Nations. And while there are those, like Ernest K. Lindley, who declare that, after his defeat in 1920, Mr. Roosevelt "did not remain an enthusiastic pro-Leaguer,"<sup>2</sup> nevertheless, it was not until strong isolationist sentiment developed against him in his campaign for the Presidency in 1932, not until the publication of William Randolph Hearst's open letter challenging him to make clear his position on the League, that he disavowed it. A few days after the Hearst letter appeared, Mr. Roosevelt announced: "I do not favor American participation" in the League. At the same time, he sought to conciliate the Wilsonians by adding: "The League of Nations today is not the League conceived by Woodrow Wilson."<sup>3</sup> He did not succeed in allaying bitterness. "Probably no incident in his career has so deeply dismayed many of his friends as this overnight switch on the League," the *Christian Century* said.<sup>4</sup> "Franklin Delano Roosevelt," said *The Nation*,<sup>5</sup> ". . . has now gone to the nationalists and isolationists."

#### *"Isolationist" or "Internationalist"?*

To both *The Nation* and the *Christian Century*, "nationalist" and "isolationist" were bad names. To "isolationist" periodicals, they no doubt were complimentary. Mr. Roosevelt has since demonstrated, however, that his policies cannot be fitted in their entirety into either of those loose categories. In dealing with the League, particularly in the Far Eastern crisis, the President has followed the policy of international cooperation (though some might argue that he gave and sought international cooperation only in the national interest). He

<sup>2</sup> *Halfway With Roosevelt*, by Ernest K. Lindley. Viking Press, New York, 1936, p. 288.

<sup>3</sup> Speech of February 2, 1932; reprinted in *Public Papers and Messages of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol. I.

<sup>4</sup> October 5, 1932.

<sup>5</sup> February 17, 1932.



accepted the League's invitation to participate in the work of the Far Eastern Advisory Committee. Frederick L. Schuman asserts in *Europe on the Eve* that he forestalled Germany's withdrawal from the arms conference at Geneva in 1933 by his appeal for world disarmament. On May 23, 1933 he sought to meet French demands for security-before-disarmament by pledging the United States to refrain from actions that might defeat collective effort to restrain aggressor nations, and by pledging us further to engage in "consultations." Professor Schuman has said: "This statement represents the farthest point to which the United States has ever gone in the direction of international collaboration to achieve collective security." And Mr. Lindley agrees.<sup>7</sup>

### *The Prevailing Trend*

It would not be correct to give the impression that Mr. Roosevelt's actions represented any sharp reversal of American foreign policy. On the contrary: increasing participation in European affairs has characterized our foreign policy under every Administration since the first World War. "Since 1920," Morison and Commager state in their *Growth of the American Republic*, "no party has dared advocate membership in the League of Nations, but the United States has gone far toward . . . co-operation with that organization." The United States began to send unofficial observers to Geneva in 1922. In 1925 we sent an official delegate to the League conference on arms and ammunition. The Dawes Plan and the Young Plan marked our unofficial—but no less real—entanglement in European finance. And every President since Wilson—Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Roosevelt—has urged that we join the World Court.

Immediately after his election—and even before his inauguration—Mr. Roosevelt made it clear that he agreed with Herbert Hoover's policies in the field of international affairs, though he disagreed with them violently in the field of domestic economics. On January 11, 1933, he endorsed Mr. Hoover's request for power to join with other nations in placing an embargo on arms to "aggressors." On January 17, one day after Mr. Hoover's Secretary

of State, Henry L. Stimson, re-stated the doctrine whereby the United States has steadfastly refused to recognize the acquisition of territory by force in violation of international treaties, Mr. Roosevelt declared: "American policy must uphold the sanctity of international treaties." Raymond Moley has interpreted this statement as implying approval of "collective sanctions."<sup>8</sup> The analysis may be subject to some discount, for most reviewers seem to agree that Dr. Moley's book is filled with personal bitterness. Yet it finds support in many of Mr. Roosevelt's subsequent writings and speeches, and especially in his actions.

### *World Economic Conference*

The President, then, is clearly no "isolationist." Neither does the word "internationalist" completely describe him, as Mr. Roosevelt indicated during his first year in office when he scuttled the World Economic Conference, which had been approved by Mr. Hoover. The incoming President declined to link the question of debts with the question of tariff reduction, as desired by the outgoing President—and by the French and the British. He also emphasized that he would place "nationalist" ahead of "internationalist" considerations in dealing with the conference. "I favor . . . the putting of first things first," Mr. Roosevelt warned in his inaugural address. "I shall spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic readjustments, but the emergency at home cannot wait on that accomplishment." To meet the emergency at home Mr. Roosevelt pursued what has been termed "a nationalist monetary policy,"<sup>9</sup> and when that policy clashed with the World Economic Conference, he "torpedoed" the conference.

The phrase most often associated with Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy is "the Good Neighbor." It appeared first in the inaugural address of 1933; and though it has since become linked to our Latin American policy, Mr. Roosevelt clearly meant the Glittering Generality to have broader application, for he was speaking of "world policy."<sup>10</sup> He defined the "Good Neighbor" as one who respects himself, and

<sup>7</sup> *Europe on the Eve*, by Frederick L. Schuman. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1939, p. 37.

<sup>8</sup> Lindley, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> *After Seven Years*, by Raymond Moley. Harper & Bros., New York, 1939, p. 94.

<sup>10</sup> "International Aspects of Roosevelt's Monetary Policies," by Maxwell S. Stewart. *Foreign Policy Reports*.

<sup>11</sup> *Public Papers*, Vol. II.



respects the rights of others, "who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements. . . ." These, of course, are more Glittering Generalities: they do not so much define Mr. Roosevelt's policies as cover them with homely associations. Precisely what constitutes respect for "the rights of others"? The Soviet Union insists that it respects the rights of Finland, and it complains that Finland refuses to respect the rights of the Soviet Union. To Finland that sounds as though Joseph Stalin is threatening her independence. *Pravda* answers that Finland is threatening war.

Consequently, there are those who fear that Mr. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy can become an excuse for meddling, for busybodyism, and even for old-fashioned imperialism. For example, *The Nation*, which generally supports Mr. Roosevelt, has commented: "The good neighbor must be helpful, but the good neighbor is sometimes most helpful by minding his own business."<sup>11</sup>

#### "Good Neighbor" in Action

To determine just what Mr. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy is, therefore, we must examine his actions, rather than his words. During his Administration, the Marines have been withdrawn from Nicaragua and from Haiti. In 1934, part of the Platt amendment, which permitted the United States to intervene at will in Cuban affairs, was abrogated. A new treaty was negotiated with Panama in 1936, and pledges not to intervene by force were kept when Mexico and Bolivia confiscated American oil properties. Since then, reciprocal trade pacts have been signed with ten Latin American countries, and several good-will tours and conferences have been held to build up friendly relations.

Mr. Roosevelt has, moreover, steadfastly refused to act in the religious controversy in Mexico, despite continual pressure from Catholic organizations in the United States. In November, 1935, for example, he told Martin H. Carmody, Supreme Knight of the Knights of Columbus, that "rights enjoyed by Mexican citizens living in Mexico" were "direct concerns of the Mexican government," in which "it has been the policy of this Administration to refrain from intervening."<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> October 14, 1939.

However, there have been inconsistencies. On September 10, 1933, Grau San Martin became President of Cuba. He immediately made himself unpopular with American sugar interests by establishing an eight-hour day, and by raising wages in the sugar fields. He antagonized American utility interests by ordering the Cuban Electric Company to slash its rates. He clashed with American banking interests by refusing to recognize an \$80,000,000 loan made to former President Machado." Despite the "Good Neighbor" policy, the United States refused to recognize Grau, even though, without recognition, he managed to hold office until January 15, 1934. Grau charged that our Ambassador to Cuba, Sumner Welles, actually held "communication and dealings with the enemies of the Government," and especially with those who took part in the ABC uprising against him in November, 1933.

#### "Neutrality" and Four Wars

On the surface, at least, Mr. Roosevelt's policies in respect to Europe and the Far East have seemed even more inconsistent. Our first Neutrality Act was passed in 1935, while the League of Nations was attempting to enforce sanctions against Italy, to punish it for invading Ethiopia, and, if possible, to check the invasion. Mr. Roosevelt helped to push it through Congress, and signed it. Although the embargo seemed to apply to Ethiopia as well as Italy, the former was actually unaffected, for it was unable to purchase arms here anyway. The United States, therefore, was in reality, if not in theory, co-operating with the League to check aggression by punishing the aggressor.

In 1936, civil war broke out in Spain. Our Neutrality Act made no provision either for civil war or for rebellion. Under it, the Loyalist government was permitted to purchase arms in the United States. In Europe, the Powers had adopted the policy of non-intervention, ostensibly to isolate the war and to prevent it from spreading. Mr. Roosevelt followed their lead by pushing through Congress another Neutrality Act, one that applied to Spain. Here again, in fact if not in theory,

<sup>12</sup> *Public Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 450.

<sup>13</sup> "The Cuban Revolution: Reform and Reaction," by Charles A. Thomson. *Foreign Policy Reports*.



Mr. Roosevelt was co-operating with the European Powers. The result of his co-operation now was to hurt not the aggressor but the government attacked. For the second Neutrality Act, like non-intervention, clearly helped the Nationalists, who could buy arms from Germany and Italy anyway. Yet, the Nationalists, supported by the Germans and Italians, were just as clearly the aggressors.

Japan's invasion of China muddled things even further. Mr. Roosevelt obviously felt strongly about that war. It was on the day of the Far Eastern Advisory Committee's meeting at Geneva to decide what attitude the League of Nations should adopt that he delivered his now-famous Chicago address,<sup>14</sup> with its denunciation of "violations of treaties and . . . ignorings of humane instincts." After learning of the speech, the Committee voted unanimously to condemn Japan, expressing moral support for China. "The Committee acted more strongly than leading members expected," Clarence K. Streit cabled the *New York Times*.<sup>15</sup> "The reason is Franklin D. Roosevelt." Nor did the President rely on words alone to help the Chinese. He refused to invoke the Neutrality Act, because that would have given assistance to Japan. In addition, his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, requested arms manufacturers not to sell to Nippon, and steps have been taken since to discontinue our trade pact with that country.

#### *The War in Europe*

Mr. Roosevelt didn't hesitate to invoke the Neutrality Act when the present war broke out in Europe. The embargo was declared at once. However, it was quite evident that our embargo was, in effect, helping Germany and hurting the Allies, for the British Navy quickly swept German shipping from the seas, and even if there were no embargo Germany couldn't buy here, whereas the Allies could. On September 21, Mr. Roosevelt asked the Congress to reassemble in extraordinary session to repeal the embargo and enact his cash-and-carry plan. This Congress has done.

What is the President driving at? Those critics of his Administration who like to gibe at his inconsistencies (and there have been

many such inconsistencies, both in domestic and foreign affairs) might say that Mr. Roosevelt is simply an opportunist, who shifts and veers with the political winds. They might thus explain his switch on the League in 1932, pointing out that Mr. Roosevelt made other compromises with Mr. Hearst in that campaign, as when he agreed to John Garner's nomination as Vice-President, thereby gaining Mr. Hearst's support for his own nomination as President. On the other hand, New Deal partisans could answer that Mr. Roosevelt's statement, "The League of Nations today is not the League conceived by Woodrow Wilson," simply cannot be contested. They might say further that belief in co-operation with other nations does not presuppose belief in American membership in the League.

#### *Mr. Roosevelt and Spain*

Those critics who contend that our foreign policy is made at 10 Downing Street, London, might say that Mr. Roosevelt's apparent inconsistency on Ethiopia and Spain arose from the fact that he was following the lead of the British Foreign Office. However, all the facts are not yet known. Washington columnists have reported that Mr. Roosevelt was misled by members of the State Department in the early days of the Spanish civil war into believing that General Franco would quickly overthrow the Loyalists no matter what the United States did, and that it therefore wouldn't be worth while to irritate the European Powers. It has also been reported that when Mr. Roosevelt later changed his mind he was prevented from acting by strong Catholic pressure, especially by the arguments of His Eminence the late Cardinal Mundelein, an enthusiastic New Dealer in whom the President had great confidence.

Possibly the best explanation is that Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policies are consistent in his own mind, but that he cannot *follow* them consistently because of the necessity of compromise — with political necessity, with the exigencies of America's domestic crisis, and with pressure from his own political advisers. For in all his speeches on foreign affairs can be detected certain basic ideas: Mr. Roosevelt believes that war anywhere will inevitably affect the United States; he believes that Germany, Italy, and Japan are the war-makers,

<sup>14</sup> October 5, 1937.

<sup>15</sup> October 6, 1937.



that England and France are peace-loving nations; he concludes that America can stay at peace only by co-operating with England and France in checking the war-makers; and this, he seems to believe, can be done by economic measures, by measures "short of war." True, Mr. Roosevelt has never stated these ideas quite so bluntly as that; however, speaking in Chicago in October, 1937 he did come pretty close. It was in this speech that he used the word "quarantine." He compared the unrest and turmoil in the world today with an epidemic of physical disease, arguing that peace-loving nations could protect themselves only by isolating the unrest — by quarantining the aggressor — just as communities isolate the disease by quarantining those infected. Mr. Roosevelt's analogy between an epidemic of physical disease and international turmoil was indeed colorful, but like many, if not most, analogies, it could only be described as Card-stacking. Using precisely the same analogy, Mr. Roosevelt's opponents have answered that he wants the United States to play doctor, with all the risk of infection entailed.

As late as September 3 of this year, with the war in Europe already under way, the President expressed the hope that it could be stopped by collective action.

#### *Public Opinion Is Barrier*

If this is Mr. Roosevelt's policy, then some of the reasons for his inability to follow it with any degree of consistency become self-evident. To begin with, most of the other nations of the world are not ready for it yet, if they ever will be. The Soviet Union found that out when it started to preach "collective security." The American people show no eagerness for it, either. Deeply rooted in the minds of millions of Americans is the conviction that participation in European affairs will lead to war. George Washington's admonition has never been forgotten; indeed, few words are so widely quoted, and so deeply respected. Throughout his Administration, therefore, Mr. Roosevelt has been fighting an uphill battle with public opinion — the same uphill battle that every Administration has fought since, Woodrow Wilson came back from Paris to find the Congress and the people against him. Unlike Wilson, Mr. Roosevelt has moved slowly, carefully, making an occasional retreat,

meeting an occasional defeat, as when the Congress at its last session refused to lift the embargo, only to reverse itself when it met again in extraordinary session.

It has been Mr. Roosevelt's object to bring the American people around to his way of thinking — to propagandize them, if you will. And to his job the President has brought several unquestionable talents. Not the least of these are his voice and his command of the language. True, ghost-writers help in the preparation of most of his speeches, but they agree that Mr. Roosevelt himself polishes them up. Perhaps they are only showing respect for his office when they say that; however, the speeches all bear the stamp of Mr. Roosevelt's personality; they bristle with the same rhetorical devices.

His voice is considered ideal for radio by people in the business. It goes over the air full-bodied, and without distortion. He speaks without regional accent; his pronunciation is always the generally accepted one.

#### *"Man of the People"*

In this age of radio, when the propagandist can speak directly to millions of people as though he were in their own homes, the importance of voice and diction can hardly be overestimated. Logically, the fact that Mr. Roosevelt does not speak in the stilted, toneless way that Mr. Hoover speaks, or with the Midwest accent of Alfred M. Landon, should not make his arguments more effective; but it does. Nor should it make any difference that his accent is heard everywhere, whereas the accent of Alfred E. Smith is strange to all but New York ears. Again, the reality is that it does. Mr. Landon's backers, realizing this, made him take voice lessons when he was running against Mr. Roosevelt in 1936. More recently, District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey, of New York, has taken voice lessons, too.

If Mr. Roosevelt has undoubted talents in the field of propaganda, he also has — or rather had — one great handicap. That is his background. The Delanos and the Roosevelts are both old American families — aristocracy, if there is any such thing in the United States. Hyde Park, the family home, is anything but the log cabin where Presidents traditionally are born. Mr. Roosevelt didn't get his educa-



tion in the little red schoolhouse, either: he went to Groton, the swankiest preparatory school in the country, and later to Harvard. Nor did he work his way through college by mowing lawns.

Mr. Roosevelt, in short, did not start out as the American voter's idea of "just plain folks." He didn't fit into the stereotype, "man of the people." Study of Mr. Roosevelt's speeches indicates that he realizes this, and that he makes definite attempts to overcome it. His radio talks are called "fireside chats." The very name is the Plain Folks device at work, for it conjures up the picture of the President of the United States sitting in your parlor with you and your family, talking as one American citizen to another, discussing the problems that face us all.

#### *"I Have Seen War"*

Mr. Roosevelt, moreover, personalizes issues. He does not speak of war academically, but as you or your next-door neighbor might. "I hate war," he says. "I have seen war."<sup>18</sup> He attempts to dispel fear of some of his policies by telling his radio listeners of his personal habits, by saying that he eats scrambled eggs for breakfast, just like many another American.<sup>19</sup> Often he reiterates the phrase: "You and I both know . . ." or "You know that I . . ."

These, of course, are superficialities, but in politics superficialities can sometimes be important. Woodrow Wilson also didn't fit into the stereotype, "just plain folks." He was the college professor in politics. The cartoonists and editorial writers portrayed him — as they were later to portray the brain trusters — as idealistic, bookish, impractical: the absent-minded professor who sat down to no-limit poker with some of the slickest card sharps in the world, and who couldn't even shuffle. Many Americans never felt quite comfortable about Woodrow Wilson. The papers never ran pictures of him eating hot dogs or carving turkey. He didn't address the American people as "My friends . . ." Mrs. Wilson never told, as Eleanor Roosevelt does, what the President had for breakfast, and how the President laughed at Mickey Mouse last night.

If Mr. Roosevelt has achieved some degree

of success in breaking down the isolationist temper of the country, however — and the passage of cash-and-carry so indicates — the reasons are far more basic than his skill on the radio, or the fact that he likes scrambled eggs. In part, those reasons can be found in what has been happening in Europe since 1933; Adolf Hitler's actions have made his name anathema in the United States as propaganda never could have done, and hatred for National Socialism has no doubt led many Americans to conclude that "We should do something about it." Still, Mr. Roosevelt's propaganda is also responsible in part, for Mr. Roosevelt has done much to convince the American people of the wisdom of that conclusion.

#### *Name-calling by Implication*

The picture of the world that Mr. Roosevelt draws in all his speeches is black and white — on the one side, the aggressors; on the other, the peace-loving nations. The forces of evil comprise 10 per cent of the peoples of the world; the forces of good comprise 90 per cent. The aggressor nations are irreligious, anti-democratic, immoral. The peace-loving nations are religious, moral: they are democracies.

Again, Mr. Roosevelt does not put it quite that bluntly. In his fireside chats on domestic issues he never has been averse to Name-calling. Indeed, many of his bad names have become part of the daily language of politics: money changer, economic royalist, Tory, copperhead. In time of peace, however, the language of diplomacy is formal and correct; and Name-calling would, therefore, be almost certain to create strained relations. True, Mr. Roosevelt has spoken of Germany, Italy and Japan as nations "dominated by the twin spirits of autocracy and aggression."<sup>20</sup> However, that is not his usual practice. Usually, he calls names by implication. When he speaks of the democracies as peace-loving nations, he implies that Germany, Italy and Japan are war-makers. "Do we really have to assume that nations can find no better ways of realizing their destinies than those which were used by the Huns and the Vandals fifteen hundred years ago?"<sup>21</sup> he asked in his Pan American Day

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, his speech of September 3, 1939.

<sup>19</sup> See *Time Magazine*, December 12, 1938.

<sup>20</sup> "Annual Message to Congress, 1936." *Public Papers*, Vol. V, pps. 10, 11.

<sup>21</sup> See *New York Times*, April 15, 1939.



address this spring. At his words, the clock turned back to 1917, when "Hun" and "German" were synonymous in the United States.

The President rarely mentions Germany, Italy and Japan by name. However, when he denounces the violation of treaties as deceitful, nobody can mistake his meaning. He means that Germany, Italy and Japan are deceitful. When he denounces attacks upon smaller countries as immoral, he means that Germany, Italy and Japan are immoral.

Germany's answer is more Name-calling. The Versailles Treaty itself was immoral, the German propagandists retort. Adolf Hitler, in violating it, merely has rectified an injustice, they say.

#### *No War in Americas?*

Mr. Roosevelt's constant denunciations of the "10 per cent" who instigate war, contrasting them with the "90 per cent" who seek peace,<sup>20</sup> has — again by implication — clothed the enemies of the Axis with the Glittering Generality, "peace-loving nations." His veiled denunciation of Germany on September 8, 1939, coupled with his assertion that Americans may remain neutral in act, but they cannot remain neutral in thought, was another implied generality: the President, in effect, was saying that England and France had gone to war in the cause of international justice.

Mr. Roosevelt's attempts to identify dictatorship with treaty-breaking and democracy with peace led him in 1936 to still another Glittering Generality. Democracy, said the President, is "our faith of the Western World." Since Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia and Chile are the only countries below the Rio Grande that might, by even the loosest use of the word, be called democratic, the generality hardly seems justifiable. Much the same can be said of Mr. Roosevelt's Pan American Day address, in which he declared that "For upwards of half a century the republics of the Western World have been working together to promote their common civilization under a system of peace. . . . The American family is today a great co-operative group facing a troubled world in serenity and calm." A Nazi communiqué answered this statement with the words: "How can a head of a State repeat such nonsense? The more since the United States

alone in the past forty years has undertaken and carried out sixteen war-like invasions of Latin American countries."

#### *Democracies and Aggression*

Of course, the actuality is that no country is perfect: no country is all black, and none is all white. The black and white picture of the world that Mr. Roosevelt draws through his Name-calling and his Glittering Generalities simply does not exist. The democracies, too, have invaded smaller countries, violated treaties, broken agreements. Moreover, any description of the events of the past few years that overlooks the part that England, France, and even the United States have played in the aggression of Germany, Italy and Japan can only be described as Card-stacking. It was only in 1931 that Sir John Simon defended Japan's invasion of China, and so able was his defense that it brought praise and thanks from the Japanese Ambassador to Geneva. Mr. Roosevelt, in his Chicago address, castigated nations which carry on undeclared wars against smaller nations, and which destroy shipping with "pirate submarines." He was referring obviously to Germany and Italy, and their war against the Spanish Loyalists. However, the non-intervention policy, created by England and France, aided Germany and Italy, not only by shutting off supplies from the Loyalists, but also by hiding the intervention from the peoples of the world. Mr. Roosevelt, himself, did the same, by supporting and signing the second Neutrality Act.

Mr. Roosevelt's black and white picture of the world, useful though it may be for the purposes of propaganda, also overlooks the fact that most of the conflicts that disrupt Europe today were foreseen many years ago, when the ink was not yet dry on the Treaty of Versailles, and by people who did not know of the existence of the Austrian ex-corporal Adolf Hitler or the Italian journalist Mussolini. Literally hundreds of Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen and Germans — from John Maynard Keynes, the economist, to Herbert Hoover — predicted that endless trouble would result from Versailles: Austria, Sudetenland, the Corridor — all, it was pointed out, would some day become powder kegs.

<sup>20</sup> See New York Times, October 6, 1937.

<sup>21</sup> Public Papers, Vol. V, p. 604.



This does not mean that Adolf Hitler is justified in excusing his aggression by shouting "Versailles!" It does, however, indicate that basic economic, political, geographic and cultural dislocations are more responsible for Europe's recurrent wars than are bad men, whose name today may be Hitler or Mussolini, whose name yesterday was Hohenzollern or Hapsburg, whose name the day before was Napoleon or Frederick the Great. To overlook those dislocations, while blaming war on the "10 per cent" is Card-stacking, for it means disregarding relevant, if not the most relevant, facts.

#### *Fears of the Isolationists*

As might be expected, those who believe that entanglement in European affairs will increase the danger of war have greeted Mr. Roosevelt's speeches on foreign affairs with fear and suspicion. That Mr. Roosevelt is aware of this is evidenced by his constant assurances that he does not want to drag the United States into war, his constant denunciations of those who charge — or even suggest the possibility — that his policies are based upon considerations other than an honest, intense desire to keep this country at peace.<sup>22</sup> His policies, he insists, are policies "short of war." He reiterates: "I hate war."

He attempts to convince the American people that isolation no longer is possible because the world has become too small and too interdependent. At the same time, he assuages their fear that measures short of war may lead to war by sugar-coating his policies with the word "neutrality."

Let's see what the dictionary says about the word:<sup>23</sup>

The state or condition of being neutral or of being unengaged in disputes or contests between others; the state of taking no part on either side; in international law, that condition of a nation or state in which it does not take part directly or indirectly in a war between other states.

Our first Neutrality Act helped Ethiopia: whatever Mr. Roosevelt's intentions may have been, the United States took sides. Our second Neutrality Act helped the Spanish Nationalists: from the standpoint of the Loyalists, it

was definitely unneutral. When the present war broke out in Europe and the Neutrality Act was again invoked, the effect was quite definitely to help the Reich. It might be said, of course, that *Webster's* definition is too academic, that from the practical standpoint neutrality means only non-participation in war. However, Mr. Roosevelt himself, recognizes the validity of the definition, for in his message to Congress of September 21 he argued for repeal of the embargo by saying that it was helping Germany. Mr. Roosevelt argued that repeal would make for "real and traditional neutrality." Yet repeal will definitely help the Allies, just as the Act itself helped the Reich.

Incidentally, the new cash-and-carry plan is called "The Neutrality Act of 1939."

#### *Democracy and Religion*

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Mr. Roosevelt's propaganda for collective action with the democracies to halt war has been his use of the Transfer device to clothe democracy with the sanctity of religion. In the course of the address in which he called democracy "our faith of the Western World," for example, he warned that we could not make this faith complete unless we affirmed "our faith in God," adding: "Periodic attempts to deny God have always come to naught." In his message to Congress on January 4, 1939, he said that foreign tumults directly menaced "three institutions indispensable to Americans." Of these, he said, "the first is religion . . . the source of the other two — democracy and international good faith."

If religion is the source of democracy, then how explain the support that Catholic prelates gave to Francisco Franco, who fought to bring fascism to Spain? How explain the legislation to suppress civil liberties in the Province of Quebec, sponsored by leading Catholic dignitaries there? Mr. Roosevelt, moreover, is not alone in believing that his cause — the cause of democracy — is the cause of God. All nations, with the exception of the Soviet Union, do the same. "Gott mit uns," and "Gott strafe England," said the Germans in 1917. And from

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, his message to the Herald Tribune Forum, reprinted in the New York *Herald Tribune*, October 31, 1939.

<sup>23</sup> *Webster's Universal Dictionary*, The World Syndicate Publishing Co., New York, 1937.



pulpits throughout America came denunciations of the Kaiser as the "anti-Christ."

As the Rev. Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick has said:

Of all the ways for Christians to make a war seem holy, the simplest way is to get Jesus into it. The psychologists call that rationalization. Of course, we use Jesus. We elect Him chairman of our board of sponsors. We send Him to war. He cannot help it. He cannot speak against it. He died on Calvary long ago.

### *Spy Trials and Propaganda*

On several occasions, it has been pointed out that acts, too, can be propaganda. The Soviet demonstration trials, at which self-confessed traitors, spies, and counter-revolutionists tell in detail of their alleged crimes, and weep in shame for them, are one example: the defendants are brought into open court only to show the world, and especially the people of the Soviet Union, why Joseph Stalin must act this way or that. In American history there is the Boston Tea Party, which dramatized the cry of the Colonists: "No taxation without representation!"

Similarly, Mr. Roosevelt has dramatized the alleged threat of the aggressor nations to American security by launching the Department of Justice upon an intensive search for spies. Thus far the spy-hunt has inspired private spy-hunts all over the country, the deputization of thousands of amateur detectives, the posting of \$500 rewards in New York City and the Midwest by private individuals. So far as can be learned, no spies have been uncovered. The one result was the indictment of Earl Browder, Communist Party leader, on evidence uncovered by the Criminal Alien squad of the New York Police Department.

Some time ago the Federal Government put several German spies on trial — again to show the alleged menace of foreign espionage. The Germans, however, were small-fry; their activi-

ties were admittedly unimportant. To build up its case, the Government therefore indicted several high German officials, too. Of course, these officials were some 5,000 miles away from the court house when the spy trial began. They made no defense. The court didn't bother with them. Consequently, their indictment served only the purpose of making the spy trial seem more important than it otherwise would have seemed.

### *Opponents Do the Same*

Now it may be that foreign spies *do* menace the United States. No one can say for certain, because little information has yet been made public. It may be that propagandists for Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy exaggerate the danger. Perhaps his opponents underestimate it. Unfortunately, propagandists are not so much concerned with studying all sides as with getting their own side across. This is true of Mr. Roosevelt. It also is true of those who denounce his policies. His opponents, too, call names, and speak in Glittering Generalities, and stack the cards. The impact of George Washington's "Farewell Address" upon American thinking has already been mentioned. It should not be forgotten, however, that propagandists who quote George Washington are using the Testimonial device, the same device that advertising writers use when they quote baseball players in cigarette ads.

The intelligent citizen, therefore, must get behind the slogans and propaganda devices to study the basic problems involved — problems of national defense and economic well-being — political, cultural, psychological, and sociological problems that have been developing for many years. The propagandists will attempt to compress these many problems into two or three catch-phrases, whether they be propagandizing for or against Mr. Roosevelt's policies. The citizen must determine what lies back of these phrases and why.



# Propaganda Analysis Worksheet

THE debate over the embargo has brought into focus the varied pressures which have operated to shape American foreign policy for twenty-five years. The issues rush across the American scene in words and phrases which recall rather than review the earlier battles. Franklin D. Roosevelt's phrase "citadels for democracy and civilization" recalls the "too proud to fight" concept of the Wilsonian era. "They want our money and our sons," resounding from many local rostrums, recalls the disillusion of the post-war, debt-defaulting period. Henry Ford's "This so-called war is nothing but about 25 people and propaganda," has meaning to a public which had been educated in post-war skepticism. "Blood-soaked dollars" recalls the profiteering phases of our last war experience. The reference most frequently made is to "other people's wars," which repeats our Versailles discovery that the war aims of the Allied Powers were realistic and political, not merely altruistic and humanitarian.

Three features seem to emerge from the debate in Congress:

1. The confusion of meanings of the words used in the discussions. The word *neutrality* particularly seems to need to be defined; it has come to have many meanings, some of which seem to be contradictory. This word ranges in definition from complete impartiality between belligerents to a conscious policy of helping one nation against another when our national policy demands such action. *Isolation*, *contraband*, *embargo*, and the concept of "freedom of the seas" have caused confusion by remaining undefined.
2. The difficulty of seeing the whole and complex problem of our foreign relations with Europe, Latin America and Asia in the light of a world working toward universal literacy, machine production, and scientific practices in health and population control.
3. The loss of historical perspective because of the drama of war and the aroused emotions of peoples.

Running through the whole story of the foreign policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt is the increasing interest of Congress in foreign

relations. The age-old questions of government arise again. Is a deliberate, representative assembly fitted to manage the delicate problems of foreign relations? If the assembly is not fitted, must greater power be granted to the executive?

## I. INDIVIDUAL WORK PROJECTS

### *What Influenced Our Thoughts?*

The Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association has recently issued a pamphlet *American Education and the War in Europe*, from which the following paragraph is quoted:

We believe that it would be instructive and helpful if the experience of American education with reference to a similar situation 25 years ago were systematically studied and analyzed. We recommend that some competent research agency survey the literature and evidence for the years 1914-17 and makes its conclusions available to the teaching profession and to the general public.<sup>24</sup>

Probably no group of Americans is better equipped to undertake the task of outlining such an investigation than the readers of PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS. *If each reader who lived through these years will list the influences which shaped his attitudes toward the World War of 1914-17 and send this list to the Institute, a body of materials can be assembled which will form the foundation of such a study.* Younger readers who did not live through these years can interview older friends in the community who were influential in helping to form public opinion in the community during the pre-war years.

1. What books did you read during these years, 1914-17 which helped form your war attitudes?
2. Did the newspaper which you read have an editorial policy with which you agreed?
3. What movies influenced your attitudes?
4. Did you hear speeches made by visiting lecturers from foreign countries?
5. Did you yourself make speeches or write articles or otherwise take part in the shap-

<sup>24</sup> Educational Policies Commission, *American Education and the War in Europe*, National Education Association, Washington, 1939.



ing of public opinion in your community or state?

6. What generalizations did you reach about the justice of the respective causes?
7. Was there any citizen in the community who consistently opposed the entrance of the United States into the war? What was his background and what were his sources of reading and information?

## II. GROUP DISCUSSION

### *Factors in Our Environments*

Most Americans are members of various groups. For example, "John Jones is: (1) a man; (2) a farmer (3) of wheat in (4) Nebraska; (5) he is in favor of the soil conservation program; (6) he is a so-called New Deal Democrat; (7) he is a member of the Methodist Church; (8) he is a member of the Grange; (9) he is father of five children, all of whom are attending public school; and so on ad infinitum."<sup>25</sup>

When a conflict appears in American life, each group considers its own interests, and the citizen frequently reaches a decision as the result of conflicting group pressures. What pressures from other groups in your community have influenced the members of your group to take action in favor of the retention or repeal of the present embargo? Consider:

1. Have veteran groups announced any stand on the issue?
2. Have church groups discussed the issue? Have the church programs stressed different issues from the programs of other groups?
3. What has been the attitude of business groups? Of farm groups? Of labor groups?
4. What arguments are heard most frequently in your group discussions? Are these same arguments used by any organized group in your community? Are the members of your group who use these arguments members of other groups?
5. What changes in opinion in group programs can you detect since September 1, 1939?

<sup>25</sup> Violet Edwards, *Group Leader's Guide to Propaganda Analysis*. Institute for Propaganda Analysis, New York, 1938, p. 51.

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# Propaganda Analysis

*A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda*

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

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## Who Started the War?

IT WOULD be naïve to suppose that the British and German governments in issuing, respectively, a Blue Book and a White Book on the present war are merely concerned with serving the needs of the scholar and the historian. It is true that at first sight they seem a mere compilation of documents. The Blue Book, issued by His Majesty's Stationery Office, is entitled simply *Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities Between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939*. The White Book, issued by the Reichsdruckerei, or Government Printing Office, in Berlin, bears as objective and restrained a title: *Documents Concerning the Last Phase of the German-Polish Crisis*. At first sight one would take neither for propaganda. But when one begins to examine them one finds that they neither contain, nor purport to contain, *all* the documents bearing on the outbreak of the war, but a selection. In each case the selection was made by one of the warring powers, hardly an impartial judge. In each case the selection was made to support a thesis. The German thesis is that the British were to blame for the war; the British thesis, that the guilt lies in Berlin. Neither government sought merely to place at the disposal of students and observers documents from which a considered judgment might be reached. Each sought rather to present documents which — in the opinion of the governments concerned — could lead but to one conclusion. Thus, each volume must be analyzed as propaganda. Each is an example of the propaganda technique the Institute has termed Card-stacking.

The key to the British Blue Book may be found in Document No. 105. This is the text of the speech made by Prime Minister Chamberlain before the Commons on September 1. In it Mr. Chamberlain said, "Now that all the *relevant* documents are being made public we shall stand at the bar of history knowing that the responsibility for this terrible catastrophe lies on the shoulders of one man — the German Chancellor, who has not hesitated to plunge the world into misery in order to serve his own senseless ambitions." The italics are ours. They serve to emphasize the most important word — from the standpoint of propaganda analysis — in this statement. The Prime Minister was the judge of what documents were *relevant*, and the Blue Book must be read in the light of the possibility that His Majesty's Government only thought those documents relevant which tended to prove what it wanted to prove. Some people believe that Germany would not have dared attack Poland if there had been an Anglo-Russian alliance. People of this mind would consider documents on the negotiations for this alliance, documents explaining the failure to bring it about, as relevant. None of these documents are in the Blue Book. Some people believe that Britain's interminable negotiations over the cash loan so desperately needed by Poland for her defense encouraged the Germans to believe that Mr. Chamberlain did not really intend to give Poland aid if the Reich attacked her. No documents throwing light on these negotiations appear in the Blue Book. Others, looking further back, consider that the



aid, active or passive, given to the Nazis by sections of the British Tories, must be taken into account in deciding the problem of war guilt. Documents of this kind — bearing on the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the seizure of Austria, the attack on Czechoslovakia, and Spanish “non-intervention” — are also omitted. It may be, of course, that publication of the Russian documents would disturb possible attempts at a new rapprochement between London and Moscow, that these and other documents will be published later. The point to be kept in mind is that the Blue Book contains the documents Mr. Chamberlain considers relevant, and that these “relevant” documents place the responsibility for the war “on the shoulders of one man — the German Chancellor. . . .”

#### *Germans Do the Same*

The German White Book is equally as anxious to stack the cards against Britain. The key to the White Book lies in Document No. 25 of that volume. It is the memorandum presented to the British Ambassador by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs at 11:30 A.M. on September 3, 1939, fifteen minutes after the German Chargé d’Affaires in London had been handed the British declaration of war. It is a lengthy document, and could hardly have been prepared in the fifteen minutes that elapsed. If the British Blue Book seeks to place responsibility on the shoulders of one man, the White Book seeks to place it on the British government. Three claims are set forth. The first is that while the National Socialist regime had sought since 1933 to revise the Versailles treaty “by way of peaceful negotiations,” “the British government . . . by their intransigent attitude have frustrated any practical revision.” The second is that Germany was the aggrieved rather than the aggressor in the dispute with Poland. Again, Britain is blamed. “The British government — an unprecedented occurrence in history — has given Poland full power with regard to any action against Germany which she might intend to undertake. The British government gave the Polish government the assurance of their military support in any circumstances, in case Germany should commence hostilities in reply to any provocation or attack. Thereupon Polish acts of terror against Germans domiciled in

the districts torn from Germany immediately assumed intolerable proportions. . . . The Free City of Danzig . . . was first threatened with economic ruin . . . and finally encircled by military forces.” The British, the Nazis continued, might have used “their great influence in Warsaw to exhort those in authority to conform to the laws of justice and humanity.” The British government “did not see fit to do anything of the kind.” Instead “by constantly stressing the fact of their duty to assist Poland under all circumstances, they clearly encouraged Poland to continue in her criminal attitude which was endangering the peace of Europe.” In the words of the White Book, the British gave Poland “a blank cheque.”

The third claim made by the Nazis is that the British were responsible for continuance of the war after it started by turning down a final peace offer made by Mussolini on September 2, “although the Reich government had expressed their readiness to accept such proposal.” Document No. 25 of the White Book concludes that “The British government are thus responsible for all the misery and suffering that has overtaken now, or is about to overtake, so many peoples.”

#### *More Effective in Europe*

In certain respects both the Blue Book and the White Book seem poor propaganda when read in the United States. Neither can be understood outside its frame of reference. In this country, where public opinion has been generally hostile to “appeasement,” it will be wondered why so many documents were included in the Blue Book which show Mr. Chamberlain prepared to “meet the Germans halfway” on Poland as he met them “halfway” on Czechoslovakia. Inclusion of these documents can be understood only in the light of Mr. Chamberlain’s conviction that the attempt at “appeasement” was justified. The Blue Book attempts to show that, despite the willingness of the British to compromise and appease, Hitler insisted on fighting. To persons who have always opposed the policy of appeasement, the Blue Book reveals that Mr. Chamberlain was still trying to find some “honorable” way to appease Hitler on Poland, and therefore appears to be a condemnation. But read in Great Britain by persons who have always favored the policy of appeasement, the



Blue Book must be all the more impressive because it shows how hard the Chamberlain government sought to placate Hitler by giving him part of what he wanted in Poland, as Munich gave him part of what he wanted in Czechoslovakia.

On the other hand, to those who have been strongly anti-Hitler and opposed to appeasement, the German White Book will seem better pro-British propaganda than the British Blue Book. The German White Book can best be understood if one remembers that it was prepared primarily for domestic consumption and in accordance with Hitler's own ideas of what constitutes good propaganda. Hitler's propaganda methods spring in part from his admiration for Allied propaganda in the last war and for American advertising. From the first he drew the conclusion that good propaganda should never seek to be "fair." "It was fundamentally wrong," he wrote in *Mein Kampf*,<sup>3</sup> "to discuss the war guilt from the point of view that not Germany alone could be held responsible for the outbreak of this catastrophe, but it would have been far better to burden the enemy entirely with this guilt, even if this had not been in accordance with the real facts." He felt that in "introducing the German<sup>2</sup> as a barbarian and a Hun" the "war propaganda of the British and the Americans was psychologically right."<sup>4</sup> It hardly needs to be explained that Hitler did not think the Allies were right in picturing the Germans as barbarians and Huns. But he did feel that good propaganda must be simple and brutal, never "objective." Hitler drew a similar moral from advertising. "What would one say," he asked, "about a poster, for instance,

which was to advertise a new soap, and which nevertheless describes other soaps as also being 'good'? . . . Exactly the same is the case with political advertising."

It was easy enough for the Allies to call the Germans barbarians and Huns under wartime conditions with their press controlled and censored. And it is easy enough for the White Book to make the German public, fed for six years by a government-controlled press and radio, accept at face value talk of British "encirclement" and Polish "atrocities." But the same statements translated and sent abroad in foreign editions of the White Book make an entirely different impression on the public in countries which have, or had until last September, a free press and means of obtaining fairly accurate information with which to check conflicting propaganda statements. Read by the average German within the Reich the White Book is effective pro-Nazi propaganda. Read outside the Reich, particularly by those who are anti-Nazi, the White Book is as effectively anti-Nazi propaganda. Lord MacMillan, head of the British Ministry of Information, understood the principal involved when he said: "Hitler is our best propagandist."<sup>4</sup>

#### *Germans Will Credit It*

Thus, the German claim that the Nazis have sought revision of the Versailles treaty "by way of peaceful negotiations" strikes a responsive chord in the Reich where Nazi propaganda has played on Hitler's success in the past in achieving his objectives "without war." But read outside the Reich and countries like Italy and Russia, whose press now reflects the German viewpoint, this will seem a caricature of the truth. The threat of war, the mobilization of armies, and military occupation marked the annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Memel in a way that makes talk of "peaceful negotiations" seem less than half-truth. The claim that "the British government . . . by their intransigent attitude have frustrated any

<sup>3</sup> Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* [New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939], p. 236.

<sup>2</sup> The Kaiser seems to have provided Allied propagandists with this cue. In sending German Marines to China in 1900 after the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in which German missionaries were killed, the Kaiser said, "You are about to meet a crafty, well-armed, cruel foe. . . . Give no quarter. Take no prisoners. Kill him, when he falls into your hands. Even as, a thousand years ago, the Huns under their King Attila made such a name for themselves as resounds in terror through legend and fable, so may the name of German resound through Chinese history a thousand years from now. . . ." (J. A. Spender, *Fifty Years of Europe* [Philadelphia: Frederick A. Stokes, 1933], p. 203).

<sup>4</sup> Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, p. 234.

<sup>4</sup> It is significant that far from being afraid of the propaganda effect of the claims made in Document No. 25 of the German White Book, the British had already reprinted it in full as Document No. 119 of their Blue Book, which appeared several weeks before the White Book. Lord MacMillan's remark may also explain why so much of the British Blue Book is made up of speeches by Hitler.



practical revision" will strike even more oddly on American ears. For here the present British government is associated not with intransigence, but with "appeasement."

Much the same must be true of the three documents — Nos. 20, 21 and 22 — reprinted in the White Book to bear out the Nazi claim that the British, by turning down Mussolini's last-minute peace offer when the Reich was prepared to accept it, "are . . . responsible for all the misery and suffering that has overtaken now, or is about to overtake, so many peoples." One purpose of these documents seems to be to show the German public that, even after the Nazi armies had invaded Poland, Hitler was prepared for a truce and a conference, and to be further evidence of Der Fuehrer's "magnanimity." But the Italian offer involved "an armistice, leaving the armies where they now are," and the German armies were already well advanced into Poland. Even the Italian communiqué said that it would result in a settlement "favorable to Germany." Only a public fed on Nazi propaganda about Polish atrocities could feel that Germany's readiness to accept it was magnanimous.

#### *Dividing the Allies*

It may be noted in passing that the Italian peace incident, as presented in the German White Book, seems to have another propaganda purpose. It seems to be part of the German campaign, noted by almost all the correspondents, to divide the French and the British, and to put the onus for continuing the war on the latter. Document No. 20 of the White Book ends with the significant line, "This idea" (i.e. the idea of "an armistice, leaving the armies where they now are") "which originated with the Duce, is today particularly advocated by France." Document No. 21, a short communiqué issued by the official French news agency Havas on September 2, reads: "The French government, as well as several other governments, have been informed of an Italian proposal for a settlement of the European difficulties. After discussing the proposal the French government gave a reply in the affirmative." The British Blue Book is far from clearing up the whole story of this last-minute peace effort. Was there really a disagreement between France and Britain? Would that explain the delay in the British

and French declarations of war? Perhaps the French will yet issue a Yellow Book on the subject.<sup>5</sup>

It is when we come to the German claim that the British gave the Poles "a blank cheque" and thus blocked a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish dispute that the orientation of the Blue Book becomes clear. The British could afford to reprint most of the White Book documents in the Blue Book, and did. But the Germans could not afford to circulate the Blue Book documents within the Reich. The Blue Book's opening section, quoting Hitler's past pledges on Poland, are too inconsistent with the press campaign the Germans opened against Poland after Prague. But even more damaging to a German reader would be the documents which show that the British did not give the Poles "a blank cheque." These documents show that Mr. Chamberlain left himself always with enough of a loophole to permit territorial concessions by Poland to Germany, and to permit pressure by Britain to bring these concessions about. It is significant, for example, that nowhere in the Blue Book does any British statesman or diplomat speak of Poland's "territorial integrity." The phrase appears only in Document No. 124, President Roosevelt's appeal to Hitler on August 24 to settle his dispute with Poland by direct negotiation, by arbitration, or by submission to a neutral conciliator. Britain never guaranteed Poland's "territorial integrity."

#### *The Pledge to Poland*

The first British pledge to Poland is reprinted in the Blue Book as Document No. 17. Mr. Chamberlain said: "In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish government all the support in their power." At first glance, this seemed like an unequivocal "hands off" warning to Germany. But it was not. It hid many qualifications. The qualifications raised questions, and the questions remained unanswered. Would the Poles or the British be the judge of what was "clearly" a

<sup>5</sup> British government publications are ordinarily bound in blue, German in white, French in yellow.



threat to Polish independence? Studying the pledge, one might conclude offhand that Poland would be the judge; but Sir Nevile Henderson, in later conversations with Adolf Hitler, thought otherwise. Might not the Nazis be encouraged by the use of the term "independence" instead of "territorial integrity"? A Poland minus Danzig and the Corridor might also be termed "independent." Even Slovakia was called "independent." What if the Polish will to resist were undermined? And what did the British government mean by "all the support in their power"? The words seemed simple enough at the time, but "all the support in their power" turned out to be no support at all. The phrase "at once" also seemed simple enough, but Great Britain did not announce a state of war until two days after Poland was attacked. Domestic opponents of the Chamberlain government felt that the pledge was ambiguous and that the ambiguity would encourage Hitler. Absence of any mention of Danzig was particularly deplored.

It was not until July 10 that Chamberlain mentioned Danzig. Five questions were raised in the Commons that day. These questions are reprinted in Document No. 35 along with Chamberlain's answer. They are typical of the misgivings expressed by the Opposition. Document No. 35 is also important as the definitive statement of Polish as well as British counter-propaganda on the question of the Free City. The Prime Minister said: "The Vistula is Poland's only waterway to the Baltic, and the port at its mouth is therefore of vital strategic and economic importance to her. Another Power established in Danzig could, if it so desired, block Poland's access to the sea and so exert an economic and military strangle-hold upon her." Answering the charges of Nazi propagandists, he insisted that Poland had done nothing to curtail the liberties of the people of Danzig: the city, he pointed out, was administered entirely by Germans. "The present settlement," while it might be capable of improvement, "cannot . . . be regarded as basically unjust or illogical," he said, adding that "maintenance of the *status quo* had, in fact, been guaranteed by the German Chancellor, himself. . . ."

This seemed clear enough. Danzig was vital to Poland's independence; "hands off Danzig." And if Poland, herself, were to decide when

her independence was threatened by German aggression, it seemed that Britain had, indeed, given her a "blank cheque." But was Poland really to decide?

### *Sir Nevile Speaks Up*

Apparently not. For when Adolf Hitler told Sir Nevile Henderson on August 28 that he would be willing to enter into "peaceful and friendly" negotiations with Poland "if there was a Polish government which was prepared to be reasonable," Sir Nevile replied that Britain would decide what was "reasonable." As Sir Nevile describes the conversation in Document No. 75 of the Blue Book, "Herr Hitler continued to argue that Poland could never be reasonable: she had England and France behind her, and imagined that even if she were beaten she would later recover, thanks to their help, more than she might lose. He spoke of annihilating Poland. I said that reminded me of similar talk last year of annihilation of the Czechs. He retorted that we were incapable of inducing Poland to be reasonable." Sir Nevile's answer deserves careful study. "I said that it was just because we remembered the experience of Czecho-Slovakia last year that we hesitated to press Poland too far today. Nevertheless, we reserved to ourselves the right to form our own judgment as to what was or was not reasonable so far as Poland or Germany were concerned. We kept our hands free in that respect." The British were prepared to decide for themselves what would constitute "a clear threat" to Polish independence.

"At the end," Sir Nevile reports, ". . . Herr Hitler asked whether England would be willing to accept an alliance with Germany. I said, speaking personally, I did not exclude such a possibility provided the development of events justified it." Hitler said he would give his answer next day. The answer<sup>a</sup> was that Hitler had no "intention of touching Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State." And he agreed "to accept the British government's offer of their good offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. They counted on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939. The German government will

<sup>a</sup> Document No. 12, White Book; Document No. 78, Blue Book.



immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator." What Germany wanted was "return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland."

*Britain Moves for Compromise*

If what Chamberlain said in July was still true, that "Another power established in Danzig could . . . block Poland's access to the sea and so exert an economic and military stranglehold upon her," these demands were clearly a threat to Poland's independence. An emissary "with full powers" meant an emissary authorized to say "yes" or "no" on the spot to German demands, and the answer would be given under threat of war. He would, therefore, be in much the same position as Schuschnigg and Hacha, as the Poles realized. But the British were not prepared to say "no" to these demands. Henderson merely asked<sup>7</sup> whether the time limit constituted an ultimatum. Hitler and von Ribbentrop answered that the demand for an emissary by the next day was only intended "to stress urgency." The first reaction<sup>8</sup> of Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, was not that the German demands were unacceptable as constituting a clear threat to Polish independence, but that it was "unreasonable" to "expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin today, and German government must not expect this." That was at 2 A.M., August 30. At 10 A.M. Britain's Ambassador in Warsaw telegraphed<sup>9</sup> that he felt sure it would be impossible to induce the Poles to send an emissary under the circumstances. "They would certainly sooner fight and perish rather than submit to such humiliation, especially after examples of Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania and Austria." But at 2:45 P.M.<sup>10</sup> Halifax telegraphed Henderson that "we are considering the German note with all urgency." At 5:30 P.M.<sup>11</sup> Halifax wired the British Ambassador in Warsaw to ask the

Polish government to restrain military and civil authorities and "stop inflammatory radio propaganda." Still no decision on Hitler's demands. It was not until 6:50 P.M. that Halifax telegraphed a decision:<sup>12</sup> "We cannot advise Polish government to comply with the procedure, which is wholly unreasonable."

At midnight of August 30, Henderson handed German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop the British government's formal reply to the German proposal. The British made "an express reservation in regard to the particular demands" in the German note but said they were glad the Germans were "prepared to enter into direct discussions with the Polish government."<sup>13</sup> Early in the morning of August 31<sup>14</sup> Polish Foreign Minister Beck was asked "to speed up preparations for these direct discussions." At 7:15 P.M. that day the British Ambassador in Warsaw<sup>15</sup> reported that Beck was instructing the Polish Ambassador in Berlin to approach the Germans and said that the Poles accepted the British proposals. But the Germans would not wait for direct discussions, and it was already too late. For at 9:30 A.M. that same day, August 31,<sup>16</sup> Halifax received a telegram from Henderson saying that he told von Ribbentrop that the British had "found it difficult to advise" the Poles to send an emissary with full powers and suggested instead that the formal German proposals be given the Polish Ambassador. "Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German aloud at top speed. . . . When I asked . . . for the text of these proposals . . . he asserted that it was now too late." Nevertheless the Polish Ambassador called on the German Foreign Minister at 6:30 P.M. of August 31.<sup>17</sup> But the German invasion began at dawn the next day. Thus, the British case is that the Germans attacked Poland despite the British willingness to arrange "direct discussions" with the Poles, and to decide for themselves what would be "reasonable" concessions by the Poles. One concludes that the Germans could have had another "Munich," but chose

<sup>7</sup> Document No. 79, Blue Book.

<sup>8</sup> Document No. 81, Blue Book.

<sup>9</sup> Document No. 84, Blue Book.

<sup>10</sup> Document No. 83, Blue Book.

<sup>11</sup> Document No. 85, Blue Book.

<sup>12</sup> Document No. 88, Blue Book.

<sup>13</sup> Document No. 89, Blue Book.

<sup>14</sup> Document No. 90, Blue Book.

<sup>15</sup> Document No. 96, Blue Book.

<sup>16</sup> Document No. 92, Blue Book.

<sup>17</sup> Document No. 101, Blue Book.



war instead. That is what the British Blue Book seems intended to convey to the reader.

### *Hitler Lauds the Empire*

Two other points may be noted in the Blue Book. One is the picture of Hitler as mentally unstable. On August 23<sup>18</sup> Henderson finds him "excitable and uncompromising . . . his language was violent and exaggerated." Later Henderson went back for a second talk.<sup>19</sup> "He was quite calm the second time and never raised his voice once." On August 25<sup>20</sup> Henderson found Hitler "absolutely calm and normal." On August 29<sup>21</sup> "news of Polish mobilization had obviously excited him." These references have the tone of clinical reports. The second is the high moral tone of the British. In Document No. 105, Mr. Chamberlain speaks of the desire to "reestablish in the world the rules of good faith." Henderson reports that he told Hitler on August 29<sup>22</sup> that "our word was our word, and we had never and would never break it." Lord Halifax says,<sup>23</sup> "It is not necessary to remind you that the principle on which the British Empire is conducted is education in self-government." These references must arouse mixed feelings among the Czechs, Spaniards and Hindus, not to mention the Irish. But by far the most eloquent propaganda for the Empire is supplied by Adolf Hitler. In Document No. 21, from Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on April 28, 1939, Der Fuehrer speaks of his "realization of the importance for the whole of mankind of the existence of the British Empire." He said he had "never left room for any doubt of my belief that the existence of this Empire is an inestimable factor of value for the whole of the human cultural and economic life." He said he knew that Britain had acquired her colonial territories by "force and often brutality" but felt that the Empire must be judged not by these

methods but by its fruits. "Now there is no doubt that the Anglo-Saxon people have accomplished immeasurable colonizing work in the world. For this work I have a sincere admiration. The thought of destroying this labor appeared and still appears to me, seen from a higher human point of view, as nothing but the effluence of human wanton destructiveness." That same month<sup>24</sup> Hitler attacked the Soviet Union as "the Jewish Bolshevik pest" and said "Marxism, Communism and . . . democracy . . . after all . . . are made of the same substance."

Adolf Hitler is still the British Empire's best propagandist.

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The Institute does not have all the answers: it lays no claim to infallibility. It will try to be scientific, objective and accurate. If it makes mistakes, it will acknowledge them. It asks those who receive its letters to check its work.

<sup>18</sup> Document No. 57.

<sup>19</sup> Document No. 58.

<sup>20</sup> Document No. 69.

<sup>21</sup> Document No. 80.

<sup>22</sup> Document No. 75.

<sup>23</sup> Document No. 10.

<sup>24</sup> Document No. 20, Blue Book.



# Propaganda Analysis Worksheet

THE MANY scholarly investigations into the causes of the first World War constitute the most thorough job of propaganda analysis undertaken in world history. In 1914 as today each belligerent power issued a series of "color books" to justify its entrance into the war. Many scholars suspected that this "rainbow collection" contained numerous examples of card-stacking, but since only the editors had access to the state archives, no proof could be produced.

Then in 1917 the Russian archives fell into the hands of the Bolsheviki; their propagandists soon discovered that the facts recorded in the Russian state papers would be as damaging to the old Czarist regime and its capitalistic allies as any edited documents. The German Revolution of 1918 brought into republican hands the records from the German Imperial archives. Since the republicans had no desire to uphold their aristocratic predecessors in the foreign office, they published in their complete form many original documents which had been edited in the "color books."

An additional incentive for analysis was supplied by the Versailles Treaty: Article 231 of that document stated that Germany and its allies had been entirely responsible for the war. German scholars presented the German case, based on the published documents, to the world of scholarship in a program for revision of the war guilt clause in the Versailles Treaty.

American scholars joined in the work of analysis. Unlike their European colleagues they carried on their investigations outside of the atmosphere of Bolshevism, German Republicanism, and the drive for revision. Pushing their way back to the year 1870, world scholars generally agreed that the first World War had five underlying causes:

- (1) The system of secret alliances which had characterized European diplomacy before 1914.
- (2) The large standing armies and navies of the great powers.
- (3) Nationalism with its world missions.
- (4) Economic imperialism which resulted

from the mass production of goods and the struggle for markets.

- (5) The poisoning of public opinion by the newspaper press in all of the great countries.<sup>25</sup>

Scholars have presented the American public with this basic pattern for considering war guilt questions. The new "color books" of 1939 can be appraised in the framework outlined above. But first we must bring the pattern up to date: *What changes have taken place in the categories of: alliances, militarism, nationalism, imperialism, and the press*, outlined above?

## I. GROUP DISCUSSION

### (a) Diplomacy

Two changes were made to democratize diplomacy after 1919: (1) the requirement that all treaties be registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, (2) in democratic states all treaties had to be ratified by the elected legislatures. Harold Nicolson, after surveying the difficulties of post-war democratic diplomacy, states: "I do not wish to leave in the mind of the reader the impression that I regard democratic diplomacy as more inefficient or dangerous than its predecessors. Far from it. I consider it, even in its present confused state, infinitely preferable to any other system. Yet I confess that to my mind democratic diplomacy has not yet discovered its own formula."<sup>26</sup> He suggests three avenues to improvement:

- (1) The citizen in a democracy should distinguish between policy and negotiation. He should feel that he is safeguarded against secret diplomacy and not worry about the imaginary terrors of secret negotiations.
- (2) The professional staff should be retained, trusted, and democratized.
- (3) Nothing should be left undone to edu-

<sup>25</sup> Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War* [New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939], Vol. I, pp. 34-49.

<sup>26</sup> Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1939], p. 102.



cate the public in the general principles of diplomacy.

How far have Americans traveled in the direction of achieving these goals since 1919?

(b) *Armies and Navies*

The failure of disarmament proposals and the subsequent rearmament programs are familiar stories which every American knows.

- (1) Why did the allied powers fail to disarm after Germany had been disarmed in 1919?
- (2) Why did the Washington Conference in 1922 succeed in limiting naval armament in a period of almost universal failure?
- (3) Were the rearmament programs for offensive warfare a result of fear and insecurity; or public works projects to absorb men and materials in the only program for the general welfare which the western mind was able to accept?

(c) *Nationalism*

In 1914 each great power contained a small ultra-nationalist group. Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, and the French program for the return of Alsace-Lorraine were the most prominent in the movement. But the British naval clique encouraged a vigorous nationalism, and "the enthusiasm of the Italian patriots, led by men like D'Annunzio, knew no bounds either in ambition or literary expression."

But in 1914 Nietzsche and Bernhardt represented only small sections of the German public. Today their type of nationalism is the official German view. Mussolini has become D'Annunzio's successor and has made nationalism the official program of Fascist Italy.

- (1) What change in the picture of conflicting nationalisms has been made by the introduction of Russian Communism into the world situation?
- (2) Has nationalism declined in France since 1914? In the British Empire? In the United States? In Japan? In China?
- (3) Is nationalism of the extreme and unreasoning variety necessary if a nation is to survive in the modern world?

- (4) Is nationalism of the German and Italian variety a regression to a nineteenth century pattern? Did Germany and Italy fall back into their earlier, simpler way of thinking because: they were bewildered by their problems, and nationalistic history supplied a basis for building a political party?

(d) *Economic Imperialism*

The economic picture has been changed since 1914. Consider:

- (1) The effect of war debts and reparations on the world currency situation.
- (2) The trade dislocations caused by four years of war.
- (3) The growth of technology and use of substitutes.
- (4) The effect of post-war tariff barriers on international trade.

Consider the following questions which are highly controversial but important for an understanding of underlying causes:

- (1) Do the so-called "hungry nations" deserve a share of the world's natural resources greater than they now hold? (Compare with Germany's demand for "a place in the sun" before 1914)
- (2) Is Germany's present policy justified by the refusal of the victorious allies to revise tariffs and other trade restrictions?
- (3) Have any steps been made in international economic cooperation which have acted to improve the general situation since 1914?

(e) *The Newspaper Press*

The sensational and subsidized press of 1914 which was occasionally used by diplomats as a shield and as an excuse for extravagant demands has been expanded and refined to "the war of nerves" of 1939. Consider:

- (1) Have the new instruments, radio and movies, for informing the public been brought into the old pattern established by the 19th century newspaper?
- (2) Has censorship and central control organized the press on a permanent basis of dishonesty which was reached only occasionally in 1914?
- (3) What contributions have been made by

\* Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926], p. 51.



the press in the period 1914-1939 toward a more intelligent democratic diplomacy?

## II. GROUP DISCUSSION

### *Basic Assumptions*

Every nation's foreign policy rests upon certain basic assumptions. In judging whether the foreign policy is ethical or not these basic assumptions must be taken into account. Thus:

- (1) *If we admit* that the Serbian dream of bringing all the South Slavs under a Serbian government was justified, we must admit that Serbia was justified in encouraging anti-Austrian propaganda in the Austria-Hungarian Empire before 1914.
- (2) *But if we admit* that it was vitally necessary to hold the Dual Monarchy together, we must also admit that Austria-Hungary was justified in taking strong measures against Serbia.

In view of these examples what basic assumptions are the great powers now at war asking us to accept as a starting point for considering their "color books"?

- (1) Do you agree that the British are justified in demanding a preponderance of sea power against any possible enemy?
- (2) Is Great Britain justified in regarding itself as the champion of all small countries whose independence is threatened?
- (3) Is Germany justified in imposing her Kultur upon smaller neighboring nations?
- (4) Is Germany really in danger of encirclement by powerful and jealous neighbors?
- (5) Have the French been justified in regarding Germany as a powerful and chronic enemy bent on destroying French civilization?

## III. INDIVIDUAL WORK PROJECT

After your reading and group discussions on the underlying causes of war and the basic assumptions of the Great Powers re-read the bulletin.

- (1) Can you find parallels between August, 1939 and July, 1914? For example, did Chamberlain make the same error as Grey in giving the Germans reasons for believing that Great Britain would remain neutral?

- (2) Compare the emphasis on atrocities in 1914 and 1939. Is the greater emphasis for the purpose of influencing neutral opinion or building internal morale?
- (3) Compare the actions of Serbia in 1914 with those of Poland in 1939. To what extent should a great power offer guarantees to a smaller power?
- (4) What techniques are repeated? Compare the German demand for an emissary by the next day with the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia in 1914.

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**Correction** In the August 1, 1939 issue of *Propaganda Analysis*, "The Associated Farmers," it was said that the Bank of America is one of the two biggest landlords in California, controlling "approximately half of the farm lands in central and northern" sections of the State.

The Institute was in error on this point. According to statistics supplied by Russell G. Smith, executive vice president of the Bank of America, the bank owns and controls only a relatively small proportion of the farms in the State.



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# Propaganda Analysis

*A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda*

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

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## Mr. Dies Goes to Town

OFF and on, since August 12, 1938, four or five members of Congress have gathered in the air-cooled caucus room on the second floor of the old House office building; and there, with newspaper men sitting by, they have listened for hours on end as witness after witness has told of Communist and fascist activities in the United States. Occasionally, they have leaned across the long conference table, perhaps twisting in their chairs to face the witness, and they have asked him two or three questions. Usually, they have just sat there, sprawling, listening, day in, day out.

The newspaper men have listened, too, sometimes taking notes, sometimes handing slips of paper to one Congressman or another, with questions scrawled on them. At four in the afternoon or five, the boyish-looking tow-head chewing gum at the head of the conference table has declared the meeting over; and, picking up their notes, the reporters have gone off to file their stories, and later to meet at the bar of the National Press Club to discuss the day's work.

A good day's work it has been, almost invariably, because that boyish-looking Congressman was Martin Dies, of Texas, and those other men were his fellow-members of the special House committee to investigate un-American activities, the so-called Dies committee. Hearings of the Dies committee are news today, front-page news, even with two wars in Europe and one in the Far East.

The reporters have differed violently at times about this committee, some approve, others don't; but there is one thing on which

the majority of them agree: they have never covered anything quite like it before. This is not the ordinary House or Senate investigation, where documents are subpoenaed and financial records checked to discover hidden sources of income or undercover activities. Here the accused have not been summoned to face their accusers, damned, and forced to confess by skillful questioning and documentary evidence that simply cannot be denied. Here, until quite recently, the accused could not be found, except, perhaps, in the seats reserved for spectators. The accusers sit and talk, piling charge upon charge, and rarely does anyone bother to ask on what evidence the charges are based. Often, days after, the reporters discover that some of the witnesses are not really who they said they were; that others have just come from prison or else are on their way to prison; that one is wanted in New Orleans for murder.

As the *New York Times* reported four months after the committee got under way,<sup>1</sup> the reporters, sympathetic as well as unsympathetic, believe that hearings of this committee are headaches to cover because of "the mixture of plausible testimony with fantastic, the practice of committee members of putting words in witnesses' mouths, their almost universal failure to seek development or proof of startling accusations . . ." One afternoon, the nineteen reporters, who regularly cover the hearings, are questioned by the *New York Daily News*, and seventeen of them agree on the committee's lack of fairness. The late Rodney

<sup>1</sup> November 6, 1938.



Dutcher, of the Newspaper Enterprise Association, writes: "No such loosely handled investigation has been covered previously by this generation of Washington correspondents."

In the words of *Time* magazine, the newspaper men believe that Mr. Dies has been "listening to everybody, hauling in backfence radical gossip . . . scandals, guesses, and wild charges . . ."<sup>2</sup> Yet, like *Time*, many of them rank the committee with "the big U. S. legislative inquiries," feeling that Mr. Dies may have stumbled upon "the best way of building up the picture of the elusive world of U. S. Communism." And this attitude is, perhaps, typical of most of those who support Mr. Dies, and possibly of Mr. Dies himself, who, during the committee's first year at least, often conceded that some of his witnesses might be unreliable,<sup>3</sup> but insisted, nevertheless, that valuable evidence of Communist activities was being uncovered where none had been suspected. Mr. Dies has generally added "fascist activities, too." However, the committee has devoted relatively little attention to fascist activities. Newspapers, in covering the committee, have devoted even less.

#### *Other Correspondents Differ*

Other correspondents — and Kenneth G. Crawford, of the *New York Post* is one—can't see it quite that way. They look upon the committee as the sounding-board for every anti-labor propagandist in the United States, out to destroy the C.I.O., the New Deal, and, indeed, all liberal and progressive organizations by smearing them with red paint. Of course, says Mr. Crawford, this is the fascist technique: stampede the people by shouting "Communist!" And he believes that Mr. Dies is the hatchet-man of "the native American fascist." True, Mr. Dies occasionally hits out at fascism, but Mr. Crawford does not accept these denunciations at face value: they are camouflage, designed to obscure the fascist nature of the committee, he insists.<sup>4</sup>

Something can be said for both sides. It may no longer be fashionable to adopt the attitude that nothing is all black, and nothing all white;

but even Mr. Crawford would probably admit that deep in the mass of what he considers fantastic testimony must be much that is true and incontrovertible. Hundreds of thousands of words of testimony have been taken; and though some of the witnesses—or most, or all—may have been prejudiced or contumacious, their batting average for truth could not conceivably have been .000. On the other hand, neither could it have been 1.000. Unquestionably, as Mr. Dies has said, among the witnesses there have been "screwballs" and "crackpots." Mr. Dies, himself, admits that "some decent Americans may have been unfairly 'smeared.'"<sup>5</sup>

#### *"Incidental" Results*

This, say those who on the whole approve of the Dies investigations, was unavoidable—the incidental result of the novel technique which Mr. Dies has adopted for "building up the picture of U. S. Communism." Mr. Crawford undoubtedly would reply that quite the contrary is true; he would say that only the information which Mr. Dies has gathered about the Communist Party, U. S. A. has been incidental—the by-product of Mr. Dies' propaganda-campaign against the New Deal and labor.

One could argue endlessly about this, for the argument is like the one about the chicken and the egg—which came first? And, when it was all over, the interest would be merely academic, for what the man-in-the-street wants to know is this: how much of the six volumes of testimony which have already come from the presses of the Government Printing Office in Washington, D. C., how much of the other volumes that will soon be available<sup>6</sup> can he believe? It may be convenient to say, as *Time* has said, that "if true only in part," the situation presented is one "at least as ugly as that ventilated by Senator La Follette's exposé of civil liberties." However, that is only begging the question: literally hundreds of American organizations have been charged with being "Communist dominated"; thousands of highly-respected Americans have been named as "Communists," as "Communist sympathizers," as "fellow travelers," or still more loosely as members "of these forces." Were the charges

<sup>2</sup> October 23, 1939.

<sup>3</sup> See *New York Times*, February 12, 1939.

<sup>4</sup> *The Pressure Boys: The Inside Story of Lobbying in America*, by Kenneth G. Crawford. (Julian Messner, Inc.: New York, 1939), Chapter VII, "Un-American Activities."

<sup>5</sup> *New York Times*, February 12, 1939.

<sup>6</sup> *Hearings Before a Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives*. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1938, 1939.



justified? Are the C. I. O., the American Youth Congress, the Art Students League, the American Civil Liberties Union, the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, the American League for Peace and Democracy, the Nature Friends of America, the American Labor Party, World Peaceways, the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, the Farmer Labor Party, the League of Women Shoppers, and Consumers Union "Communist organizations"? What makes them "Communist organizations"? Similarly, are Sherwood Anderson, H. L. Mencken, John Dos Passos, Oswald Garrison Villard, Arthur Garfield Hays, John Brophy, Paul H. Douglas, Sinclair Lewis, Archibald MacLeish, John Dewey, George S. Counts, and Louis Adamic "Communists" or "Communist sympathizers"? Why?

These names have not been picked at random, although they might easily have been. They were chosen because they are representative of those who have been named before the committee as being either "Communists" or "Communist sympathizers," but who deny the charge. Sandwiched in between them were the names of many others, admitted Communists; but an investigation was hardly necessary to reveal that Granville Hicks or M. J. Olgin, Kenneth Fearing or William Gropper were members of the Communist Party, U. S. A.

#### *Some Obviously Fantastic*

Some of the charges are obviously fantastic: no one who is even on book review terms with the writings of H. L. Mencken or Sinclair Lewis, for example, could believe that either has the slightest leaning toward Communism. The New Deal is too radical for them; indeed, Mr. Mencken's antipathy for the New Deal is such that he rarely speaks of the President except as "Dr. Roosevelt." On the other hand, some of the charges do seem plausible. Did not John L. Lewis, himself, accuse Mr. Brophy of Communist sympathies, if not affiliations, back in 1924?

Mr. Dies has said (and his assertion was made in response to attacks upon him from the floor of the House) that although there may have been smearing, loose talk, unfounded charges, and wild accusations, these were all discounted in preparing the committee's first

report.<sup>7</sup> Again, this is begging the question, for the charges remain in the record; they can be referred to—and they are referred to—over and over again by unscrupulous propagandists: "It was testified before the Dies committee . . ." "An official Government investigation has shown . . ." This is the well-known Transfer device:<sup>8</sup> every word in the record carries the authority of the committee, indeed, of Congress itself. And it makes little difference if those quoted are those who caused Mr. Dies to speak of "screwballs" and "crackpots." Mr. Dies has never revealed their names, so how is the man-in-the-street to know who is who?

#### *Testimony Publicized*

Day after day, the charges—the wild charges as well as the plausible ones—have appeared in hundreds of newspapers. The newspapers print them without comment, as they must, for to comment would mean to editorialize. If there is any counter-testimony, they run it, too; but there is little counter-testimony, for, except in rare instances, the committee has not called witnesses for the defense. So the man-in-the-street has seen only the charges, day after day; and, inevitably, some of them have begun to sink in. Adolf Hitler understands this well, this power of repetition: lies will become accepted truth if repeated often enough, he wrote in *Mein Kampf*. As the old saying goes, "Sling enough mud, and some is sure to stick."

Now, it obviously would be impossible to analyze, charge by charge, the hundreds of thousands of words of testimony which have been taken by the special House committee on un-American activities since August 12, 1938, valuable as that might be. Months could be spent checking on each witness and weighing each bit of evidence; and there have been dozens of witnesses. One charge, alone—the charge that Harry Bridges, West Coast leader of the C.I.O., is affiliated with the Communist Party—recently was investigated by James M. Landis, dean of the Harvard Law School. Dean Landis spent eleven weeks hearing thirty-two witnesses give 1,500,000 words of testimony, and even longer analyzing what they said, before he was able to reach his decision. His decision was to absolve Mr. Bridges of the charge, despite the Dies committee.

<sup>7</sup> *Congressional Record*, Vol. 84, No. 27. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1939.

<sup>8</sup> See *Propaganda Analysis*, November 1, 1937, "How to Detect Propaganda."



And if that one charge took Dean Landis four or five months to investigate, what is the newspaper reader, who must devour and digest the day's news in forty-five minutes, to decide when he opens the paper one morning to discover that John P. Frey, chief of the Metal Trades department of the American Federation of Labor, has accused no less than 500 officials of the C. I. O. of being Communists? Mr. Frey could be dead right, of course; or Mr. Frey could be wrong. Or Mr. Frey could be right about some of the officials, and wrong about others. And suppose Mr. Frey is right about all 500: does it follow that "Communists dominate the C. I. O."? How many officials are there in the C. I. O. altogether? How important were the ones named by Mr. Frey? Do they have any voice in determining policies?

Only long, painstaking investigation could reveal the answer to any of these questions: the newspaper reader is busy, he must get to work.

#### *Evaluates the Testimony*

However, the newspaper reader is not quite as helpless as that, for there are certain generalizations which can be made—crude yardsticks for judging the value of testimony—and while they provide no final answer, they do provide some alternative to blind rejection, or equally blind acceptance, or complete indifference. One might ask, for example: what is the character of those who make the charges? Are they non-partisan, or have they axes to grind? If the witness is partisan, it doesn't follow that his testimony should be rejected. All courts of law recognize this; and even murderers, who turn State's evidence only to escape the gallows, are often believed, where supposedly law-abiding citizens, who have no apparent interest other than justice, are not. However, the character of the witness, as well as his reasons for testifying, are considerations of some importance.

Applying this yardstick to Dies committee testimony, one is struck immediately by the fact that few of the witnesses could be considered impartial, and that many of them had an obvious stake in smearing those whom they charged with being Communists. Mr. Frey could hardly be expected to speak without prejudice about the C. I. O., for, as everyone knows, the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. are arch-enemies, which have refused to stop their knockdown-dragout fight in spite of the Presi-

dent, the Secretary of Labor, and the overwhelming majority of the American people. Harper Knowles, who accused the heads of the Democratic Party in California of being Communists or "Communist sympathizers," was equally prejudiced. Mr. Knowles said that he represented the American Legion, which the State Commander of the Legion denied; and it developed that he was actually secretary of the Associated Farmers. Now, one may agree or disagree with the program of the Associated Farmers;<sup>9</sup> but the organization was formed specifically to carry on propaganda and to lobby for special legislation, and is, therefore, as non-partisan as the Republican National Committee. Mr. Knowles said that Culbert Olson, the Democratic candidate for Governor of California, accepted "the program of the strategy committee of the Communist Party"; that Ellis Patterson and Sheridan Downey, the candidates for lieutenant governor and U. S. Senator, respectively, were Communist Party members. He offered no evidence to support these charges. Later, he was to appear before Dean Landis to repeat his charges against Mr. Bridges, and Dean Landis was to say that Mr. Knowles was "neither candid nor forthright."<sup>10</sup>

Walter Steele, editor of the *National Republic*, charged dozens of liberal organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union, with being part of the Communist movement. His testimony fills 453 pages of the Dies Committee hearings. A member of the advisory committee of the Paul Reveres, Inc., Mr. Steele, himself, might well have come under the scrutiny of Mr. Dies. For the Paul Reveres is among the most active pro-fascist and anti-Semitic organizations in the country.<sup>11</sup>

#### *"Red" Indian Bureau*

Alice Lee Jemison, who charged the Indian bureau of the Department of the Interior with being Communistic and with attempting to spread Communism and paganism on the reservations, is Washington representative of the American Indian Federation: the Federation, it happens, was organized to lobby for legislation whereby tens of thousands of Indians

<sup>9</sup> See *Propaganda Analysis*, August 1, 1939, "The Associated Farmers."

<sup>10</sup> *New York Times*, December 31, 1939.

<sup>11</sup> See *Propaganda Analysis*, January 1, 1939, "The Attack on Democracy."



would each be given \$3,000: the bureau, it happens, is against the proposal, and has fought it consistently.

Paul V. Gadola, who appeared before the committee to denounce Attorney General Frank Murphy for his actions during the sit-down strikes, is prominent in the Republican Party in Michigan. And Mr. Murphy was running for re-election as Governor of the State on the Democratic ticket. Ironically enough, among those whom Judge Gadola accused of being Communists was Homer Martin, then leader of the United Automobile Workers. Mr. Martin did not retain his leadership for long, and soon after he was to appear before the committee, himself, to charge that his troubles within the union arose from his refusal to play ball with the Communists.

#### *Gehan's Six Witnesses*

Mr. Dies gave Mark Gehan, former Mayor of St. Paul, Minnesota, six blank subpoenas, and Mr. Gehan brought to Washington at Government expense six witnesses, hand-picked, who charged that "Communists have taken over the Farmer-Labor Party." It may be coincidence, but Elmer Benson was in the midst of his campaign for re-election as Governor at the moment, and Mr. Gehan was among the Republican leaders in the campaign to defeat him. It may also be coincidence, but among the documents which his witnesses introduced were several Republican campaign pamphlets.

If these witnesses had axes to grind, however, there were others, the character of whose testimony was even more questionable. On the day of his second appearance before the committee, Alvin I. Halpern also testified in court, but not about the Spanish Loyalist Army. Mr. Halpern was charged with robbery. Mr. Halpern is now in jail.

William McCuiston's appearance before the committee was even more unfortunate. He stepped from the witness stand into the arms of the Washington, D. C. police. It developed that New Orleans wanted him for murder.

As for Edward F. Sullivan, the committee's first investigator, he was at one time associated with James True, of James True Associates, prominent anti-Semitic publicist and inventor of the Kike Killer, an instrument for bashing in the heads of Jews. Since his dismissal from

the staff of the Dies committee, Mr. Sullivan has managed to find employment with still another fascist group—the Ukrainian National Federation, an organization seeking to annex the Ukraine to Hitler's Third Reich.<sup>12</sup>

Of course, not all who testified before the committee had axes to grind, or criminal records, or fascist connections; and it does seem, after reading the committee's two reports, that members of the committee paid as little attention to what men like Mr. Steele and Judge Gadola said as the man-in-the-street would if the facts had been available. Unfortunately, the facts weren't available for the committee never revealed them. And, when the committee's second report was issued,<sup>13</sup> absolving the C. I. O. almost completely of charges of "Communist domination," the one story which appeared in the newspapers could not possibly have offset in his mind the dozens of stories in which every leader in the C. I. O. was accused of Communist sympathies.

#### *Soft-pedals Report*

Similarly, though hundreds of liberal organizations were named by witnesses as "Communist front" organizations, the committee itself named only eleven. It rejected at least 90 per cent of the charges made before it, possibly more; but, again, the charges appeared in the newspapers, and they must have impressed themselves upon the minds of many newspaper readers. And, only those newspaper readers who carefully studied the committee's second report would know, for example, that although the committee's own investigator, J. B. Matthews, was positive that most of the consumers' organizations in the United States were part of the Communist movement, and that Communists dominated the American Youth Congress, the committee report made no mention of the consumers' groups and merely criticized the American Youth Congress for permitting Communists to affiliate.

Another yardstick for determining the value of testimony is the nature of the evidence that was offered to substantiate the charges. Of course, in some cases, the witnesses offered no evidence whatever; and in others the evidence was incontestable. However, the overwhelming

<sup>12</sup> *Dixie Demagogues*, by Allen Michie and Frank Rhylick. (The Vanguard Press: New York, 1939), p. 58.

<sup>13</sup> January 3, 1940.



bulk of the evidence might be classified—in the words of Arthur Garfield Hays—as designed to prove “guilt by association.” One method adopted by witnesses for proving that organizations were “Communist dominated” was to say: X organization is “Communist dominated”; John Smith and Joseph Jones are both members of the executive committee, they must be Communists; they also belong to Y organization; therefore, Y must be “Communist dominated,” too; on the executive committee of Y are William Green and George Spelvin; by the same logic, Mr. Green and Mr. Spelvin must be Communists; but, Mr. Green and Mr. Spelvin belong to Z; therefore, Z. . . .

At other times, it was assumed that, if the Communists are in favor of X, anyone who favors X must have “Communist sympathies,” himself. Mr. Steele provided what is perhaps the classic example of this logic when he listed “members of these forces,” meaning, one must assume, the Communists, who met with the “representatives of certain foreign governments,” meaning the Soviet Union. Among the names was that of Mrs. Ogden Reid, of the New York *Herald Tribune*, the most prominent Republican newspaper in the country. The *Herald Tribune* was in favor of lifting the embargo against the Spanish Loyalists, as were many Republicans, including Alf M. Landon and Frank Knox, the Republican candidates for President and Vice-President in 1936. The Communists were also in favor of lifting the embargo. Since Mrs. Reid met with several other pro-Loyalists at the Soviet Embassy to discuss the embargo, Mrs. Reid must be tinged with Communism. So Mr. Steele concluded.

#### *Logic by Mr. Thomas*

It took Republican committee member J. Parnell Thomas, of New Jersey, to reduce the logic of guilt by association to complete absurdity, however. Edward P. Banta said that one writer on the Federal Writers Project followed “the Party line,” even though he wasn’t in the Party; and this writer, he said, was related to an “attorney for the Jersey Civil Liberties Union, prosecuting the case against Mayor Hague.” Mr. Thomas interrupted:

In other words, that is the second connection, then, that you have made between the Communists and the Federal Writers Project in New York City and the Jersey City Civil Liberties Union?

In the case of the C. I. O., the method adopted to bolster the charges of “Communist domination” was simply to quote John L. Lewis. Offhand, it might have seemed like pretty good evidence, too: Mr. Lewis, the head of the C. I. O., himself believes that some of his most trusted lieutenants are Communists, among them John Brophy. So the witnesses implied, and so they occasionally said point-blank. However, it was in 1924 that Mr. Lewis made the statements which they quoted, while he and Mr. Brophy were contending for leadership of the United Mine Workers, and Mr. Lewis in 1924 was using precisely the same propaganda-tactics against Mr. Brophy that John P. Frey was later to use against him: Name-calling. He was attempting to smear his rival by shouting “Communist!”

#### *The Catholic “Red”*

Actually, Mr. Brophy is among the most active laymen in the Catholic Church, with one son preparing for the priesthood, and two daughters already nuns. Mr. Brophy’s friends within the Church immediately came to his defense. And Mr. Frey’s answer was that he didn’t make the accusation, really: he merely quoted Mr. Lewis.

Perhaps the most important witness before the committee was Mr. Matthews, whose testimony was considered so valuable that he was later hired to succeed Mr. Sullivan on the staff. Mr. Matthews was, at one time, connected with Consumers Research. Although never in the Communist Party, he sympathized with it; his break with the Party coincides with the strike of Consumers Research employees in 1935. Mr. Matthews considered the strike unjustified; he believed that most of the leaders, if not all, were Communists, and that it was inspired by the Communist Party chiefly to gain control of the consumer movement. The Communists did gain control, he believes; and he expressed this belief in his study of the consumer movement, submitted to Mr. Dies just before the work of preparing the committee’s second report got under way. Page one stories about it appeared in almost every metropolitan newspaper; and some papers, like the New York *Herald Tribune*, printed the complete text.

Now, Mr. Matthew’s report can, in many ways, be considered representative of the



charges made by those who appeared before the committee as partisans, attempting to prove guilt by association, offering little additional evidence. Mr. Matthews felt intensely about the strike; moreover, it resulted in the establishment of Consumers Union in direct competition with Consumers Research. In studying the reports of the hearings, the Institute, therefore, felt that it might be valuable to examine Mr. Matthews' consumer report in detail, not only for itself, but also because of the light it might throw on the sort of testimony which can be expected under the same, or similar circumstances.

#### *Accuses Consumers*

Mr. Matthews opens the report by discussing the change in Communist Party tactics, as ratified in 1935 by the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International. Previously, he says, the Communists had devoted little attention to consumers; now, they began to concentrate on them. As their first step, they organized the League of Women Shoppers, he declares. Among the other "Communist organizations" in the consumer field he includes Consumers Union, the Milk Consumers Protective Committee, the Consumer-Farmer Milk Co-operative, the National Consumers Federation, and several local committees. Mr. Matthews intimates, though he does not directly say, that Donald Montgomery, Consumers Counsel of the Department of Agriculture, is somehow part of this picture of "Communist domination" of the consumer movement. He says that Mr. Montgomery has "been active from the beginning in the work of the Consumers National Federation," and that he recently "undertook an investigation of national advertising in *Good Housekeeping* magazine." Mr. Matthews sees this investigation as one aspect of the "Communist attempt to sabotage and destroy advertising," thereby helping to "destroy the capitalist system of free enterprise."

Mr. Matthews attempts to prove his charges against Consumers Union by proving that it was organized by Communists; the organizers, he says, were Arthur Kallet, Susan Jenkins, and Walter Trumbull. All three, incidentally, were connected with the Consumers Research strike—Mr. Kallet was the only executive who supported the strikers; Miss Jenkins was among

the strikers; and Mr. Trumbull was the American Federation of Labor representative, who helped to organize the strike.

Unless Mr. Matthews is attempting to say that Mr. Trumbull's work in the A. F. of L. was itself part of the movement to set up Consumers Union, his reference to him is meaningless. For Mr. Trumbull was never connected with the organization in any way. Mr. Kallet says that he never even met him. Moreover, once the strike was under way, Mr. Trumbull left; the A. F. of L. sent another organizer to replace him.

Miss Jenkins was connected with the formation of Consumers Union; she helped to raise money for it. She denies rather vigorously that she was ever in the Communist Party. To prove that she was, Mr. Matthews points out that she once worked for the Communist newspaper, the *Daily Worker*. Miss Jenkins admits this, but explains that she worked there for only two weeks, not in any editorial capacity but on the switchboard, connecting telephone calls between the press room and the copy desk. Her employment lasted only during the pre-election rush, when the work on every newspaper becomes especially heavy, she points out. Miss Jenkins says that she got the job while she was on strike against Macaulay Publishers. The *Daily Worker* requested the union sponsoring the strike to send over an operator, and Miss Jenkins was picked, because she was broke and had dependents. Just why the *Worker* should have called on the union, Miss Jenkins cannot say; but she imagines that it wanted to show its support for the strikers.

#### *Charges Against Mr. Kallet*

The charges against Mr. Kallet are more extensively documented. Mr. Matthews just quotes him as having written that co-operatives "permit many people to express their resentment against the capitalist system by 'playing store.'" They are, therefore, business enterprises, not training schools for revolution, Mr. Kallet wrote. And Mr. Matthews comments: "The politically informed person will have no difficulty in recognizing the strictly Communist phraseology of the foregoing statement."

Mr. Matthews says that Mr. Kallet was at one time on "the editorial board of the Communist publication *Health and Hygiene*; and he quotes from *Scribner's* magazine for No-



vember, 1937, in which it was said that Kallet "will tell anyone that he dislikes our economic system. . . ."

Mr. Kallet says that Mr. Matthews' charges are "nonsense." He says that he did write the statement about co-operatives, but that he "can't see anything Communistic about it." Although Mr. Matthews seems to believe that Mr. Kallet has since changed his mind, because the "Communist line" has changed, Mr. Kallet says, "I still believe what I wrote, regardless of any charge in this alleged line." As for the statement in *Scribner's*, Mr. Kallet calls it "sheer fabrication." Mr. Kallet says, "I never even intimated anything of the sort." And, he adds: "Perhaps Don Wharton, the author, was thinking of Mr. Matthews."

Mr. Kallet admits that he was on the board of *Health and Hygiene*, but says: "I never heard that it was Communist, at least while I was there." He also says that he took no part in running the magazine.

#### *Consumer Advertising*

Consumers Union has advertised in several Communist publications, including the *New Masses*, and Mr. Matthews sees this as evidence of "Communist domination," too. Mr. Kallet answers: "We've spent ten or fifteen times as much on advertisements in the *New Republic* and *The Nation*. We don't advertise in the *New Masses* any more because it doesn't pay. It's strictly business with us. We've tried to put advertisements in the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*, but they won't accept them.

"If we're 'Communist dominated,' and if the Communists are opposed to advertising, how does Mr. Matthews explain the fact that we place so much advertising ourselves?"

Kallet says that Matthews is wrong in saying that Harry Bridges was among the sponsors of Consumers Union on the West Coast. "He just isn't."

In discussing the League of Women Shoppers, Mr. Matthews first says that Miss Jenkins was "the most active organizer." Having proved to his own satisfaction Miss Jenkins' Communist affiliations by the fact that she worked for two weeks as emergency telephone operator for the *Daily Worker*, Mr. Matthews concludes that it must have been the Communist Party which started the League for Women Shoppers. Aside from the logic, Mr.

Matthews' facts are wrong. Miss Jenkins was not the most active organizer; she was not even *an* organizer. She had no connection with the organization until one year after it was started, when she became executive secretary for three or four weeks.

According to Mr. Matthews, five of the directors and sponsors of the League are "well known Communist Party members and fellow travelers." He lists Helen Kay, Clarina Michelson, Louise Thompson, Leane Zugsmith, and Tess Slesinger. Except in the case of Miss Kay, he makes no attempt to prove his charge; and Miss Kay's name cannot be found either among the sponsors or among the directors. She did serve as secretary of the organization, but no longer.

Miss Michelson and Miss Thompson really are sponsors; but, says the president of the League, Sophia Ames Boyer, sponsors have no part in determining policy. Anyway, she adds, there are seventy-two sponsors in all. Suppose Mr. Matthews charges against Miss Michelson and Miss Thompson are justified; can two "Communist sympathizers" among seventy-two sponsors make the League "Communist dominated"?

Miss Zugsmith helped to found the League, and is now on the New York board of directors as well as the national board. Mrs. Boyer knows nothing of her political affiliations; but again she points out Miss Zugsmith is just one among fifteen on the New York board, and one among sixty on the national board. Miss Boyer does not know Miss Slesinger, but suggested that "she may be connected with our chapter on the West Coast."

The League of Women Shoppers, by the way, supported the strike at Consumers Research.

#### *Facts Mixed*

Mr. Matthews' charges against the Milk Consumers Protective Committee rest primarily on his belief that Miss Jenkins is chairman and Meyer Parodneck vice-chairman of the organization. Miss Jenkins is not chairman, as Mr. Matthews could easily have discovered by reading the record of the Dies committee hearings. Until recently, the chairman was the late Dr. Caroline Whitney. Since her death, Mr. Parodneck has been acting in her place.

Can Mr. Parodneck rightly be accused of Communist sympathies? Mr. Parodneck says



no. Mr. Matthews bases the accusation chiefly on something he wrote for the *New Republic*, in which, says Mr. Matthews, he spoke in glowing terms of the progress of the consumer movement in the Soviet Union. This is true. What Mr. Matthews failed to mention in his report was that in the same article Mr. Parodneck also spoke in glowing terms of the progress of the consumer movement in Scotland, Denmark, Sweden, England, and Finland. Mr. Parodneck had recently surveyed the consumer movement all over the world to determine how the depression had effected it. Mr. Matthews say that "in his article Mr. Parodneck made it clear that his own ultimate objective was to achieve the abolition of the system of free enterprise and to substitute for it some form of economic collectivism, indicating his own special bias in favor of the Soviet Union." That is not true. Mr. Parodneck's article consisted merely of details about the consumer movement in several countries, ending with this generalization: "The uniform success of consumer co-operation in the countries discussed, during the years that profit business has suffered its worst setback, would seem to indicate the power of consumer cooperation as a means of fighting the depression."

#### *What Does He Mean?*

Mr. Matthews' interpretation of this sentence can only be explained by assuming that consumer co-operation and Communism are synonymous in his mind. As Mr. Parodneck's article points out, however, the largest business enterprise in England is the Co-operative Wholesale Society. Is England Communist? In Helsinki, the co-operative organizations "dwarf all other enterprises." Is Finland Communist? Only Mr. Matthews, Joseph Stalin, and Mr. Stalin's puppet Finish government in Moscow seem to believe that.

Mr. Matthews also damns the Consumer-Farmer Milk Co-operative because of Miss Jenkins and Mr. Parodneck, who, he says, "have been among the most active leaders." Again, Miss Jenkins—who, it happens, is not connected with the organization. Mr. Matthews names three sponsors of the organization as Communists. Mr. Parodneck says they are just three among fifty, and he asks how they can possibly dominate the other forty-seven.

Having demonstrated to his own satisfaction that Arthur Kallet, Susan Jenkins, and Meyer Parodneck are Communists; having demonstrated to his own satisfaction that Consumers Union, the Milk Consumers Protective Committee, and the League of Women Shoppers are, therefore, "Communist dominated," Mr. Matthews has no trouble whatever in finding reason to believe that Communists played the leading role in the formation of the Consumers National Federation. Mr. Kallet, Miss Jenkins, and Mr. Parodneck were "among those most active in the formation of the National Consumers Federation." Q. E. D.

Come now to Donald Montgomery, of the Department of Agriculture. The National Consumers Federation, Mr. Matthews has just shown, is "Communist dominated." Mr. Montgomery "has been active from the beginning in the work of the . . . Federation." Again, the logic of guilt by association.

Mr. Montgomery, himself, denies being active in the Federation, or having any contact with it, except as part of his regular duties in the Department of Agriculture. Mr. Montgomery says that his office is supposed to answer requests for information of interest to consumers. Hundreds of consumers' and women's organizations write him every year for such information, including the National Consumers Federation, he says. That is his only contact.

Mr. Montgomery denies that his office conducted an investigation of *Good Housekeeping*, with or without the aid of the Work Projects Administration. The Federal Trade Commission did conduct such an investigation and is now prosecuting the magazine for illegal advertising practices. Mr. Montgomery says that he didn't even hear about the investigation until the complaint was filed.

#### *Facts or Smearing?*

It seems evident, after studying Mr. Matthews' report, that his charges against the consumer movement are wholly unfounded. Of course, the Communists in any group can be expected to exert an influence far beyond their numbers: organized minorities always do. Still, to indict an entire movement, involving hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people, just because three or four of the leaders *may* be Communists is hardly justifiable. They *may* be Communists; but Mr. Matthews cannot



be said to have proved it: his evidence is sparse and flimsy, at best. Moreover, suppose they are Communists: what is Communistic about wanting to make your purchases as economically as possible? In the past, that desire was always considered admirable. Has it suddenly become subversive?

If this is the quality of Mr. Matthews' testimony concerning the consumer movement, can one have any faith in his other testimony? And what of those who spoke with even less authority than he? Were they really giving evidence on Communistic activities? Or were they, also, just smearing red paint?

## Propaganda Analysis Worksheet

THE Seven Propaganda Devices<sup>1</sup> (particularly, Name-calling, Transfer, and Card-stacking) are easy to spot in the pages of the voluminous reports of the Dies Committee hearings. They were easy enough to blue-pencil in the very generous press coverage of the hearings. However, as has long been the contention of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, one can be well aware of these tricks—themselves signs of a basic weakness in argument—and not be able to weigh evidence adequately because of certain emotional attitudes and/or because of inability to locate evidence and to evaluate it. Let us concern ourselves, here, with the latter: A man is called a Communist or a Nazi or a horse thief. Name-calling, to be sure, and easy enough to detect as such. But, what about its truth or falsity, and *what is the meaning of its truth or falsity?*

The detection of propaganda devices, or appeals, is a much needed skill—a tool of citizenship in a democracy—but obviously it cannot stand alone. (Study of the Dies report would seem to prove this conclusively.) Aided by this necessary tool (skill in detection of common propaganda devices) the student of propaganda must take a second step into the field of critical inquiry. He must ask, in the case of Name-calling: Is the name deserved or undeserved? Am I offered proof of its truth or falsity? Does the proof I'm offered stand up under searching inquiry? What actually does the evidence I'm offered prove? Is there any counter-evidence? A third step generally leads us to the collection of evidence ourselves and to its analysis in terms of "what does it mean?" Specifically, what does it mean in terms of my

future behavior in the society of which I am a part? My behavior in buying, discussing, voting? The analysis of propaganda must stem from the basic methods of thinking involved in all fields of learning which use an experimental, scientific approach. (See definition of concept of critical thinking as an expression of the scientific method in *Propaganda Analysis*, September, 1939, "Let's Talk About Ourselves.")

Dubious methods used to present a statement may cause us to doubt that the statement is valid, but we may very well not have the techniques for weighing and evaluating the truth and the implications of the evidence presented in support of the statement. How often this state of affairs occurs in the course of a day's newspaper reading or radio listening! Sometimes, too, our doubt of the statement's validity may be merely what is termed "instinctive"—that is, our quick doubt and distrust, or approval, is very much in the nature of "reflex action." Conclusions reached or inferred by a writer or speaker clash, or agree, with our beliefs, opinions likes or dislikes—in brief, with "the pictures in our minds" of men, events, even words. It is necessary, therefore, in any attempt at critical thinking to search ourselves—to ask *why* we think and act as we do, consciously to examine our attitudes, beliefs, habits of thinking, consciously to ask HOW and WHY. Naturally, we go through this procedure that we may re-build our attitudes, beliefs, habits upon stronger ground.

### I. GROUP WORK PROJECT

#### "The Pictures in Our Heads"

You have been reading the newspapers; each day you've followed the accounts of the Dies

<sup>1</sup> *Propaganda Analysis*, November, 1937, "Some ABC's of Propaganda."



Committee hearings. Have these accounts made any impressions upon you? What impressions? Let us try a simple exercise:

List organizations which you believe to be Communist or "Communist dominated." Do the same with fascist organizations. Make separate lists of individuals—of persons whom you think of as Communists, of persons whom you think of as fascists or Nazis.

Then, check your lists with the second report of the Dies committee, asking: Are my lists borne out by the official report of the Committee? In what instances? If I have names of organizations and individuals not included in the report, where did I get the impression that these organizations and persons are Communist, "Communist dominated," or fascist? From press accounts of the Committee's hearings? From radio news broadcasts or commentators? Do I have any evidence, any proof, to warrant my impressions? What? If so, are there any deductions I can make concerning (1) the sources of my information and misinformation, (2) my own habits of reading and listening? Where do I get my impressions, "the pictures in my head" of men, groups, events?

Discuss with members of your group the possible relationships of such questions as these to the following:

The Dies committee has consistently received front-page space in every newspaper in the country.

The Dies committee is composed of political people in a political world.

Can it be demonstrated, as some have claimed, that the Dies committee uses the propaganda devices against political opponents, labor, minorities, educators, the New Deal program?

Can it be demonstrated that whatever one may think of the soundness of its methods the committee stumbled upon "the best way of building up the pictures of the elusive world of United States Communism?" Of United States fascism?

*Follow-up activity:* The House committee investigating the National Labor Relations Board, called the Smith committee, and the Senate committee on civil liberties, the La Follette committee, are now holding hearings simultaneously. Follow reports of these hearings in your local newspapers and in five or six of the country's leading newspapers (examples,

Chicago *Daily News*, New York *Times*, New York *Herald Tribune*, St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*, Los Angeles *Times*, a Scripps-Howard newspaper, a Hearst paper). Check and compare the coverage given to these two committees' hearings, in terms of the number of column inches given to each.

## II. GROUP PROJECT

### *We Have Assumptions*

Behind every advertisement, behind every statement we, or others, may make there are assumptions. Usually we are unaware of our own assumptions; we have not taken the trouble to bring them out into the light of day to see whether they tally with available pertinent facts and evidence. Before we can become effectively aware of other people's assumptions, assumptions usually present in their arguments, we must look at our own. Let us do so in an elementary inquiry into the meanings which we attach to words:

The Dies Congressional Committee was organized to inquire into "un-American activities." What does "un-American" mean? What are "un-American activities?" Let each member, unassisted by others in the group, write down what the word, un-American, means to him. Follow the same procedure with other words which appear again and again in the proceedings of the Committee: *subversive*, *Communist*, *transmission belt*, *Nazi*, *fascist*, *Communist dominated*.

Then, bring your definitions, your concepts of the meanings of these words and phrases, to the attention of your group. Use them as a basis for group discussion. Ask: What assumptions are revealed, or hidden, in my definitions of these terms? How well do my definitions correspond with the definitions of others in the group? Are their assumptions similar to mine? Are our assumptions the same as those of various well-known students of these terms? Wherein and why may there be differences? Can we account for them? How closely do my definitions tally with those of scholarly students of these subjects? Do members of the Dies committee define what they mean when they use these terms? If so, are their definitions and assumptions concerning these forces borne out by our researches in the field?

*Follow-up Exercise:* Consider the effect of repetition of such words as *Communist*, *fascist*,



*subversive*, and *Communist dominated* upon the thousands of readers of the daily press. Consider, moreover, in detailed manner the effect of this repetition *in connection with* the "smearing technique" graphically described on page 6 of this bulletin. Conclude this exercise with a group statement of what is meant by "proving guilt by association."

### III. GROUP WORK PROJECT

#### *The Nature of Proof*

Propaganda analysis becomes a positive process when it contributes to our behavior. We may understand the nature of proof; we may know the kind of evidence which a county judge demands and accepts; and, still our way of life may not show that we understand it. Of what value is it for us to understand thoroughly what a proof means if it does not clarify our thinking and make us more critical of new ideas and programs that are presented to us? If a person clearly understands pertinent aspects of the nature of proof, his behavior, we must assume, will be marked by the following characteristics.<sup>2</sup>

1. He will select the significant words and phrases in any statement that is important to him and ask that they be carefully defined.
2. He will require evidence in support of any conclusion he is pressed to accept.
3. He will recognize stated and unstated assumptions essential to the conclusion.
4. He will evaluate these assumptions, accepting some and rejecting others.
5. He will evaluate the argument, accepting or rejecting the conclusion.
6. He will constantly re-examine the assumptions which are behind his beliefs and which guide his actions.

Since the concept of proof is a concept which is involved in all situations where conclusions are to be reached and decisions made, no thoughtful citizen of a democracy can avoid the necessity of examining the evidence in support of the great variety of conclusions he is pressed to accept. Accordingly, keep the procedures enumerated above clearly in mind. With your group leader or committee chairman select the following materials for appli-

<sup>2</sup> *The Nature of Proof*, by Harold P. Fawcett. (Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University: New York, 1938), pp. 11 and 12.

cation of these procedures in evaluating evidence: (1) an advertisement for toothpaste in a popular magazine; (2) a local problem which involves an issue which has received widespread attention by the press and the public; and, (3) a segment of the second report of the Dies committee, which states a conclusion and calls for action. Lay aside any prejudice you may have on any one of these subjects and consider arguments on their merits.

Several interesting and clear-cut plans for work of this type are suggested in *The Nature of Proof* in the section on "The Recognition of Assumptions in Non-Mathematical Arguments," pages 75 through 86. Others are described in "The Making of Their Modern Minds: The Study of Public Opinion" by William Van Til, *Social Education*, October, 1939 issue.

Additional suggestions for inquiries and for practices in testing the nature of proof and "what constitutes evidence" are outlined in *The News Letter*, Bureau of Educational Research, Ohio State University, December 1939, Volume V, Number 2. See "Notes on Propaganda" by Edgar Dale. Note, especially, the examination of documentary historical evidence by questions suggested by Donald L. McMurry in "The Evaluation of Propaganda by the Historical Method." Apply these questions, where they are pertinent, to the work of the Dies committee and to its second report.

Nine "typical cases" of civil liberties which are frequently under fire, clearly presented in the *Weekly News Review* article "Dies Report is Widely Studied," are recommended for group and classroom discussion. (*Weekly News Review*, Washington, D. C. January 15, Vol. XVIII, No. 17). Many others excellent leads for group study and discussion are contained in the Town Hall of the Air booklet, "Should the Dies Investigation be Continued?" January 4, Volume XIII.

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# Propaganda Analysis

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INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

40 EAST FORTY-NINTH STREET: NEW YORK CITY

Volume III

JANUARY 20, 1940

Number 5

## What Is the Christian Front?

NOW that seventeen members of the so-called Christian Front have been arrested in New York, charged by the Department of Justice with attempting to overthrow the Government of the United States, page-one newspaper stories are making the American people suddenly aware that Father Charles E. Coughlin, of the Shrine of the Little Flower in Royal Oak, Michigan, has created an organization in the cities of the industrial East, which can only be described as fascist—an organization whose members talk of killing the Jews and blasting their way to power with guns and dynamite.

If the news has surprised anyone, the reason is only that New York newspapers until now have attempted to play down the activities of this Christian Front as much as possible, reporting them only in occasional two or three paragraph stories, hidden somewhere in the financial pages. During the past year, more than 200 members of the Christian Front have been arrested in New York, either for acts of violence or for inciting others to violence. Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia has sent investigators to dozens of Christian Front meetings—investigators who have invariably been spotted by the speakers and denounced as “the stooges of the little red stinkweed in City Hall.” The Commissioner of Police has been compelled to warn the members of the force against being too lenient with the Front: the organization is composed primarily of Irish Catholics, and many of the New York police, being Irish Catholics themselves, are not unsympathetic. The files of the Police Department’s criminal alien squad are bulging with reports on the

leaders of the Front, several of whom have long prison records.

Almost nothing of this has gotten into the papers. It was typical of the *New York Times*, for example, that when the Christian Front attacked members of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Madison Square Garden some months ago, the story was reported fully—except that no mention was made of the Christian Front.

The Christian Front was started in May, 1938, when the Reverend Charles E. Coughlin urged his followers to form platoons of twenty-five. The progress of the Front has since been reported in detail in Father Coughlin’s weekly, *Social Justice*. Only recently, for example *Social Justice* reported the formation of squads of so-called Minute Men, trained in the use of arms to fight “if and when it became necessary.” Story after story has told of meetings of the Christian Front, some of them addressed by Father Coughlin, himself, over long-distance telephone.

It was John F. Cassidy, now under arrest, who formed the first platoons. At first, he did so with the help of the Paulist Fathers, who permitted him to use their home as the headquarters of the Front. Later, the Paulist Fathers were to drop the Front, when it began to engage in street fights and in mass attacks on isolated “Jews.” (The members of the Front have not always been able to distinguish Jews from Christians who disapprove of their activities.)

The Christian Front is organized somewhat vaguely. Often the platoons seem to have no direct organizational connection with each other; and meetings, therefore, give the impression of spontaneity. Members of the



*Amerikadeutscher Volksbund* seem to serve the same purpose within the Front that Communists have served within progressive and labor groups: they are the militant, well-knit minority, who, as they say, "activize the others." Sometimes, leaders of another fascist organization will step in temporarily, as when Allen Zoll, of American Patriots, Inc., led members of the Front in picketing radio station WMCA for refusing to broadcast the speeches of Father Coughlin without first seeing his script.

Nevertheless, the platoons have been able to work together with remarkable smoothness. The members know just what is expected of them, because they listen to Father Coughlin on the air every Sunday and read *Social Justice*, from which they get not only their ideology, but general directives as well.

On January 1, *Social Justice* said: "Father Coughlin is the only spokesman of . . . the Christian Front."

The members of the Christian Front are, for the most part, the poor and discontented. On the fringes of the organization have been some well-to-do members of the community, like Merwin K. Hart, of the New York State Economic Council, and George U. Harvey, president of the Borough of Queens. The rank and file, however, are down at the heels: disgruntled men with frayed collars and unpressed trousers; unhappy housewives from slum tenements on First Avenue or Tenth Avenue or Amsterdam Avenue; youngsters of twenty or twenty-one, who have never worked, and have little hope of ever getting jobs "until people like me get into power."

Night after night, they meet in Donovan's Tavern, just off Columbus Circle, at Tri-boro Palace uptown, at Ebling's Casino, and two or three similar places, to voice their discontent. They hold street-corner meetings all over the city, at which soap-box speakers berate the Jews as the cause of depression and war, usually speaking of them as "the Indians," or "the Eskimos," or the "Gefülte-fishes." Invariably there are threats of violence: talk of "blood flowing in the streets of New York."

"We'll have to handle those Eskimos the Franco way," the speakers will say.

"The Franco way" is Father Coughlin's phrase. It reflects the belief that Francisco Franco resorted to arms in Spain only to keep the "Communists" from taking over the gov-

ernment. Father Coughlin has several times warned his followers to prepare for just such an eventuality in the United States by arming now. On July 30, 1939, he urged that these men be prepared "to meet force with force."

So there has never been any secret within the Christian Front about the military nature of the organization. The application blank for membership—it costs \$1 to join and the monthly dues are 25 cents—requires applicants to list their military experience.

However, the members of the Christian Front do not consider themselves revolutionists. They believe they are resorting to force only "in self-defense." They have been convinced by Father Coughlin that "atheistic Jews" and Communists are insidiously taking over the Government of the United States, and that direct action is needed to stop them. In their propaganda-twisted minds, when they speak of dynamiting buildings, murdering Congressmen, and "washing the streets of New York with Jewish blood," they are really planning to re-establish "Constitutional Government."

"Oh, you just don't understand . . ." said one arrested member of the Christian Front, when reporters asked him if the United States "doesn't have Constitutional Government now."

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Number 6

## Propaganda via Short-wave

THIS has been called the "Quiet War," for there has been virtually no activity on the Western Front, nor is any expected until the spring, if then. Yet, on the short-wave radio front, the war has been anything but quiet, and each day it becomes more furious, as the nations of Europe snipe at one another with ridicule or hammer away with invective. And if the war on the Western Front is still not "the second World War," since most of the world has thus far managed to stay out, not so the war in the ether. It began many weeks, even months before the armies of Reichsfuehrer Adolf Hitler swarmed into Poland; and it now involves even those nations which most vehemently protest their neutrality. Only Switzerland and tiny Luxemburg have remained aloof from it, the latter because she is afraid, the former apparently because she just doesn't care.

Each nation has developed its own radio technique. The Nazis are loud and insistent; they call upon the neutrals to discount the "lies" of the British "Ministry of Misinformation" and warn the English that Neville Chamberlain's "warmonger" cabinet is profiteering in munitions stock. The British Broadcasting Company is more stand-offish; it adopts a "why-bother-to-tell-lies" attitude, but it manages to keep nine stations busy sending out news bulletins in seventeen languages.

For short-wave consumption, the French treat the war casually, as though it were a minor annoyance. One might almost imagine that radio propaganda were beneath their dignity. On the standard-band and medium

wave, however, the French are bitter and vindictive. Before the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed, the Moscow radio descended to obscenities in attacking the Germans. Radio Roma is perpetually horrified by "Soviet atrocities in Finland."

The German short-wave battery is Reichsender Berlin, six high-powered stations, which broadcast in ten different languages. Prototype for all that comes from these stations is Hans Fritzsche of the Deutscher Reichs-Rundfunk. Almost every night Hans Fritzsche goes on the air for fifteen minutes to review the news of the day. Quoting from Allied, German, Italian, and Soviet newspapers, he gives his own interpretation of the day's events. The butt of Herr Fritzsche's attacks is Winston Churchill, who has been accused of everything from the Munich bombing to the sinking of the Athenia. Once BBC sarcastically remarked that Herr Fritzsche would some day charge Mr. Churchill with starting the Reichstag fire.

BBC is the British equivalent of Reichsender Berlin. It was BBC which put on the air the most harrowing atrocity story of the war, a detailed description of conditions in Nazi concentration camps. So effective was this story, which, incidentally, was translated into no less than fourteen different languages, that Reichsender Berlin for once was stunned into silence. After recovering, the German short-wave radio crackled for days in denunciation.

No doubt BBC's atrocity story was largely true. Instead of denying it, Reichsender Berlin accused Great Britain of inventing concentration camps during the Boer war. Day in,

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day out, the Nazis told of the terrors committed by the British during that war, but no Nazi commentator bothered to point out that England fought the Boers forty years ago, not yesterday.

Just as conveniently, BBC overlooked the fact that His Majesty's Government had long known about conditions in Nazi concentration camps, but had found it convenient to remain silent. Although BBC spoke of Britain's "duty to humanity" to enlighten the world concerning these conditions, it was not until Britain went to war against the Reich that she felt compelled to speak out for humanity's sake.

Moscow has forgotten everything it ever said about Germany. A year ago, the Soviet attacks on the Nazis were largely unprintable. One of the mildest was keeping the Reich posted on Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment Paul Joseph Goebbels' alleged extra-marital relations. The Moscow radio would call for Mrs. Goebbels, telling her that Dr. Goebbels was stepping out, and where she could find him. Such heckling is now reserved for the Allies.

#### *Short-Wave Mix-Ups*

Radio Roma keeps pace with the other short-wave batteries by continually sniping at Moscow and the "Soviet's ruthless aggression in Finland." Particularly stressed is the Soviet "rain of death" on "defenseless villages," yet any listener, substituting the word "Ethiopia" for "Finland" and "Italy" for "Russia," would think Radio Roma were giving an account of the Fascist invasion of Haile Selassie's empire. The commentator has forgotten that Mussolini's son exulted over the "beautiful unfolding roses" created by Italian bombs as they fell on Ethiopia.

Occasionally one of the short-wave commentators carefully digs a hole, and his rivals gleefully shove him into it. There was the British tale about Fuehrer Hitler's importing large quantities of coffee while all the rest of Germany followed ration cards; but, as Reichssender Berlin gaily noted, everyone knows Hitler doesn't drink coffee. Similarly, the Nazis reported the Ark Royal was sunk, and BBC for months has had great fun when the cruiser showed up in such ports as Cape-town and Rio.

Chief sore spot with the Allied and German

short-wave batteries are the bootleg stations within their own boundaries. Even in the pre-war warm-up, the German Freedom station denounced Hitler, and ribbed Dr. Goebbels about his private life. Some believe the Gestapo nabbed the Freedom commentators (at least one German went to prison for his alleged anti-Nazi radio activities), and that smart outsiders in neighboring countries are muscling in on the station's reputation. Whether that is true or not, Freedom packs a wallop when it charges that the Munich beer-cellar bombing was planned by men high in the Nazi councils or that Hitler is planning repatriation of German colonists in Hungary because he wants their 10,000,000 *pengo*.

Before the war started, most of the major nations tore their hair over similar bootleg stations, which persisted in voicing the opinions of suppressed groups. Anti-Stalinists, scolding Russia for "turning the communism of Marx and Lenin into a farce," boldly operated within their own country; Corsican nationalists railed at the French by private transmission; and anti-Fascists went looking for trouble in Italy.

For approximately four hours every day the Berlin station fills the ether with reports in various languages of the latest events in the war. These announcements cover all the fronts: Discontent is increasing among the British laboring class, the Nazis say; the submarine and mine campaigns are so successful that the British will soon be starved out; Paris *Jour* reports that French soldiers are bare-footed; the Dominions are voicing discontent over their war burdens; wives of soldiers receive only half as much support in Great Britain and France as in Germany. This "unhappiness" among the Allies is contrasted with Germany's plentiful supply of food, her "united home front," and the "purposeful" reconstruction work in Poland.

#### *What the Germans Say*

From four to six hours every day Berlin turns over its short-wave to out-and-out attacks on the British and French Empires. The Allies have long been intent on dismembering Germany, according to the Nazis, and the Germans are forced to fight for their very existence. Churchill is the "world's greatest liar," and the French "knaves" promise that all will be well



if Germany will only get rid of Hitler—but of course that is a “lie,” too. As a matter of fact, Germany is the most peace-loving nation on earth, and the British the most war-like. “In the last three centuries England has waged 144 campaigns, France 89, but Germany only 39, of which 14 were against Austria and 16 against Bavaria, to establish the unity of the Reich.” The Nazis are struggling desperately against the “Jewish-plutocratic spirit of England” which will “fight to the last Frenchman.”

Reichssender Berlin hammers away at the Allies by quoting British, French, and neutral commentators. Of course, Berlin doesn't, in each case, quote the whole story. According to the Nazis, G. B. Shaw is violently anti-British, and Hugh Johnson, Lindbergh, and Henry Ford know that this war isn't being fought to preserve democracy. Although Hungarian, Spanish, Belgian, Japanese, and American papers are drawn upon, the favorite sources of confirmation are the Soviet and Italian press.

#### *The Nazi's Entertain*

But this quoting from outsiders is not exclusively a German trick. Perhaps the strangest exhibition was that given by Reichssender Berlin and BBC when Oswald Garrison Villard, the American journalist, wrote his impressions of the war for the London *Daily Mail*. When the Germans quoted Mr. Villard, he sounded pro-Nazi; BBC made him sound anti-Nazi. It was the same article, but no one would ever have known it.

As a come-on for foreign audiences, Reichssender Berlin goes on the air with the music of Beethoven, Mozart, Bach, and Wagner. But ever so often the announcer breaks in with quick little speeches: “Two countries are fighting each other. The richest country with the poorest people, and the poorest country with the happiest people, where nobody is unemployed.” Or, “John Bull sits behind his ships while airplanes fly overhead and the Germans are broadcasting over his head through the blockade. . . . The ‘haves’ are aware that they have no business fighting. Every Englishman thinks about this and is puzzled when he sits down to his abbreviated breakfast, without his ham and eggs.”

Even more effective is the Nazi trick of having Germans go on the air to talk to friends and relatives in foreign countries. It doesn't

matter that personal messages don't get beyond the initial “My greetings to you and to dearest papa and all the other dear ones,” the relatives and friends will listen anyway. The rest of the message will go something like this: “I am contented . . . from the standpoint of a housewife . . . ration cards a very wise and good scheme. . . . It is really impossible to eat up what is allotted to us. . . . When you have plenty of eggs and milk, it is really no art to cook well. But with things rationed as they are, it is much more exciting to be a good cook.”

#### *Fred Talks to “Dear Harry”*

Right now in Iowa, a certain loyal American is burning up because Nazi Fred Kaltenbach keeps calling on “dear Harry” and all his neighbors not to believe Churchill's “lies.” “Harry” really did know a Fred Kaltenbach, but this wheedling voice keeps reminding him what pals they used to be out where the tall corn grows. After recalling the wonderful pumpkin pies he and “Harry” used to eat together, Fred calls on his “friend” not to “fall for British propaganda.” It's all the “bunko,” spread around by that “liar Churchill, the First Lord of the Sea Bottom.”

Comparable to Mr. Kaltenbach, with his genuine Iowa drawl, is the German “Lord Hawshaw,” whose accent is perfect Oxford. Lord Hawshaw, so named by his British listeners, tells England that “we Germans now command the sea. A submarine can dive many times; a capital ship but once.” The English regard Lord Hawshaw as a great joke and couple him with “Lord Booboo,” an Oxford-accented propagandist who broadcasts from Moscow and gives his news a pro-Communist twist.

Both Reichssender Berlin and BBC go in for repetition as one means of putting their message across. All German broadcasts end with the battle cry: “Germany fights for the removal of an injustice, the others for its continuation.” The British doxology is slightly more poetic: “And now we shall say good night. Sleep well. Wherever you may be in the colonies, this is a very good night from home.”

But the overseas service of BBC, like Reichssender Berlin, carries on a campaign of attack and vindication. Daily the British short-wave assaults Hitler and his “henchmen”: “They



have made themselves rich and sent millions out to neutral countries while the people go hungry. They have robbed you of every liberty, turned you into slaves without freedom of speech or freedom to work." Twitting the Germans about their laws against listening to the foreign radio, BBC adds: "Your leaders tell you it is bad for your nerves to listen. But it is not your nerves they are afraid of; it is your thoughts and your memory . . . you get a full ration of lies, but only a half ration of bread." The British substantiate their attacks on the Nazis by giving daily reports of massacres in Poland and unrest in Austria.

#### *BBC Quotes the Fuehrer*

One of BBC's delights is broadcasting selected bits from phonograph records of Hitler's speeches, and making a liar of the man by his own words. "Hitler has always lied to you," the commentators say. "He said that he was persecuting the Communists to save Europe from Bolshevism, and he allied himself to Stalin. He declared that he wanted a racially pure Germany, and now he is ruling the Czechs and the Poles. He solemnly declared that Poland was his good friend. You have seen how he kept his word. And . . . in *Mein Kampf* . . . he says, 'The great mass of people believe a big lie quicker than they will a small one.'" BBC concludes: "His words are not worth the paper they are written on or the air into which they were bellowed."

Persuading the Nazis to listen to BBC broadcasts despite the Gestapo is one of BBC's greatest problems. Their most tempting bait is reading the names of German prisoners of war, because mothers, whose sons are missing, naturally will hang by the radio to get word of them, no matter what the penalty may be. The British sandwich the names between the mixture of news and commentary which makes up the bulk of the program. Since they never read more than six names on any one broadcast, the Nazis may have to listen for months before they get word of their loved ones.

Comparable to Germany's concerts as a means of gaining the attention of foreign listeners are BBC's short-wave dramas. Among the most effective is the serial, *The Shadow of*

*the Swastika*. Sounding much like the *March of Time*, the weekly production is packed with drama. It looks deep into the background of Nazi history and ferrets out significant moments in Adolf Hitler's life. The Fuehrer himself is pictured as dim-witted and hysterical. When not shouting at the top of his lungs, he sheds tears like a baby who has lost his lolly-pop.

In a lighter vein was a satirical take-off from *Alice in Wonderland*. In *Adolf in Blunderland*, "Little Adolf" was just too cute. When asked what size he would like to be, he said, "Oh, I'm not particular as to size, so long as I'm bigger than the British Empire and the Dutch Empire and Belgium and the Balkans all rolled into one. You see, ninety million people is such a ridiculous size to be. My head needs more space all the time." By the end of the program, the BBC artist had debunked all Hitler's doings down to and including his imagined death at the hands of his own storm troopers.

#### *French Abandon Short-Wave*

After hostilities started, the French abandoned their short-wave broadcasts in German, using the medium wave and standard-band instead. These cannot be reached by American aeriels. Addressing the United States, Paris-Mondial stresses the uninterrupted life of Paris; American girls chatter about the latest Paris fashions, where they have cocktails, and what everyone is saying along the boulevards.

But if the Nazis may be credited, Paris-Mondial has no compunction about going after the Germans via medium wave. According to Reichssender Berlin, the French assure the Germans all will be well if only they get rid of Hitler, while at the same time, informing their own citizens that Germany would be cut to pieces along the lines of the Peace of Westphalia. In additions, the French are said to enjoy heckling German officials. One broadcast recently noted that Von Ribbentrop had been grievously in error when he insisted that England and France wouldn't fight if Poland were attacked: "Ribbentrop, we must warn you. The spectre of Roehm is behind your back. Adolf the Beloved is practicing target shooting."



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# Propaganda Analysis

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INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

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## Soldiers of the Lord

NO sooner had the guns started to boom again across the frontiers of Europe in September, 1939, and the various governmental propaganda agencies to issue their pronouncements, than the leaders of organized religion began to invoke divine aid in behalf of their country's cause, advancing reasons to show why God was inevitably on their side.

In the first month of the war, the French newspaper *Le Temps* published forty-eight separate articles which sanctified the Allied cause in the name of God and with the blessing of his churches, or implied divine disapproval of the Reich. *The Times* of London published thirty-three such articles; the *Manchester Guardian*, thirty-one; the *New York Times*, forty-three; the *Chicago Tribune*, six; and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, fourteen.

Conversely, the German *Angriff* published eleven articles enlisting religion on Hitler's side; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, thirteen. And the *New York Times*, on September 15, carried an Associated Press dispatch from Berlin reporting that anti-church agitation by the Nazi government had ceased in an effort to achieve national unity, and that war prayers were being gradually introduced.

We recall that during the first World War German ministers linked the name of Emperor William with Jesus, St. Paul, and Martin Luther, and suggested that God might "be singling out the German people as a means of defeating the destructive anti-Christian tendencies of the age."

So pronounced were these World War utterances of German clerics that Jacob P. Bang,

professor of theology at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, incorporated some of the choicest of them in a book which he entitled, *Hurrah and Hallelujah*.

A rather unique collection could also be made of the pronouncements of British and French ecclesiastical leaders of those days. One, quoted in the *London Times*, of August 12, 1914, is perhaps typical. The Bishop of Hereford saw in the war the promise of a "Better Day." "Such a war," said he, "is a heavy price to pay for our progress toward the realization of the Christianity of Christ, but *duty* calls, and the price must be paid for the good of those who are to follow us."

There is nothing at all strange in this support given by organized religion to the state in time of war. This dual alliance between war and religion is as old as civilization itself.

As far as Christianity is concerned, there is a lengthy and notable war record. Professor Ray H. Abrams, in his *Preachers Present Arms*, suggests that "Of all the great world religions, with the possible exception of Mohammedanism, none has been more devoted to Mars than has Christianity. Founded by one who was adored as the 'lowly Nazarene,' 'The Prince of Peace,' and 'The Lamb of God,' his followers have, nevertheless, when occasion demanded, pictured him as a mighty warrior in the forefront of the battle. They have participated under his Banner in the bloodiest wars known to man."<sup>1</sup>

Judaism, as every reader of the Old Testa-

<sup>1</sup> *Preachers Present Arms*, by Ray H. Abrams. (Round Table Press, New York, 1933), p. 3.



ment knows, always went to war in the name of Jahweh, the God of Battles, from the time of Moses to the Christian era. In His Name, thousands of innocent women and children were slaughtered in order to gain and hold possession of what was termed the "Promised Land." The Jews have given us the Holy Scriptures, which is probably the greatest religious war book known to men.

It so inspired Cromwell that he caused to be printed a special edition in 1643 which he termed, *The Souldiers Pocket Bible*, "containing the most (if not all) those places contained in Holy Scripture which doe shew the qualifications of his inner man, that is a fit Souldier to fight the Lords Battels, both before he fight, in the fight and after the fight."

In these later days of grace, since the Jews have been scattered throughout the world, their support of wars carried on by their particular state has varied according to circumstances. Certainly, in the first World War, the Jewish rabbis and congregations gave ample evidence of loyalty to the side in which their country participated.

#### *The Churches Mobilize*

Organized religion seems to have a way of getting on the band wagon and going along with the parade. In fact it sometimes helps in leading the parade. As Professor Harold D. Lasswell, says in *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, "the churches of practically every description can be relied upon to bless a popular war, and to see in it an opportunity for the triumph of whatever Godly design they choose to further."

The present war in Europe is too young to prophesy the extent to which religion may be used to depict one side as crusaders in a Holy War, and to make a Satanic Majesty of the enemy. But the immediate mobilization, perhaps conscription, of the churches for the present war of words and emotion, viewed against the background of what has happened before, may significantly reveal what we may expect in the future. If the history of institutionalized religion has any bearing on the possibility of a reliable prediction for the future, we may be assured that the great majority of Christians and Jews in England and France will be in favor of full prosecution of the war to defend civilization and save it from disaster. In Ger-

many, for obvious reasons, the Jews will not support the Fatherland, but the Christians will obey the voice of the state, and their organizations will aid in promoting the Holy Cause.

Thus we find in the September 2nd issue of the *Times* of London that the Archbishop of Canterbury calls for "resolute loyalty" to England in the war. Similarly, in the *Times* of September 18, we read that Dr. Winnington-Ingram, formerly Bishop of London, preaching at Fulham Parish church, declared that had England failed to fight upon the invasion of Poland, she would have been guilty of accepting a bribe at the expense of freedom and the rights of the weak. He said: "Our consciences are clear. We can be absolutely certain of final victory. We must fight with no hate in our hearts—certainly not against the ordinary German soldier. When this evil has been conquered and crushed forever, far more skillfully than we did last time, we must build up a new world."

The very fact that the Archbishop of Canterbury, head of the Church of England, and the former Bishop of London declare that war by the Allies has become necessary to prevent injustice and the loss of human liberty, transfers religious prestige and approval to armed force against Germany. The cause of war more easily finds convenient support in the minds of religious people when prominent, authoritative clergymen publicly endorse the struggle as one for "God and Country."

#### *Not "Holy" but "Righteous"*

Since the term "Holy War" got into such thorough disrepute in the period of disillusionment which followed in the wake of 1914-18, there seems to be great caution in introducing this term again. Hence there must be a substitute phrase which will arouse an emotional appeal. The Archbishop of York has found it. In January of this year he declared: "We are fighting for Christian civilization. I cannot use the phrase 'Holy War' for war in its own nature is always an expression of the sin of man. But without hesitation I speak of this as, for us, a *righteous* war."<sup>2</sup>

That British clerics are using opportunities to explain the "righteousness" of their cause to congregations in the United States is not surprising. Propaganda seeks to make as many

<sup>2</sup> *Time* magazine, January 29, 1940.



converts as possible. The New York Times of September 4, 1939, reported a sermon delivered by an English pastor at a Fifth Avenue church in New York City. The minister was the Reverend Dr. Donald Davidson of St. Andrews Presbyterian Church, Bournemouth, England. He explained: "When leaders like Adolf Hitler abuse their authority, they are making for themselves a 'quick end,' for God is against them."

"God is the sworn enemy of every tyrant, and this dictator will find that he has not only France and England to reckon with, but our Lord as well. God made the world and has every right to control it. If He did not take action in what we have seen at the present time, we would think He was indifferent."

### *Reaching American Clerics*

In the first World War it was Sir Gilbert Parker who, being in charge of British propaganda for the United States, sought to influence American opinion by writing to friends in America, getting influential Britishers and Scotsmen to do likewise. Lecturers and preachers were sent over and every available contact was made use of. Eventually the carefully compiled mailing list of Wellington House was expanded until it contained the names of 260,000 influential persons in the United States.<sup>3</sup> This same device of using contacts between British noteworthies and Americans is being used again. In the Manchester Guardian of September 6, 1939, we discover that the Reverend Dr. J. H. Rushbrooke, president of the Baptist World Alliance, has forwarded the following message to the Baptists of the United States:

British Baptists returning from Atlanta find themselves ranged behind their Government in support of war. Why? Not because they believe that armed force can achieve positive good. They know it cannot bring about the acceptance of ideals which we cherish—of religious and civil freedom, of democratic control of government. But they are clear that there is one thing force can accomplish: as the instrument of right it can neutralize other force which is the instrument of wrong. . . .

The Prime Minister has declared that we are resisting evil things—brute force, bad faith, injustice, oppression, persecution. British Baptists know that he speaks truly. They do not expect force, even

when rightly applied, to ensure the attainment of the good; but they do hope and pray it will neutralize the force which sustains evil.

It is evident that the message of Dr. Rushbrooke is being used not only to rationalize English armed force, but also, by implication, to give it the religious approval of the Baptist World Alliance. It's the Transfer device. The authority and prestige of Dr. Rushbrooke and the Baptist World Alliance are carried over to give equal acceptance and respectability for British and hence the Allied cause.

The Jews in England have, naturally, additional reasons for desiring to see Hitlerism crushed. In a Jewish New Year message reported in the London Times of September 8, the Chief Rabbi, J. H. Herts, is quoted as saying:

The champions of the rule of law among the nations have taken up the sword against the forces that are working for the destruction of the European system and of the moral values of civilization. These same heathen forces made the defamation and the utter ruin of the House of Israel one of the main aims of their iniquitous policy. Throughout Germany and its satellite States, the Jew is denied elementary rights, and his whole existence in these lands has become a nightmare. None will respond more wholeheartedly than Britain's Jewish children to the call of King and Country. None will pray more fervently than they that God will shield with His mighty arm our beloved country, which remains the bulwark of liberty, justice, and humanity on earth. . . .

### *Hitler is the Enemy*

Rabbi Altmann just a few days previously had pointed out, "We are not going to wage war against a *people* but against a *man* who has become a satantic power in the world. We bear no hatred against the German people. It has itself become the victim of brutal force and cannot voice its real sentiments."

Here again, as in 1914, one man is indicted as responsible for the holocaust. In those days the Kaiser was depicted as his Satanic Majesty—and in the cartoons by Raemekers and others he was frequently made to appear like Mephistopheles in *Faust*.

Psychologically, it is much simpler to blame one man. He is easier to visualize and flay in fantasy than a whole nation.

The writings of A. G. Gardiner in 1914 were characteristic of this point of view of allocating blame to the German government. He wrote in the London Daily News, August 8, 1914:

<sup>3</sup> *Propaganda for War—The Campaign Against American Neutrality, 1914-1917*, by H. C. Peterson. (University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, 1939), p. 16.



"We have no quarrel with the German people. . . . No, it is not the people with whom we are at war. It is the tyranny which has held them in its vise, the tyranny of personal government armed with a mailed fist, the tyranny of a despotic rule, countersigned by the Krupps . . . In this war we are engaged in fighting for the emancipation of Germany as well as for the liberties of Europe."

It is highly probably, however, that, once the indictment against a nation's leader, or a few leaders, has been established as "fair and logical," the indictment will spread to all the leader's subjects. In the first World War, the dramatically effective and infectious term, "Hun," soon described for a great majority of the American people the entire German population.

#### *The Catholics and War*

For instance, though A. G. Gardiner in England, and James M. Beck and Woodrow Wilson in America emphasized the fine distinction between German rulers and the German people, we soon found the Reverend Charles Carroll Albertson, of the Lafayette Avenue Presbyterian Church in Brooklyn, describing Germany as "a whole nation suffering from moral strabismus." We found Evangelist William A. (Billy) Sunday declaring that: "All this talk about not fighting the German people is a lot of bunk. They say we are fighting for an ideal. Well, if we are, we will have to knock down the German people to get it over."

The Roman Catholic Church is more international in its organization than the other churches. It is, therefore, always a matter of interest to see how, in times of armed conflict, the forces of patriotism and the religion of nationalism outweigh any abstract considerations about the brotherhood of man, or the catholicism, i.e. universalism of the church. On many occasions, of course, Catholics have fought against Catholics in the name of God and Country, as have Protestants and Jews.

In this war, the Catholics of England and France are united behind their governments. It has been difficult up to the present time to secure reliable data on the attitudes and activities of the Catholics in Germany.

In the first week of the conflict, Cardinal

Hinsley sent out a pastoral letter to be read in the Catholic churches in England. The Cardinal wrote, in part: "Implore Almighty God to give strength and victory to those who, in obedience to authority, are striving and fighting for the cause of justice and peace."

In France, Cardinal Verdier, Archbishop of Paris, delivered a sermon in the basilica of Notre Dame of the Victorios on the occasion of a mass on the birthday of the Holy Virgin. He said that France desires to defend freedom; she has "undertaken a crusade against barbarism; thus she struggles for the world and works for heaven. This glorious mission ought to inspire everybody with faith and confidence, it ought to induce everyone to make necessary sacrifices. . . ." In conclusion the Cardinal said that "the soldiers who fight and fall on the field of battle are martyrs." He ended with words of confidence in "God and victory."

At this point it may be well to note a characteristic feature of religious propaganda and reasoning, in its endorsement of a particular righteous war, and the urging of men to enlist. The device consists of taking highly emotionally toned religious words and phrases, to which people have been conditioned to respond in a certain way, lifting these words and phrases from their original sacred context and frame of reference, then transferring them to the endorsement of something entirely foreign to the original meaning. However, care must be exercised to transfer the use of the words to a new association which has many similarities to that of the original context.

#### *Use of Religious Symbols*

In the address of Cardinal Verdier, for example, there is a reference to making *sacrifices*. In the minds of Christians that word brings up mental pictures of a sacrifice on the altar, or denying oneself to demonstrate one's penance for sin committed, or one's love for God or man. Now men are asked to sacrifice or give up something to help in the winning of God's war. It becomes, thereby, a Christian duty.

Then the word *martyr* is used. The Christian martyrs died in eras of great persecution because they, like Jesus, preferred to die rather than give up their faith. The Christian Church has adored, practically worshipped, its martyrs. But they were not fighters, for the most



part they were pacifists. Now men are asked to become *martyrs* for another kind of faith, the Christian faith in justice, liberty, and the cause of France which is under attack by the Germans. This is a new kind of martyrdom. However, if soldiers were simply martyrs, the army would collapse.

Now comes the neatest rationalization of all. It was Pareto who pointed out that, since we ordinarily shrink from the realism of sending men out to kill in cold blood, we create an acceptable euphemism, and glorify the soldier who goes forth to battle and dies "gloriously" for his country. What we actually desire in time of war, but have difficulty in admitting to ourselves, is soldiers who go forth to battle and prove such able killers that they slaughter the enemy and themselves escape injury. But in patriotic literature and religious devotion, the emphasis is upon the "sacred dead." Only on rare occasions is it the great killer, as such, who is enshrined in memory. It is rather the reverse of the picture, the *sacrifice* that is kept sacred. The tombs of the unknown soldiers throughout the world are illustrations, of this type of rationalization.

#### *Testimonial from the Pope*

Returning again to various attempts in France to build up religious sentiment in favor of the war, we come to the use made of pronouncements of the Vatican. Roman Papal Catholic disapproval of Germany, is turned around to imply Papal approval of the Allies. This is clear in an emphatic interpretation which an editorial in the French *Le Temps* on September 9, 1939 places upon a statement by Pope Pius XII:

The Holy Father did not fail to seize the first opportunity publicly to define the position of the Catholic Church, to express to all Christianity his grief at the outbreak of the catastrophe of war. Choosing his words carefully, he stated the following principles: that the universal Roman Catholic Church could not discriminate between peoples. However, he distinctly stated that this attitude does not imply a surrender of the necessary rules of Christian civilization. Recalling the anxiety with which he encouraged all efforts in favor of peace, Pius XII said that he saw approach with a grief-shaken heart the "catastrophe which follows as an inevitable consequence of the abandonment of negotiations and a resort to armed force."

Everybody understands that this is a formal condemnation of German aggression, for it is Hitler's

Germany which checked negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw, even though it knew of Poland's willingness to negotiate and stave off the start of conflict. It is Hitler's Germany which had recourse to force of arms, which is responsible for unprovoked aggression when the possibility of a peaceful solution existed. One can be sure that the Holy Father does not know how to be indifferent to the martyrdom of a Catholic nation such as Poland.

This editorial, of course, links a distinctly French argument with the name and official utterances of the Pope. Thus, it uses the Testimonial device.

#### *The Vatican in 1914*

The record of the Vatican with respect to past wars is rather revealing because it throws light on the present. There is certainly no evidence that the Papacy has been absolutely opposed to war as such. It has only been opposed to war on certain occasions. During the Middle Ages, the Popes were embroiled in wars innumerable, and, as heads of the Holy Roman Empire, they directed Holy Wars whenever it seemed advisable for the preservation of the Empire or the Papacy, or the Faith, or the rooting out of heresy. The Crusades were only one series of Holy Wars out of dozens.

It is sometimes argued that in these halcyon days men knew no other methods, and hence the Popes resorted to war when it seemed to serve a Holy Cause; today, so the argument goes, the Popes are peace-loving and hate war. We are told that Pope Pius XI was a great peace loving man. When he died millions of words were printed all over the world about his herculean efforts on behalf of world peace.

During the World War, Benedict XV issued peace proposals which, if agreed to by the warring powers, were calculated to iron out the difficulties. These proposals were not taken seriously by the Allies. The Roman pontiff himself became more than ever suspected of being pro-German, particularly pro-Austrian. Benedict XV, however, was neutral in his policies for a very real reason. The Roman See was not opposed to the forms of government or economic systems in the principal warring countries, and Catholics in those countries, for the most part, had been very well treated. The Catholics were especially strong in Germany, Austria, France and Italy. Why should His Holiness have asked loyal Catholics to do combat against their brothers in the Faith?



What, however, of the record of the Vatican since 1918? A good test is to examine the attitude of the Pope toward the two wars engaged in by Italy. In the Ethiopian conquest he at least by his silence, gave tacit approval to troops who went forth to subdue the Lion of Judah and his dark hordes—and this despite the fact that these Africans belonged to the Coptic branch of the Christian Church. After the *fait accompli*, Pius XI bestowed his Apostolic benediction on Victor Emanuel as King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia.<sup>4</sup>

In the recent struggle in Spain, Pope Pius XI was openly on the side of Franco. Every morning the seventy-nine year old Pontiff celebrated a requiem mass for the “innocent victims of the Spanish terror.”

On the walls of his private chapel there hung a painting that he had commissioned, which depicted the defeat of the Bolshevik Army at the gates of Warsaw in 1920. At the time of that event he was the Papal nuncio to Poland and was the only envoy who refused to leave the besieged city. He acquired a deep and lasting hatred of Communism.<sup>5</sup>

According to his interpretation of events the Church was menaced by communism in the Soviet Union, Mexico, and Spain. He believed that, of all the perils which confront human society, “the first, the greatest and now the general peril, is certainly communism in all its forms and degrees.”

### *The Record in Spain*

Accordingly, Pius XI charged that the Bolshevik propaganda in Europe had caused the Spanish civil war:

Satanic preparation has relighted—and that more fiercely—in neighboring Spain that hatred and savage persecution which have been confessedly reserved for the Catholic Church and Catholic religion as being the one real obstacle.

Our benediction, above any political and mundane consideration, goes in a special manner to all those who assume the difficult and dangerous task of defending and restoring the rights to honor God and religion. . . .

In February, 1937 he rejoiced over the Spanish Fascist capture of Malaga.

<sup>4</sup> New York Times, February 13, 1937.

<sup>5</sup> Literary Digest, September, 1936.

<sup>6</sup> Commonweal, June 5, 1936.

On Sunday, June 11, 1939, the present Pontiff received 3,161 Spanish veterans of Franco's army and praised them for achieving “a victorious triumph of the Christian ideal.”

The *Christian Century*, in commenting on the Spanish situation, said:

To a great extent the church has thrown the weight of its influence upon the side of Franco and the insurgents. Italian troops have gone into that war with banners blessed by the church. It has played its part in representing the conflict as one between atheistic bolshevism and the crusading forces of Christianity. It has striven to create the impression that the loyalists were murderous ruffians whose most characteristic activities were desecrating altars, slaughtering priests and raping nuns, while the rebels and their invading allies were practically advancing on their knees.

### *German Atrocities in Poland*

The Catholic Church has had experience in making use of atrocity stories. When the world is informed that Catholic churches have been burned, priests killed and nuns violated, the incidents are not only proof of the utter Godlessness and barbarism of the perpetrators, but, by implication, the atrocities are tenfold more serious than when ordinary property is destroyed or common citizens killed or brutally treated. It would take us too far afield to discuss the amount of trustworthy evidence to support the contentions of the Catholic indictments. Undoubtedly some of the stories were true, others absolutely false. The point of discussion here is the specific use which the Catholic Church makes of these stories in its propaganda efforts.

The recent Catholic report on atrocities committed by the Germans on the Poles, and Catholic property and priests, is another illustration of the particular use made of this type of material for propaganda purposes.

When men in the World War were transferred from service in Belgium to Italy they noted a striking change in the atrocity stories. There was an almost complete absence of stories about little children with their hands cut off, etc. In Italy the propaganda revolved around the terrible destruction of Catholic Church property and the killing of priests. *These* were the evidences of German barbarism.

It is clear from the foregoing that while the Vatican may be in favor of and work for peace, it is not opposed to all wars. At the present



time, Pope Pius XII, while no doubt horrified at the total slaughter which is going to take place in this war, is practically openly on the side of the Allies and against Germany and Russia. In a letter to Cardinal Verdier, Archbishop of Paris, he wrote: "We desire ardently that Catholic France, overcoming the difficulties of the present hour, achieve in even greater degree her noble vocation of apostleship and civilization, which Divine Providence has assigned to her in the concert of nations."

He referred to the French as "a great and good people" and concluded by directing "his paternal thought toward the whole French clergy, and especially those whom the gravity of the hour is exposing to the greatest peril, placing them in a position to acquire the highest merit."<sup>7</sup>

This last remark, about the priests with the French army, reminds us that France, almost the exception among nations, does not exempt clergymen from combat service. In the first World War, 30,000 of the Catholic clergy, both regular and secular, joined the colors. According to a New York *Times* correspondent, "When the armistice came, they had won 16,000 citations, and of them 6,000 had been killed."

In the present war more than 500 priests from the Paris Diocese alone are serving at the front. (Chaplains are not included in any of the above figures.)

#### *The Church in Canada*

In view of the papal blessing on the French clergy and people and their cause, Cardinal Verdier followed with a pastoral letter which stated frankly what the Pope "because of his position" could only say indirectly. Germany had violated all her treaties and, therefore, "the war is a crusade." "No other war has had aims that are more spiritual, moral and, in sum, more Christian," he continued. "We are all mobilized. There is not a single Frenchman who is not at his post. Each has his different task but they are all equally sacred."

While ecclesiastical leadership in Europe is getting on the band wagon and issuing propaganda to support the war for God and Country, what is happening in America?

First, let us take a glimpse at Canada. There

is, up to the present moment, some division of opinion (as is also true in England) among the clergy. There is a rather unique group of about seventy-five Protestant clerics who have resolved to remain pacifists. So far, with few exceptions, these have been able to retain their pulpits.

However, the great bulk of Canadian ministers seem to be committed thoroughly to the cause of Britain. A subscriber to the *Christian Century* describes the situation in the issue of February 2. "The church generally has no doubt whatever regarding its Christian duty to the empire in the present crisis."

#### *Is Pacifism un-Christian?*

Dr. C. E. Silcox, General Secretary of the Christian Social Council of Canada, stated the case against pacifism. It "violates the teachings of biology." "The law of preservation is a fundamental law of life."

Moreover, "pacifism also misunderstands the essential and positive meaning of the state. . . . The State exists to protect not merely itself but the fundamental rights of all its citizens. . . . Citizens cannot well accept the privileges and protection which the state affords unless they are willing to accept the responsibilities which go with such privileges, and to pay the price which may be required when the state and all the interests inherent in the state are threatened."

Dr. Silcox uses another line of argument so familiar in the World War: "the pacifist who will do nothing to restrain by force a mad nation is like a man who will not use force to restrain a mad man." Also, "The pacifists urge too sentimental and romantic a view of God. . . . God is not alone Love. He is also Law and Justice. . . ."<sup>8</sup>

In the United States, the Government has always been able to rely upon the churches for support in time of any major war. Before the shooting started in the Revolutionary period, the pulpits of New England were preparing the minds of the members of the congregation for an open break with the mother country. When it did come, preachers everywhere joined the colors and used their pulpits as recruiting stations.

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in the *Information Service* of the Federal Council of Churches January 20, 1940.

<sup>7</sup> New York *Times*, February 7, 1940.



In the Civil War, the churches—North and South, were for the most part loyal to their respective sides.

In the Spanish-American War the Government again relied upon the forces of organized religion.

In the World War, as the Interchurch World Movement phrased it: "Every office of the Government with a war message to deliver appealed to the ministers first of all."

The churches for the most part were overwhelmingly supporting the state. Their pulpits became the most active recruiting stations in the land. As agencies of propaganda they were second to none, with the possible exception of the newspapers. The mass of the clergy rationalized the conflict as the "most holy war of all the ages," and called for the "slaughter of the Hun."

### *The Crusade for Peace*

In the period of disillusionment following the World War, churches joined the peace movement. Practically every denomination went on record as being opposed to war. Some of these resolutions totally repudiated war in scathing terms. Ministers joined in the crusade for peace. Hundreds of the most prominent who had extolled the cause of the Allies, and participated in one capacity or another, swore never to bless war again.

The *World Tomorrow*, in May 1931, gave the results of a questionnaire distributed to 53,000 clergymen over the United States. There were 19,372 replies and of these 10,427 or fifty-four per cent stated it was their "present purpose not to sanction any future war or participate as an armed combatant."

Now that the long-anticipated war has started in Europe, forces are again at work to bring the United States into the conflict. So far the churches of the country have stood firmly against any participation and have preached the gospel of peace. However, there are signs that many of the clergy in this country are beginning to change their minds again about war. Their number is increasing, and to anyone interested in the way in which propaganda works, the parallels to 1914-17 are extremely interesting.

The leading (and only) editorial in the Methodist *Christian Advocate* (New York edi-

tion) of October 5, 1939, appeared with the title in clear bold type: THE GREATEST BATTLE SINCE CALVARY. After laying down a thorough barrage against Germany and Russia for their ideologies, their wickedness, denial of God, and part played in the present struggle, the editor, Mr. Harold P. Sloan, asks:

Can there be any Christian principle which prohibits Christian men, acting as free citizens, from offering effective resistance to such an enormous assault upon the whole increase (sic) of the centuries? I must answer this question with an unqualified "No."

The editor warns that "the human race is in the midst of the greatest battle since Calvary. Then God incarnate fought humanity's moral contest in awful sacrifice. Now men and women who have seen something of his vision must fight it in His strength and under His leadership."

America is not directly advised to enter the war in the manner of 1917-18, but one gets the impression from the full-page editorial that Mr. Sloan thinks we should do so, particularly when one reads: "And so the moral battle of the ages has become a political battle as well. It was this once before at Tours when another fanatical movement of organized plunder was challenged by the French. In such an hour America cannot be isolated."

This is reminiscent of the days following America's entrance into the fray in April 1917. The Rev. Randolph H. McKim, from his pulpit in Washington, D. C., then proclaimed: "It is God who has summoned us to this war. Is it His war we are fighting. . . . The conflict is indeed a crusade. The greatest in history—the holiest. . . . Yes, it is Christ, the King of Righteousness, who calls us to grapple in deadly strife with this unholy and blasphemous power (Germany)."

### *The Parallel With 1916*

A year before we declared war, Dr. William T. Manning wrote a lengthy letter to the *New York Times* in which he maintained: "Our moral sense as a nation is dulled. . . . Our present lack of national spirit is due also in part to a vast amount of well-meant but mistaken and misleading and really un-Christian teaching about peace." <sup>9</sup> Now, in the late au-

<sup>9</sup> *New York Times*, May 29, 1916.



tumn of 1939, Dr. Manning, the Bishop of New York, is again helping to prepare the minds of Americans for armed participation. Dr. Manning has never changed his attitude about war: "A Christian cannot be neutral between right and wrong. . . . Right is more important than peace. . . . What our ultimate duty as a nation may be if the conflict is prolonged, no one can say. . . ." <sup>20</sup>

This type of pronouncement is particularly characteristic of the period of immediate preparation of war-mindedness. It does not mean that because of such statements the United States inevitably must be drawn into war. But it does indicate the methods and propaganda which clergymen use to convince their hearers, or readers, that the war is essentially another Armageddon, the forces of God versus the evil might of the devil.

#### *Does God Say It?*

Similar to Bishop Manning's statement was the document released to the press on January 1, 1917 by sixty-five clergymen and laymen, in the midst of President Woodrow Wilson's efforts to bring about peace in Europe. The document read, in part:

The just God who withheld not His Son from the Cross, would not look with favor upon a people who put their fear of pain and death, their dread of suffering and loss, their concern for conquest and ease above the holy claims of righteousness and justice, and freedom, and mercy and truth. . . . The memory of all the saints and martyrs cries out against such backsliding of mankind. Sad is our lot if we have forgotten how to die for a holy cause.

Here again we note the high powered religious symbols and phraseology, and the Glittering Generalities that are brought into play to appeal to the emotions of those who have been conditioned to respond through years of Christian training to such a line of reasoning. The argument seems to run like this: Christ and the saints and martyrs died for a holy cause: the war is a holy cause: therefore, we should not hesitate to die for this holy cause. To refuse to do so is un-Christian.

It is also a matter of interest to note how many of these religious leaders know so dogmatically what thoughts are going around "in the mind of God." This air of positive assurance is a peculiar feature of religious propaganda. The appeal to the authority of God and

the Bible, for millions of people, leaves no alternative. The case is closed. God says so. Most of these people have never been trained to see that, after all, it is the minister who says so—not God. Furthermore, regardless of the topic, ministers are not at all agreed as to what God does or does not say.

Certain additional parallels between 1914-17 and the present are also clear, in that certain groups of clergymen and laymen today, as in 1914-17, are issuing statements about our responsibility with respect to the war. The press of January 27 carried a lengthy statement signed by thirty-two of the nation's most influential Protestants. They maintain:

To suggest that nothing of consequence is at stake in the success of Japanese, German and Russian designs on China, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and the Baltic States, or in the successful resistance of these latter nations, is to be guilty of moral irresponsibility. . . .

The churches in the United States are under obligation to lead their nation to assume a responsible relationship to the present conflicts.

While, to a certain extent, this clarion call is filled with Glittering Generalities, it seems to be perfectly clear that the churches are being shamed out of any neutrality they may have, and urged to support the allied cause in their hearts, if not in works.

This is the type of appeal so characteristic of the pro-Ally psychology of 1914-17 which helped to force us into the war.

#### *What of the Future?*

It would be leaving a false impression of church sentiments if we did not mention the fact that there have been numerous protests against this declaration. But, in this issue of PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, our purpose is not to balance the opinions about the war among the churches and ecclesiastics, but to show something of the manner in which clerical leaders help to "propagandize" the war as a righteous (if not holy!) cause, and prepare the minds and emotions of large masses of the people for a transfer of sentiment in favor of active participation.

So far no mention has been made of Catholic and Jewish influence in this country. Most of the Catholic press is along the isolationist—pacifist line, though there are some exceptions. A great number of influential Jewish rabbis have come out strongly against an iso-

<sup>20</sup> *Time* magazine, December 4, 1939.



lationist policy—but so far we have seen no stronger statements than those by the Protestants.

This social phenomenon of the manner in which religious propaganda is used in behalf of war cannot be explained fully in the space allotted here. It is a volume in itself. One or two suggestions can be made. As Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes has so convincingly shown, in the last two centuries, particularly since the French Revolution, the rise of nationalism has become a religion with its sacred scriptures, dogmas, ritual, propaganda, priests and devotees. In America, in the absence of a national church, it has become a great unifying religious force.

The similarity of the symbols of nationalism (as found in this country, for example,) and the religion of Christianity are at once apparent if placed in parallel columns:

The flag	The cross
The Constitution and the Declaration of Independence	The Bible
Tradition of the founding fathers	Sacred tradition and theology
Patriotic slogans	Holy words and phrases
Patriotic songs	Hymns
Uniforms	Gowns, surplices, etc.
Patriotic parades	Religious processions
Hero worship	Worship of saints
The sword	The sword of the spirit

From the point of view of the state, the churches and the clergy are, undoubtedly, among the ablest allies for purposes of spreading propaganda. The state has very shrewdly built up a religion which in time of threat to national survival commands the active support of the masses. They give millions for defense. At the same time, the churches and their leaders, with few exceptions, through social compulsion and the command of a greater loyalty, become the instruments and agents of the State. That the clergy in most countries are exempt from universal conscription may be due to the fact that, originally, they were all acclaimed as holy men of God; but if the state had simply exempted them because of their value as propaganda agents, it would have been amply repaid by the results which the men of the cloth have more than demonstrated. Once the nation, for whatever cause, becomes involved in what is thought to be a life and death struggle, the moral verdicts of the government become the moral verdicts of the clergy. Nationalism reigns supreme. The war becomes rationalized as "righteous," and the religious forces jump on the band wagon.

In the light of the past war record of the mass of the churches and clergymen, the student of propaganda may well ponder what the future holds in the event the United States again goes to war in Europe.

## Propaganda Analysis Worksheet

MILITARY critics have often stated that the generals in time of peace are busy preparing for the *last* war. The "inevitable" *next war*, when it finally breaks, is usually fought by a system of improvisation in the lower units. These improvisations percolate into the upper staff circles where they are organized into new schemes of maneuver and principles of combat.

Does the church, like its peace rival the general staff, prepare for the *last* war during the intervals of peace? After the first World War the church was one of the few institutions to add the immeasurable loss in human values to the concrete losses of life and property which statisticians had totaled as war losses. War gains

were difficult to locate, except in personal instances, and the church generally turned to a program of pacifism. But events have proved that this policy was built on the assumption that future wars would follow the pattern of wars in the past. Events in the 1930's upset the philosophy of many churchmen who were thinking in terms of World War experiences coupled with painful post-war revelations. These events were:

1. The attack on China by Japan, with the accompanying destruction of missions and the interference with missionary activity.
2. The conquest of Ethiopia, which created the widespread belief that the Great Powers were still imperialistic and would



risk war to defend colonial possessions but not to defend the idea of collective security.

3. The war in Spain, which raised old questions of church and state.

4. The persecution of the Jews in Germany and the restrictions placed on other religions, which revealed twentieth century nationalism as a powerful rival religion.

5. The tendency of the offending powers to form pacts, the Rome-Berlin Axis, the German-Japanese conversations, and the final non-aggression pact of Germany and Russia, which emphasized the danger of totalitarian nationalism to all religions.

6. To these events may be added the concern felt over the corroding effects of world Communist activity emanating from Russia and the disquieting effect of the Russian example.

How then is the church to meet the problems of this war? The long prelude of the war of nerves convinced many churchmen that their own neutrality was impossible. Every plea for peace which was issued from the pulpit aided the statesmen across the frontier who hoped to gain a bloodless victory by threatening war. Since the nationalistic powers were not only rivals to the nation in which the pastor lived but rival materialistic religions as well, was not the church destroying itself by its activities in behalf of peace? A decision was made even more difficult by the feeling that the real enemy was not the people of a rival state but an idea. This idea of totalitarian nationalism might triumph in one's own country through the censorship and regimentation of warfare. Is it possible that in this war there can be no victory, but only defeat and extinction for religion? Or did experience point a more hopeful direction, namely that the great religions are destined to survive the nationalistic aberrations of this century if they hold fast to their basic concern with human values regardless of the victories or defeats of warring states?

#### INDIVIDUAL PROJECT

##### *The Conscientious Objector*

The Bill of Rights guarantees to each citizen freedom to worship in any church which he may select. Shall a citizen who belongs to a religious group which regards war as slaughter

on the same ethical plane with murder be compelled to serve in the armed forces of the state? This question arises in every war. In the United States individuals from all religions refuse to bear arms, while entire groups, Quakers, Mennonites, and Dunkards are opposed to war. Which of the following courses of action would you uphold for dealing with such conscientious objectors?

1. Any citizen who refuses to serve in the army or navy combat branches should be sent to a concentration camp.

2. Such citizens should be assigned to medical and ambulance units where they could serve by saving lives rather than directly killing the enemy.

3. They should be assigned to work on farms and in factories where they could help win the war without serving in the army.

4. They should be excused from all military and civilian services which are connected with war.

5. Conscientious objectors should be singled out, presented with white feathers, and have their houses smeared with yellow paint if they refuse to join the armed forces.

Defend the course of action which you have chosen. Is it consistent with your ideas of democracy? If clergymen should be exempted from conscription should lay members of the church be given the same exemption if they ask for it?

#### INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PROJECT

##### *The Bible and War*

The Bible is the best known book in the Western world. Not only directly but through other literature the Bible has exerted a great influence on our thinking. Make a list of the passages in the Bible most frequently quoted with reference to war, pro and con. Many are used on both sides. Some of these are "He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword," "Thou shalt not kill." On the other side the incident of Jesus driving the money changers from the Temple is cited to support the use of force in a just cause. Other characteristics of church organization and procedure which lend themselves to war propaganda are:

1. The symbols, words, and phrases used in religion which may be transferred for patriotic purposes. Sacrifice, martyrs, altar



of our country, Holy War, Armies of the Lord, Armageddon, Sword of David, are some of these. Can you add to the list?

2. The war hymns of the church were printed in a special collection during the World War.

3. The "Fighting Parson" whose technique is to attack various groups in the community. This practice creates many enemies and it is difficult for such ministers to hold their popularity. In war-time the enemy is miles away, everyone is anxious to attack him (from a safe distance) so they back up the parson.

4. On Monday the newspapers report the sermons delivered the preceding day. Examine these sermons for examples of Card-stacking, Glittering Generalities, Name-calling and other devices.

#### GROUP DISCUSSION

##### *The Church and Nationalism*

1. As part of the life of a nation the church is called upon to take its part in reaching decisions and in acting on these decisions after they have been made. The decisions must be made within the ethical frame of reference of the national group, and the church is largely responsible for this frame. To what extent then can it be said that the churches are responsible for modern wars in that they have failed to carry out the ideal of an international brotherhood of man? This charge has been leveled at the churches. Is the charge a reasonable one? On the other hand, when the church taught peace and disarmament from 1920-30 many ministers were labeled communists by patriotic organizations with strong economic backing.<sup>1</sup>

2. The propaganda war is stated in Glittering Generalities which frequently conceal the more sordid aims of governments waging war. For example "room to live" may mean, the right of an oil company to exploit a field on another continent, or the desire for jobs as army officers and officials in a conquered territory. Are ministers prepared by their training to understand the economic and political origins of modern war?

3. How did the present-day nationalism de-

<sup>1</sup> *Professional Patriots*, by Norman Hapgood. (Albert & Charles Boni: New York, 1927.)

velop? Explain its origin. Consider the various elements of nationalism:

(a) The loyalty to a geographic region with imaginary political boundaries and a loyalty to the people who live in this area—*la patrie*.

(b) A feeling of kinship with others who speak the same language.

(c) The feeling of sharing a common history with the other people in a country.

(d) A feeling that all citizens of a country belong to an in-group while citizens outside of the boundaries belong to out-groups; that these out-groups threaten the culture, the security or general well-being of the in-group.<sup>2</sup>

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# Propaganda Analysis

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## Russia, Finland, and the U.S.A.

**G**UNS still speak more authoritatively than words, and God is not necessarily on the side of the heaviest typewriter battalions. So Russia has demonstrated and Finland has learned. When evenly-matched armies clash, the propaganda artillery may help to resolve a stalemate; it did in 1918, it may do so again. But when 4,000,000 people combat 180,000,000, Baron Münchhausen plus Baron Mannerheim are not enough. In the Finnish war Joseph Stalin virtually conceded the propaganda war by default, although Soviet sympathizers in the United States and elsewhere tried to cover his retreat. The Soviets lost every major engagement on the propaganda front—here and in Finland. But they won the war.

Propagandists are not miracle men. The Finnish cause in the United States was espoused by personalities as diverse as Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover, the Reverend Charles E. Coughlin and Elsie the Cow; at Finnish benefits Broadway stars contributed songs and Dorothy Lamour her sarong; the Gallup Institute reported that 88 per cent of America was rooting for Finland, only one per cent for Russia. Rarely, if ever, has a propaganda drive been waged under more favorable circumstances. But while all the propaganda prerequisites were on the side of the Finns, all the military advantages were on the side of Russia. The Finns needed guns and troops, Joseph Stalin needed only a

publicity man. It was a race against time: could the Finns convert a hoard of moral support into tangible military assets? Given additional time, they might have been able to do so. But they lost the race.

Although the war in Finland is over, its echoes will not subside. These echoes may become increasingly audible as the war in Scandinavia and on the Western Front proceeds. London and Paris have written off the Finns as lost, but not forgotten. When Belgium was overrun in 1914, her spiritual value to the Allied cause was only enhanced by her plight; and the dividends of the Allied propaganda investment in Belgium weren't realized until three years later. There is ample evidence that the Allies are alive to the value of Finland in their propaganda in America. To the *New York Times* P. J. Philip judiciously cabled from Paris as early as December 2:

In the Finnish issue there were none of the complications that clouded that between Poland and the Reich. The American reaction has been so prompt and so unequivocal on the side of justice and decency that it is regarded as marking an important step toward United States intervention, not in European quarrels, but in the establishment of governmental morality in the world.

Finland's advocates made mistakes, both in Helsinki and New York. To prove that Finland was no lost cause, they exaggerated their successes to ridiculous proportions; the fantasy overshadowed the urgency of their plight and gave a comic opera tinge to the whole war. (There were caustic suggestions that the Russians, not the Finns, needed relief.) Ex-President Hoover's leadership of the relief cam-

This bulletin consists of excerpts from *War Propaganda and the United States*, by Harold Lavine and James Wechsler. The book will be published for the Institute for Propaganda Analysis by the Yale University Press early this summer.

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paign also, in the long run, had serious drawbacks. He was too vulnerable. For one thing he had headed the Belgian relief movement, and most Americans tend to agree that the enterprise, whatever its humanitarian intent, was part of the build-up for American intervention in World War I; a judgment in which post-war students concur. "Above all," wrote H. C. Peterson,<sup>1</sup> "was the work of the American relief organization in Belgium a vital bit of propaganda. . . . The effectiveness of the 'poor Belgium' propaganda cannot be questioned." As the Finnish campaign got under way, Congressman William Barry (Dem., N. Y.) charged: "All of these types of activities are a deadly parallel with what took place during the years preceding our entry into the last war." More immediately, Mr. Hoover's name was indelibly linked with the images of depression: men selling apples on street corners, Bonus marchers gassed in the Capitol. He could too easily be accused of preferring Finnish relief to W.P.A. Finally, Mr. Hoover had been silent during the invasion of Spain; and writers like John Steinbeck and Theodore Dreiser wanted to know where he had been when the aggressor's identity was German or Italian. The point is not whether such criticisms were unjust; they were inevitable. On at least one count Mr. Hoover pleaded not guilty, insisting that relief measures were an emotional equivalent for war. "We are an emotional people," he told the *Times*,<sup>2</sup> "by helping a small country which has been attacked by a nation whose entire system is hateful to us, we are supplying an outlet for feelings which might otherwise lead to war." But Mr. Hoover's Belgian drive fitted the same description.

#### *The Russians Blunder*

If the Finns and their friends made errors, however, these were largely dwarfed by direct hits. In contrast the Russians blundered almost continuously, rejecting opportunities to state their case and stating it clumsily when they did. The blame of course didn't rest entirely with Soviet publicists, although there were moments when devoted Communists must have scented Trotskyism in the propa-

<sup>1</sup> *Propaganda for War*, by H. C. Peterson. (University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, 1939.)

<sup>2</sup> January 21, 1940.

ganda department. Essentially the Russians were fighting a propaganda battle against odds as hopeless as those which faced the Finnish army. History written after an event rarely discovers a case of unsullied good fighting unmitigated evil. But to contemporaries a war frequently assumes that coloration. To most Americans viewing the war in Finland, in the twilight of Russia's oft-proclaimed policy of non-aggression, it seemed momentarily as if history had finally been reduced to simplicity. The *Daily Worker* did insist, on the first day of the war, that "Red Army Hurls Back Invading Finnish Troops, Crosses Frontier." But so awkward a piece of Card-stacking was unlikely to deceive anyone. The Russian government maintained (until March 12) that this was no war at all but merely an act of "liberation"; but the generality had lost most of its glitter after Prague. Only reluctantly, and after a fatal silence, did the Soviets offer any more plausible explanations. By that time American opinion was crystallized.

#### *Finland The Underdog*

It was expressed in innumerable ways. Finland was "the underdog," Russia the "bully"; and Americans who cheer wildly for Godoy when he resists Joe Louis, or rejoice if Kalamazoo Tech upsets Notre Dame, persist in seeing their wars in somewhat the same terms. But the metaphors were not confined to the athletic vocabulary. Terse was the declaration of Fiorello H. LaGuardia after the war began: "Democracy is on the side of Finland, civilization is on the side of Finland, and Finland is on the side of God." Everything that the Finns did seemed to strengthen that picture. The Russians were "godless atheists"; the Finns, or so Helsinki reported, dropped bibles on Leningrad. The Soviets scorned private property; on December 15 the Finns paid the newest installment on their debt to the United States. Russian apologists might claim that Baron Mannerheim, whom they called "Butcher" Mannerheim, was not a staunch and uncompromising democrat; that in 1918, according to so reputable a source as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, he had slain 15,000 women and children during the White Terror. The point seemed singularly obsolete in the rush of contemporary events. Not only



An Editorial

## Wall Street Uses Finland for War

THE newspapers of the country are giving the American people a heavy dose of war propaganda on the latest developments in Finland.

The press has obviously determined to drug the intelligence of the American people, to paralyze all common-sense questioning in a wave of war hysteria aimed at the Soviet Union.

The remembered lies of the press on the Munich "peace" are being surpassed.

The plain truths are twisted or ignored.

The Finnish bourgeois-landlord rulers, incited and supported by world imperialism, continued their violations of the Soviet borders—they attacked at two points yesterday morning. They were repulsed by the Soviet Union which took the necessary steps in defense of its national interest.

It is the sheerest hypocrisy for the press to pretend moral indignation at "a little country" engaged with a "big country like the Soviet Union." They know that behind the Finnish ruling cliques stand the mighty forces of British and American imperialism, goading, encouraging, supporting the hostile acts of Finland.

The Finnish bourgeois-landlord cliques were willing to play this role of provocateur. They stood at the Soviet borders holding open the doors of war. The Soviet Union has closed the doors. No war dogs of world imperialism pass through.

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# Daily Worker

PEOPLES CHAMPION OF LIBERTY, PROGRESS, PEACE AND PROSPERITY

## Weather

LOCAL—Intermittent light rains and slightly warmer.  
Eastern New York—Cloudy and slightly warmer.  
New Jersey—Cloudy with light rains.

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## FINN CABINET RESIGNS

### Red Army Hurls Back Invading Finnish Troops, Crosses Frontier

City Budget  
Slashes  
Education  
Outlays

U. S. State Dep't Files Give Secret of F.D.R.'s Drive to Use Finland as War Base

By Adam Lavin

(Daily Worker Washington Bureau)

"The musty State

old story

At that time, as today, the imperialist governments were interested in the Baltic area because of its strategic value as a jumping off place for attacks against the USSR.

This was succinctly expressed in a memorandum from "ad. Warwick Green, chief of the American mission to the provinces. This note which was sent to the

"June 28, 1919, read: "have an imper-

population,

Advance  
6 to 9 Miles;  
Prisoners  
Are Taken

Air Fleet Bombs  
Two Finnish  
Air Bases

"1, Friday, Dec.  
ernment  
ignores

could Americans hate Stalin as they hated Hitler; they could love Finland as they could never love England. There was no counterweight to their emotions equivalent to Neville Chamberlain.

### The United States Reacts

To some Americans, moreover, the Finnish war provided sublimation for domestic grievances. They could identify native "Communism" with its Russian counterpart, and even blame Franklin Delano Roosevelt for the deeds of Joseph Stalin. A good many people who rejected the President's foreign policy toward Germany—because the President was Mr. Roosevelt—had no such inhibitions in the Finnish matter. They exulted in the embarrassment that the invasion caused Russian sympathizers in America. Some Republican leaders even managed to trace the invasion itself to the White House, on the somewhat abstruse theory that if Mr. Roosevelt had never recognized Russia, Stalin's ego would have been deflated; had Stalin's ego been suppressed, he would not have dared to attack Finland. . . . and so on. In these circles the Finnish war was more than a springboard to harass Russia; it had domestic value.

The atmosphere was not very conducive to cool reading of Russian communiqués, of which there were few. Perhaps Mr. Stalin realized that not even Ivy Lee could have sold

Russia's case to America; possibly he believed that the case was so obvious that it did not need elaboration. Russian propagandists have deceived themselves before, and their aides in other countries have frequently told them what they wanted to hear rather than what was actually true. Whatever the reason, the Soviet defense was only belatedly pieced together. As set forth in awkwardly worded communiqués and in more felicitously phrased documents written abroad, it rested on three major points and many incidental ones. Point one: the Soviet claims on Finland were indispensable to Russian security against capitalist enemies. (There is no doubt that the areas they sought had immense strategic value—both for Russia and for Finland. Finland, said the Soviets, was the key to Leningrad; a Russian base at Hano, said the Finns, would "point a pistol at the heart of Finland." Both were probably right.) Point two: the Finnish government rejected these claims, not because it feared further Russian assaults on Finland's independence—after a "Munich"—but because it was "egged on" by the Allies and was involved in a general anti-Soviet conspiracy. Point three: there was no "war" anyway because the Finnish people welcomed the Red Army, the Kuusinen "people's government" was just that, and the Finnish rulers were "bandits" who oppressed their own people the better to serve their imperialist masters.

Actually the fury of the Russian diatribes



tended to obscure whatever validity there was to the Russian argument. They preferred to stress point three, when point two was clearly their most formidable weapon. At no time did the Soviets outline their case in detailed strategic terms; when this was finally done, it was done by English supporters like D. N. Pritt and American journals like *Soviet Russia Today*. The Moscow press (perhaps for primarily domestic reasons) liked to emphasize that the Red Army was "helping the Finnish people to carry out with mighty strength the Stalinist policy of peace and friendship between two peoples." If this was music to Moscow newspaper readers, it was comedy in New York. For historians, the crucial debate—if there is any—will center over the Russian insistence that it was facing united Western intervention. That the Finns, in deciding to resist, calculated on foreign aid seems clear. On March 6 Ralph Barnes cabled the *Herald Tribune* from London: "'Exasperation' is the term used in news dispatches reaching London from Helsinki to express the feelings of the Finns at the failure of 'their friends' abroad to forward the military assistance which, it is said, was promised earlier. Undoubtedly the Anglo-French Allies are among 'the friends' referred to." But evidence of Allied "encouragement" does not prove that the Finns deliberately rejected "reasonable demands." Before September 1939, Russia had most steadfastly berated the Allies for failing to encourage countries similarly in danger of aggression. Neither does this evidence prove that an anti-Soviet conspiracy was being fashioned in the West, presumably through a swift "peace" with Hitler or a "moderate" regime instituted at a later date.

#### *The U.S.S.R.'s Rationale*

If the signs of a coming stroke against Russia had been plain, the Soviet rationale would have appeared far more formidable than it did. The invasion might still have been challenged on "moral" grounds, although there were numerous "democratic" precedents to be cited. It might have been challenged on strategic grounds—would the bases acquired cancel out loss of sympathy in other countries? But there would have been tints of gray where the world could only see black and white. The evidence, however, was not clear. That im-

portant British leaders—that Neville Chamberlain himself—had once harbored the dream was certainly arguable. But did they still harbor it after September? If so, why did they let Finland fall? Or were the Soviets taking out insurance against all future eventualities, however remote?

In any case, the Soviet argument had two fatal propaganda flaws. For one thing similar excuses have always masked aggressive acts, and the Soviets have been most articulate in lampooning such explanations. Echoes of Maxim Litvinov's speeches at Geneva were a running backfire to the apologetics of Russian spokesmen—1940 style. Emotionally impressive was the picture of the Finnish delegate at Geneva, appealing for aid with quotations from Litvinov's attacks against aggression liberally sprinkled through his text. If the Soviets had never invoked the canons of moral law, their new emphasis on *Realpolitik* would have been more effective. But they had. D. N. Pritt, Russia's most fluent defender in Britain, might write scornfully of those who used moral criticism of Soviet action; they were saying to the Soviets, scoffed Pritt:

You are in a position where any capitalist country would resort to force without a moment's hesitation; such countries are ruthless and amoral, and in a world where every rule of decency has now disappeared, they can derive great advantage from ruthlessness and amorality. But you mustn't act in that way; you have a higher moral code to keep.<sup>3</sup>

To some Americans, this picture of an amoral world was not unpersuasive; but the Soviets did not confine their defense to such "between-you-and-me" polemics. While deriding the moral laws they had been invoking until September, they sought new moral justifications for their act. They were not content with the primitive claim of self-defense; they tried to prove that they were "liberating" the Finns while protecting themselves. They were not only thwarting the "designs of the imperialists" against Russia but "rescuing" an "oppressed people." The moral code was still in force, but new statutes were being quoted, and they were substantially the same statutes which the Nazis had invoked for their "liberation" of Czechoslovakia. A further difficulty was that the Finns refused to behave like an "oppressed people" welcoming their saviors; they

<sup>3</sup> *Soviet Russia Today*, March, 1940.



shot at them. But the moral campaign did not subside. General Mannerheim was the principal whipping boy of this effort. His exploits during the White Terror in Finland were gruesomely detailed; Finland itself was pictured as a "semi-fascist" state. If Mannerheim's record was scarcely above reproach, the rest of the thesis was less than devastating. Finland is not the pure and idyllic democracy depicted by its sponsors. But Finland is, as the *New Republic* pointed out, "on the whole an orderly democracy," and the trend has been in the democratic direction. Its cooperatives have nearly 1,000,000 members; it has enacted a good deal of progressive social legislation (which many of its American advocates decry at home). In seeking to prove that Finland is not a democracy, the Communists were not too scrupulous in their scholarship. For example, on December 19, 1939, the *New Masses* quoted a report of the Foreign Policy Association—dated May 27, 1931—to "prove" the fascist character of the Finnish state. What it overlooked was the enormous changes which had been wrought since 1931—including a national election in 1937 which *Pravda* hailed as a symbol of the "democratic" victories of the Finnish people. In addition to Mannerheim, the Soviet stalwarts directed bitter fire against Vaino Tanner as one of the "bandits" directing the Finnish regime. Yet in 1937 Otto Kuusinen, exiled Finnish Communist and Moscow-appointed leader of the short-lived Finnish "republic," circulated a manifesto throughout Finland which was a rhapsodic eulogy of Tanner. Conditions, as the Communists are fond of pointing out, change.

#### *Real Issue Obscured*

All these polemics were essentially oblique to the real issue. Poland was actually a "semi-fascist" state; yet the Soviets claim to have desperately sought an alliance that would have protected Poland against Germany. Ethiopia was scarcely a model democracy; yet no one assailed the Italian invasion more bitterly than Soviet spokesmen. Communists in the United States protested bitterly against sending aid to Finland while "Americans are starving"; but Americans were hungry when the Communists rallied aid for Spain and China. Inconsistency is not an exclusively Communist

trait: witness some of the "isolationist" friends of Finland in America. But verbal storms over these issues merely obscured the legitimate ones. History, like the Scriptures, can often be quoted on both sides of a barricade. True, in 1918 Mannerheim led a merciless terror; true, Finland was envisaged as "the key to Petrograd" in 1919. But it is also true, as the Communists have not pointed out, that these words were written by Lenin in *Pravda* in May 1917: "Only equals can come to an understanding. For an understanding to be a real understanding, not a conquest masked by phrases, a real equality of rights is necessary between both parties. This implies that not only Russia but also Finland must have the right not to enter into the understanding. . . ." And in the same month he declared: "The Finns must say that they have the right to decide according to their own judgment upon their own fate, and the Russian who wants to deny this right is a chauvinist. . . . No, Russian people, do not presume to enforce your will upon Finland. No people can be free if it itself oppresses other people."

#### *Finnish Relief Campaign*

If Americans were overwhelmingly aligned with Finland, they were far less agreed on what to do about it. The campaign for Finland in America was essentially an attempt to drown isolationist inhibitions in pro-Finnish emotions. Time, not reason, was the campaign's deadliest enemy; and the time was too short. But the campaign itself was probably unprecedented. No area of organized life was overlooked, few politicians remained off the bandwagon, leftists and rightists competed in heaping praise on Helsinki, scorn on Moscow (the leftists said Stalin had betrayed Bolshevism, the rightists said he was a Bolshevik). To those who dissented the answer was simple: "Only Communists could be opposed to helping Finland."

It all began on December 20, just three weeks after the war began. In Madison Square Garden that night the Finnish Relief Fund, headed by Herbert Hoover, initiated its drive. The advance promotion was intense. Department stores donated their advertising space to blurbs for the meeting; boxes sold for \$100 each. As a box-office attraction the event was



only moderately successful. Theatrically it was full of social significance; for it demonstrated among other things that the Finns could unite those whom the Allies had severed—isolationists and interventionists. Mr. Hoover, who had heretofore vigorously championed isolationism, and Burton K. Wheeler, isolationist stalwart in the Senate, joined hands with Dorothy Thompson and Hjalmar Procope, Finnish ambassador to the United States. The addresses were typical of hundreds more to come in the ensuing weeks. Senator Burton K. Wheeler acclaimed the Finns for “preferring death to slavery”; Senator Robert F. Wagner wanted to know how “anyone with a drop of sportsmanship in his blood can fail to stand up and cheer for this plucky little nation.” Mayor LaGuardia was practical: “You can’t fight a war with aspirin.” When Mr. Procope spoke, reported the *Times*, “waves of emotion swept the audience with many men and women weeping.”

#### *The Newspapers Help*

The campaign rapidly gained momentum. Newspapers everywhere acted as volunteer collection agencies; the *Folies Bergères* gave a special preview for the Finnish fund; and upper-class society, already mobilized for Franco-British relief, dropped everything to help the Finns. Not that the pro-Finnish drive was restricted to the Social Register. It wasn’t; many labor unions contributed sums. But the most sustained program—as in the case of Allied aid—was put on by men and women of the society world. Undoubtedly they were motivated in part by the same sympathy for the “underdog” which prevailed throughout America. They also had added inspiration. After two decades of cumulative bitterness, they could hate Russia effectively. And not only could they hate Russia; they could help Mr. Hoover. Describing a benefit planned by the Regency Club, the New York *Herald Tribune* reported: “The Regency Club, 15 East 67 Street, a sumptuous playroom for the town’s most affluent and spectacular bridge players, is planning a grand party tonight for Finnish relief. . . . A polite and pleasant pandemonium is expected to reign in the plush quarters of the club tonight; and while it does not usually call its members for ‘causes,’ Mrs. T. Charles Farrelly, vice-president of the club, expressed the warm feeling

the members had for the Finns, adding: ‘And we’d do anything for Mr. Hoover.’”

While a “polite and pleasant pandemonium” swept the Regency Club, similar affairs swept the country. John Nicholas Brown staged a concert for Finnish relief at Newport; at the Everglades Club in Palm Beach two Finnish dolls were sold for \$5,700; at Lake Placid, Christopher Young showed a film called “30,000 Miles of Skiing,” with proceeds for Finland; 15 models displayed spring garments at a Rockefeller Center fashion show and ice carnival, with Newbold Morris skating; a “Big Game” party was held in the Embassy suite of the Ambassador Hotel—for Finland; and at the Coq Rouge the younger set transformed the room into an “Arctic Circle,” with John Barrymore guest of honor—for Finland. Social highlight of the campaign, however, was the Help Finland cabaret; there, reported the *World-Telegram*, “a cake of ice was presented to Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt, and white-haired Dr. Alexander Hamilton Rice did the Boomp-a-daisy dance with a member of the chorus from *Hellzapoppin*.” At the same affair the de Beers diamond was auctioned: “Miss Gertrude Lawrence coaxed, wheedled and bossed Tommy Manville into buying the diamond for \$500. Tommy, who arrived with two blondes swathed in ermine and orchids, paid for the stone on the spot with five crisp hundred dollar bills.”

But it wasn’t all in fun. There were visible emotional overtones, identifying Finland’s cause with America’s heritage.

#### *Gifts from Filmdom*

Closely associated with society’s struggle for the Finns were the contributions of theatre and movie personalities. At least one actress literally gave her nightgown for the Finns—the donor was Paulette Goddard. It happened at a large auction for Finnish relief staged at the Hotel Roosevelt with theatre stars contributing their all and affluent citizens bidding. Up for auction also went Dorothy Lamour’s sarong (which brought \$30); up went three of Jimmy Cagney’s neckties, a lock of Lana Turner’s hair, a hat that Gladys Swarthout wore in her first stage appearance, a handkerchief of Josef Lhevinne’s. But the highlight of the evening was the appearance of Elsie the Cow. As the



*Times* reported solemnly: "One of the most popular guests of the evening was Elsie, the Borden cow, whose 'autograph' was sold to many guests. The autograph was obtained by letting Elsie look intently at the purchaser and then rub her inked nose on a photograph of herself."

### *In the Sporting World*

Into the campaign for "outnumbered Finland" went the sporting world. Sports writers set up a division of their own (Lester Rodney, sports editor of the *Daily Worker*, dissenting) and pledged to raise \$1,000,000 through benefits in almost every field. In more sophisticated athletic circles, things happened, too. A horse show was staged at a New York armory; Mrs. John Hay Whitney held a hunt breakfast—for Finland. Meanwhile, as hundreds were knitting "Bundles for Britain," others decided to devote their stitches to the more urgent business of Finland. Mrs. Roberta Keene Tubman, whose work in World War I included "recruiting for the army and navy, chaperoning at cantonments and organizing women war workers into knitting and sewing groups" (so the New York *Sun* reported), launched the knitting offensive for the Finns, with major stress on chamois shirts.

But the Finns needed guns, not butter. In Washington Congress delayed, debated, psychoanalyzed the nation and saw impulses still divided. After two months of war the Gallup Institute reported that, while a slight majority favored a direct loan to Finland for non-military equipment, 61 per cent still opposed a loan for military purchases. At this juncture Major General John F. O'Ryan (commander of the 27th Division A.E.F. during World War I) impatiently took matters into his own hands. On February 2 he announced the formation of "Fighting Funds for Finland, Inc." Its purpose: to provide "realistic" aid for Finland. Debutantes flocked to the O'Ryan bandwagon. A committee of society girls was formed to "comb the night clubs" for contributions.

While Americans were in the forefront of the propaganda offensive here, the Finns were not idle. To the United States as goodwill emissaries came track-men Paavo Nurmi and Tiasto Maki; journalist Marcus Tollet, who told newspapermen on his arrival that Red planes had "machine-gunned women and chil-

dren in the streets of Helsinki"; Countess Eva Sparr, Mannerheim's sister and a lecturer in her own right. From Helsinki Kaiso Kallio, wife of Finland's president, cabled a moving appeal to "American women"; the Finnish Olympic committee (which was supposed to sponsor the next Olympics) appealed to "the athletes of the world" to "think of Finland struggling against an enemy fifty times greater in size and power."

Amid the din created by pro-Finnish prayers and preachments, Soviet apologists—official ones—could only murmur dejectedly to themselves. Amkino Corp., long-time distributor of Soviet films in the United States, quietly closed down "for the duration"; in the same week it was announced that a new motion picture eulogizing Finland would soon be displayed across American screens. Father Coughlin, who had pleaded piously for retention of the arms embargo, suffered an internationalist deviation, sending \$1,000 to the Hoover fund—"for Finland." Twenty labor leaders, from A.F.L. and C.I.O. unions, met in Mr. Hoover's office and clasped hands—"for Finland." The Reverend William T. Manning, whose Sunday sermons had been almost uninterruptedly pro-Ally, changed his subject to Finland.

### *Newspaper Sensations*

When the *Daily Worker*, on December 1, reported that the Russians had "hurled back" the "Finnish invaders," even faithful readers seemed a trifle sceptical; and those who read it over someone else's shoulder in the subway hooted audibly. It was inept propaganda; it was too reminiscent of Poland's "attacking" Germany and Albania's "threatening" Italy. After reading three months of news largely fabricated in the censor's office in Helsinki, Americans began to feel the same way about headlines like this: "Finns Slay 17,000 Reds at Climax of Six Days Battling" (New York *Mirror*, January 9). Communist propaganda was not responsible for the one major debacle suffered by the Finns in the war of words; Finnish propaganda was. But the Finns were not the only victims of their excessive optimism. The newspapers suffered, too. The simple fact is that the American press told less truth and retailed more fancy about the Finnish war than about any recent conflict. When it ended,



trusting readers could not understand what had happened because the Finns had won all the battles, and the Russians had merely won the war. Who was to blame for the deception? Were the newspapers engaged in a "venal anti-Soviet conspiracy" (which ultimately boomeranged)? Were they the innocent dupes of their own partisanship? Does the primary guilt lie in the effusive propaganda office in Helsinki or the uncommunicative press offices in Moscow? Was the press caught between the fires of censorship and competition? The answer is still far from clear.

### *Tall Stories and Tall Headlines*

In American newspaper offices pro-Finnish sentiment was no less pronounced than in the rest of the country. It dominated executive offices, but it permeated cable-editors and headline-writers as well. The partisanship was fierce and outspoken. Even had facilities for coverage been better, it undoubtedly would have exerted influence. Because Americans were overwhelmingly pro-Finn, stories of incredible Finnish feats and colossal Russian setbacks seemed obviously made for circulation managers: rival newspapers tried to excel each other in proving that the age of miracles was not only coming but had arrived. On afternoon papers, where competitive pressure was greatest, the tallest stories made the tallest headlines. There was also the factor of tempo. Under competitive pressure newspapers can't always afford to wait. A report that the Finns have pierced Russian territory may seem implausible; but suppose a rival city desk doesn't wait for confirmation—and the confirmation comes later? How does the diligent cable editor explain his dallying? Least circumspect of all were the headline writers. While the correspondent might protect himself with the clause—"Finnish sources claimed"—such drab parentheses do not make headline words. It was easier to skip the complications. Thus technicality and emotions were on the side of fantasy.

For the end result neither Helsinki nor Moscow can protest too bitterly. In the major stages of the war Moscow said virtually nothing—and the silence was liberally quoted and interpreted; Helsinki said almost anything, with the same result. The correspondents in both capitals were at the mercy of the rival

governments; and the newspapers were ultimately at the mercy of these correspondents, or of correspondents in such "interested" capitals as Stockholm, Copenhagen, London and Paris. In Helsinki a black curtain of censorship descended with the outbreak of war. It was not merely a censorship of what the correspondent wrote; it was a censorship of what he saw. He could not see the war, except as it was translated in Helsinki handouts. Less than a month after the conflict started Irving Pflaum, foreign news editor of the *Chicago Times*, tried to deflate the bubble of Finnish successes: "These stories more often than not bear a dateline some hundreds of miles from the crash of bombs and daring encounters. Copenhagen is offender No. 1, with Oslo, Stockholm, Paris and London all guilty in fostering rumors as well as fact. Sooner than most readers have been encouraged to believe, the Russians are going to spoil the pretty picture being concocted in certain journalistic centers." But Copenhagen and Stockholm and other capitals were not the prime offenders. Helsinki was. Not until after two months of camouflage from the Finnish front (or rear) did the one tangible truth about the war emerge: it was an invisible war.

### *No War Correspondents*

To the New York *Herald Tribune* on February 3, Walter Kerr cabled: "Old time newspaper correspondents say the war in Finland is the first in many years without war correspondents. It probably is . . . Even if the American correspondents were skilled with skis, which they are not, or spoke the Finnish language, which they cannot, the Army would not allow them to visit the front lines unless it were a relatively quiet day. That is why no correspondent, so far as I know, has ever seen the troops in action. . . . He visits a quiet sector of the battlefield after the battle or talks to uncommunicative soldiers back from the front." In the same week Leland Stowe, *Chicago Daily News* correspondent, cabled essentially the same lament: "We are probably the only alleged war correspondents of this century who have had to try to report two months of fierce and fluctuating hostilities without getting within hearing distance of gunfire more than two or three times at the most."

Remote as the war was to correspondents in





If 98 per cent of the American people wanted Finland to win the war, the other 2 per cent lost no time in presenting their case to anyone who would listen. Communists in America and Great Britain speeded up their presses and rolled out dozens of propaganda leaflets and books like the above. The Workers' Bookshop in New York crowded its display tables with books and pamphlets condemning the "capitalist warmongers" and lauding the Communist advance.



Finland, it was even more baffling to those in Russia. Instead of challenging the portrait of war painted by Helsinki, Soviet communiqués remained infrequent and angry. No correspondents were permitted to accompany the troops; there was even a famine of propaganda. On December 28, G. E. R. Gedye's dispatch to the *New York Times* was headlined: "Soviet's Silence on War Deepens; No Effort is Made to Deny the Foreign Reports of Defeats Inflicted by the Finns."

#### *Manufactured in Helsinki*

Thus the rival censorships blanketed the battlefields. But to superficial readers of the American press it wasn't immediately plain that news of the Finnish war was largely manufactured in Helsinki for foreign consumption—and domestic morale. Thousands of words streamed over the wires, from other capitals as well as Helsinki. Wherever they came from, the words were monotonously similar. Characteristic was the U.P. story from Helsinki on February 1:

Finnish military leaders announced early today that they are "confident of final victory" after hurling the Russian invaders back to the eastern front with terrific casualties, estimated by some military observers to total nearly 250,000 men in the two months of fighting.

In the *New York Daily News* the headline explained: "Soviet Losses in War Placed at 250,000 Men." An A.P. dispatch from Copenhagen reported on December 18: "Norwegian reports from Northern Finland describe forest fighting in which a patrol of nine soldiers was said to have killed 700 Russians in an exposed highway position." Late in February Leland Stowe cabled a saga which the *New York Post* headlined: "100 Finns Stood Off 300,000." Surfeited with tales of military miracles, newspaper readers probably weren't startled by the typographical error when the *St. Louis Globe Democrat* reported on February 9:

250,000 REDS ROUTED

By THOMAS F. HAWKINS

Associated Press Staff Writer.

It isn't possible, of course, to write off all the legends of Finnish valor and Russian failure as sheer falsehood. For one thing it seems plain that the Finns were valorous, as the stubborn-

ness of their resistance testifies; it is also likely that the Russians encountered resistance far greater than they anticipated in the first six weeks. The point that can be made with safety is that no correspondent was in a position—as many later admitted—to attest to the strange events which were recorded. Possibly the most sustained, dramatic and ultimately unconfirmed story of Finnish achievement—fostered by the A.P., the U. P. and individual correspondents—was the widely publicized, black-headlined report that the Finns had penetrated Russian soil and cut the Murmansk railroad. After the story had appeared and reappeared for several weeks, George Seldes asserted that a prominent newspaper editor had probed the story and found it utterly lacking in confirmation. The Institute can verify Seldes' statement although the editor has preferred to remain anonymous. Yet the tale recurred in one form or another for nearly three months. It broke first on December 5. There was a thirteen-day intermission; then on December 19 came word that "three small groups were said to have penetrated forty to fifty miles into Russian territory, repeatedly interrupting communications on the Leningrad-Murmansk railway road." Another silence until December 25 when the report flared again: "The Finnish army has invaded Russia." By January 6 "fast-moving patrols of the Finnish army had penetrated Soviet territory" and reached the railroad town. Throughout this interval the Russians maintained a suspicious silence.

#### *Moscow Finally Talks*

On January 13, Moscow announced that the railroad had never been hit, that "in reality the Murmansk railroad has not suspended work for a single minute." The denial spurred the newspaper editor's investigation. He found that the tale had originated with Donald Day, *Chicago Tribune* correspondent in Riga (traditional source of anti-Soviet propaganda) who was covering the war from Helsinki. Other correspondents, in both Helsinki and Copenhagen, had hesitated to transmit the story without some substantiating evidence. But fearful of competitors, they finally passed it along to "protect" themselves. It became a periodic front-page sensation.

The episode was unique only for its longev-



ity. Consider the dime-novel plot which was fashioned in Copenhagen on January 18. According to "newspapers published today" in that city, Soviet schemers had tried to lure H. F. Schoenfeld, American ambassador at Helsinki, into a death trap. The evidence: a report (which Mr. Schoenfeld denied) that his servant had been arrested for espionage; plus the fact that Russian bombs had fallen near Mr. Schoenfeld's home in the suburbs where he had planned to be (but wasn't) at the time of the raid. The proof seemed slightly circumstantial. Yet the *Herald Tribune*, among others, published the story on page one top, under the two-column headline: "Plot to Lure U. S. Envoy to Death In Air Raid Laid to Russian Spy." There was obvious propaganda value in attributing such sinister designs to the Russian army. Both the date-line and the inherent implausibility of the tale should have aroused suspicions. Needless to say, the plot did not thicken; it died after a news-life of twenty-four hours.

#### *Experts Debunk "Miracles"*

While there is still no final disproof—or substantiation—of many of the stories which were spun out of Europe, experts have already debunked two of the most magnificent miracles. On December 26 Leland Stowe cabled a gripping story of Finnish enterprise based on "a letter from a Finnish soldier to his sister here." In the *World-Telegram* it was headlined: "Finn Armed Only With Knife, Keeps Fighting Hand-to-Hand." On at least one point, however, the soldier's imagination—or nature—went berserk. Explaining why he resorted to his knife, he related that his pistol had become "so hot that it broke to pieces." As Sergeant J. G. Corrah, of the United States Army, informed *Collier's* when it published the item: "Generals, majors, colonels and enlisted men can fall to pieces if the heat is strong enough, but not a pistol." Similarly subject to scientific scepticism were dispatches sent by James Aldridge, of the North American Newspaper Alliance, and others, describing the weird postures assumed by frozen Russian soldiers in the Finnish wastes. They painted macabre pictures of battlefields which resembled Madame Tussaud's museum, of Russian soldiers freezing to death in positions of suspended activity. As Mr. Aldridge cabled on December 24:

I reached the spot just after the battle ended. It was the most horrible sight I had ever seen. As if the men had suddenly turned to wax, there were two or three thousand Russians and a few Finns, all frozen in fighting attitudes. Some were locked together, their bayonets within each other's bodies; some were crouching with their arms crooked, holding the hand grenades they were throwing; some were lying with their rifles shouldered, their legs apart.... Some were frozen kneeling with their hands covering their faces and others were grotesquely frozen in the positions they assumed, when they were shot down while running.... There was a frozen group of twenty Russians and a few Finns where it was obvious the Finns had surprised some Russian machine gunners while assembling their guns because the Russians' hands still held the parts which they were working when they looked up and saw the Finns advancing. Their fear was registered on their frozen faces. Their bodies were like statues of men throwing all their muscles and strength into some work, but their faces recorded something between bewilderment and horror.

All this made grim and plausible copy to everyone except scientists. The Institute has obtained the reactions of several scientists and of the New York Academy of Medicine; all of them concur in the view that instantaneous freezing is, as one expert put it, a "Münchenhausen tale familiar in Europe for the last two centuries." It just doesn't happen. It is estimated that it would take from four to six hours for soldiers at the Finnish front to freeze in the prevailing temperature. How, then, could they have frozen in "half-standing positions"? A man who faints will collapse in less than one second from the time his knees bend appreciably; a man falling from gunshot will act the same way.

Science, too, is a war-time casualty.

#### *Errors Sometimes Magnified*

Sometimes the cry of "fake" is premature; a technical error is magnified by partisans into journalistic treason. Such was the case of the *Springfield Union*. On December 19 its first edition ran a picture of two huddled figures, wearing expressions of "horror and anguish," and the caption read: "A Finnish soldier and his wife are shown at the grave of their only son—a victim of the bombing of Helsinki by Russian planes." Actually it was a picture of two women mournfully watching a tenement fire in New York; the caption had been inadvertently transposed. Although it was corrected in subsequent editions, the Communist press insisted for many weeks that the error was deliberate.



If the war was a circulation manager's holiday, it was a newspaperman's nightmare. What sources could be trusted, even granting the noblest intentions? Some sources were plainly untrustworthy, on the basis of repeated experience, but their products were nevertheless accepted. Least credible of all—yet most widely exploited—were insistent reports of Russian disaster, at home and in Finland. Almost invariably these dispatches had a spurious and familiar sound. But whether through wishful thinking or uncontrollable bias—or both—they were used. The tales came in swift and disorderly succession. On December 23 the A.P. reported from Stockholm: "The newspaper *Social Demokraten* reported without confirmation today that the entire Terijoki 'people's government' had been arrested by Russia because they had misled Joseph Stalin concerning Finland's military strength." While the item was brief and qualified, its treatment in the New York *World-Telegram* was not. It appeared on page one, lead story, under a four column headline. On January 12 the front pages of the *Times*, the *Herald Tribune* and other dailies displayed a dubious A.P. dispatch from Copenhagen: "Shake-Up of Red Army Officers Indicated; Trials Reported Over Failures in Finland." This page one item was based on "reports reaching Norwegian and Danish quarters from many sources." On the same day the *Times* published a note in similar vein, this one via Helsinki: "Finns said today they had found documents on the bodies of Russian soldiers that tended to substantiate reports of friction between the troops and the political commissars attached to the front. . . ." This was only a more moderate version of the upheavals that I.N.S. had reported as early as December 29 from Copenhagen; that day's N. Y. *Journal-American* looked like this:

Danish Newspapers Report (small type)  
 SOVIET TROOPS REVOLT,  
 STRAFED BY OGPU GUNS  
 (huge black type).

Six days later I.N.S. reported from Helsinki that "Finnish propaganda air raids over Soviet Russia towns near Leningrad have caused riots, according to information reaching here through foreign sources. . . ." By January 27

the ferment was spreading. A U.P. dispatch published in the New York *Times* from Rome—via Kaunas, Lithuania—asserted that "exposure of a 'vast plot' against Joseph Stalin and other Soviet leaders was reported by the newspaper *Giornale d'Italia* today in a dispatch from Kaunas, Lithuania which told of mass arrests in the Ukraine. . . ." The revolt that Rome originated via Kaunas and the U.P. was suppressed, however, by London, via Budapest and I.N.S. on February 9, after an awkward silence of sixteen days: "German Gestapo contingents helped Russian troops crush an Ukraine revolt, killing hundreds in the former Polish Ukraine occupied by the Soviets, it was declared today in a Budapest dispatch published by the London *News-Chronicle*." Disaffection in the Red Army, nevertheless, remained rife. Possibly the unkindest thrust of all, however, was delivered by K. J. Eskelund, the *Times* correspondent, who cabled this tale on March 4:

A few days ago a Finnish patrol in the Eastern front eyed a curious black-clad figure easily discernible against the snow. It turned out to be a freezing Russian. He stretched his hands up, shouting: "Don't shoot—I am a Russian capitalist!"

#### *Were Atrocities Committed?*

Mingled with news of the front that nobody could visit were stories of atrocities that were rarely witnessed. Again this does not constitute proof that they were imaginary; but the burden of proof rests with the correspondents, and it could seldom be furnished. In part the debate over the extent and cruelty of Russian bombings is, like many other Great Debates, irrelevant. The vital propaganda fact was invasion, and evidence that Soviet fliers were seeking to exterminate or protect civilians does not affect the basic issue of the war. The point is important only because it was an indispensable element in the mental mobilization of America. Stories of air raids were most effective when they reported the bombings of Red Cross hospitals, wanton attacks on civilians, destruction of "workers' homes"—by the "workers' government." All these contributed to the build-up of the barbarian. How justified was the impression conveyed by headlines and dispatches: that the Russian air offensive was indiscriminate, ruthless?

The truth is still fragmentary, but certain



conclusions seem warranted. Most observers tend to agree with the verdict of the *Herald Tribune*: "The Russians appear to be following conventional practice and concentrating their air power, not primarily against civilians' morale but against 'legitimate' targets of ports, rail junctions and industrial areas behind the lines." The mistake which many observers made, whether deliberately or not, was to assume the infallibility of a bomber's aim. Finnish sympathizers argued that, since civilians were killed, the Soviets must have deliberately used them for targets. Soviet apologists said that the Soviets would not sanction war on civilians; consequently, no civilians could have been killed. The fact is that, whatever the intent, bombs have a categorical imperative of their own. Workers' quarters in most cities are near industrial areas; an aviator attacking industrial objectives cannot too readily distinguish his victims, and the risk of civilian murder is implicit in almost any air offensive. Piecing together the reports of bombardments, it seems likely that the Russian invasion was not uniquely barbarous. But it was war; and no one has yet learned to make war mercifully.

### *It Didn't Happen*

There are some indications that the newspapers preferred to believe the worst: that the Russians were singularly brutal, not ordinary practitioners of modern war. The most serious example was the treatment of the much-publicized "Christmas bombing" of Helsinki, which never occurred. On December 23 the *New York Post* carried the headline: "Reds Threaten to Raze Helsinki Unless City Yields"; and the same day's *World-Telegram* warned: "Reds Reported Demanding Helsinki Give Up Today. Pamphlet Said to Give Warning of Severe Raid." There was one strange aspect of the story: no one except the Finnish ministry seemed to have seen the pamphlet. Whether the pamphlet was ever dropped, no bombs were—on Christmas day. We also know that the A.P., after transmitting the original threat, sent this memo to editors: "The Finnish censor has requested that the material in the second lead Finnish about the dropping of pamphlets threatening destruction in Finland if Finland does not surrender be eliminated. We suggest that you eliminate this in order that the work

of A.P. correspondents in Finland not be handicapped." Yet most A.P. clients ignored the admonition and the next morning's *Times* carried Mr. Eskelund's version of the same tale. Thus for nearly three days Americans were expecting a rain of hell on Finland. The emotional build-up was intense; the climax never came. What really happened? Why did the A.P. change its mind? Although these mysteries remain unsolved, the propaganda value of the episode was almost as great as if the Russian bombers had arrived during the Christmas mass.

### *"Letters From the Front"*

As the war took shape from handouts in Helsinki and rumors in other capitals, another device familiar to war-time publicists reappeared in American newspapers. "Letters from the front" began to crowd newspaper pages, issued by Finnish promotion men in America. The tenor of the letters was indicated by the headlines they bore: "Two Finnish Soldiers Write of the War; Youth on the Karelian Front Says Red Officers Shoot Men at Rear to Drive Others On; Report Russians Unshod" (*New York Times*) . . . "Finns' Bravery Told in Letter; Writer Asserts One Soldier Killed 41 Russians; Boy Mined Oncoming Tank" (*New York Sun*) . . . "Letter Asserts Russians Bomb Isolated Farms; Finnish Relief Fund Official Gets Brother's Story of Death and Destruction" (*New York Herald Tribune*) . . . "Finns Here Write on Reds' Cruelty; Say Soviet Fliers Spread Poison Gas" (*New York World-Telegram*) . . . "An Uncensored Letter From Finland's Front; Calls Soviet Advance Force of Anti-Christ" (*New York Evening Journal-American*). This was literature, not news.

Compressed into a few months were almost all the dramatic techniques in a propagandist's notebook. For Finland the results were not all salutary. The Finns won the first round of their propaganda struggle: they transformed what seemed a hopeless cause into what slowly resembled an irresistible one. Ultimately their enthusiasm was self-defeating. By February concern was already being expressed in pro-Finnish circles that the reports of Russia's demise were greatly exaggerated. As the need for help became acute, Finnish fictions seemed to have dulled the world's anxiety. The New



York *Times* editorially lamented that, where Finland's original weakness had at first denied her outside aid, now excessive accounts of strength might deprive her of the help she still needed. Slowly awareness permeated Helsinki that the Finns had overplayed their hand; imperceptibly the tune of Helsinki handouts changed: "Supreme confidence" became "grim determination." Finally, a fortnight before Finland capitulated, the Finnish censors issued this memorandum to correspondents: "Exaggerated descriptions of our own achievements must be avoided, especially if the information is vague. . . . All information and all criticism and mockery which might benefit the enemy should be carefully avoided. . . . Any under-evaluation of the enemy, of his fighting capacity, his supply of war materials, and of the possibilities open to him in general should be avoided. Disparagement of the enemy is not founded on reality. On the contrary several proofs of his capacity have recently been received." It was the censor's swan song.

#### *Soviet Fantasies*

All the fantasies did not come from Finland. On January 3, the Russian newspaper *Trud* alleged that the "Finnish white government" had arrested thousands of workers and patriots who "do not want to fight for the Mannerheim gang" and "arrested people are dying like flies in prison." A Tass agency dispatch from Stockholm on January 30 asserted that Finnish workers were being arrested without trial, their homes burned. Reports like these were never more substantial than rival claims of mass upheaval in the Red Army. On the whole, however, the Russian communiqués were primarily guilty of understatement and reticence. Long intervals elapsed without any comment from Russian sources and, in the absence of such comment, Finnish spokesmen had a field day. As *Time* noted, the Leningrad military area "in general has not lied about the war except to say that nothing was happening." While there undoubtedly were dull days, the silence frequently sounded sinister. In most cases the Russians confined their press polemics to attacks on "foreign lies" which had accumulated during a fortnight of Russian reticence. In so far as these blasts were aimed at fantastic reports of Finnish triumphs, they were gen-

erally justified. But not always righteous was the indignation, as when the Russians denied heatedly that they had bombed the Swedish village of Pagala. That, they said, was a "malicious fabrication." Three days later the Russian government apologized to Sweden for bombing Pagala. It was, they said, a mistake.

#### *"Capitalist Conspiracy"*

If the Soviets were, on the whole, moodily silent, their staunchest American spokesmen were not. Dependent on the Soviet communiqués for the news about the war, the *Daily Worker* frequently had no news to report about military affairs, but it was never taciturn. Most of its coverage of the Finnish war was a wave of attack against the "capitalist press," for "distorting" the news, for "conspiring" against the Soviets. The capitalist press was scarcely invulnerable, but the stones were hurled from a glass house. While most newspapers retailed the legends of enormous Finnish victories, the *Daily Worker* maintained its traditional policy: non-recognition of any Soviet defeats. The biggest boomerang suffered by the American Communist press was the fate of the Kuusinen government. Throughout the war the *Daily Worker* dismissed the Finnish government as "White Guard," described the Kuusinen government as "the real government" of Finland. It carried testimonials from anonymous Finnish workers allegedly groaning under Mannerheim's yoke and yearning to enlist in the Kuusinen forces. To the *Daily Worker* peace with Mannerheim was unthinkable; had not the Soviets signed a peace treaty with Kuusinen on December 2 in which he ceded the territory the Soviets wanted? Stubbornly, until the last moment, the *Daily Worker* refused to concede that Kuusinen might be forgotten. On March 9, the *Worker's* foreign expert wrote that "the only real peace efforts in Finland come from the Soviet Union and the Finnish peoples' government at Terijoki headed by Otto Kuusinen. The Kuusinen government reflects the real wishes of the Finnish masses for peaceful relations with the U.S.S.R." To all reports of impending negotiations the *Daily Worker* cried "plot," charging that such rumors were designed to "head off an uprising of the Finnish people, especially



in response to the call issued the other day by Otto Kuusinen. . . ."

But chary as the *Daily Worker* was of offending Moscow, Moscow neglected to reciprocate. On March 12 the Soviets made peace with the Finnish government, and Otto Kuusinen trudged back to Moscow after his brief reign, a hero in Union Square but not in Finland. It was not the first time that the *Daily Worker* had read Soviet communiqués too literally. The peace negotiations had actually been in progress since February 22.

By mid-March, reported *Time*, "a U. S. citizen who had neither danced, knitted, orated, played bridge, bingo, banqueted, or just shelled out for Finland, was simply nowhere socially." Thirteen agencies were collecting funds for the Finns, and Miss Isabella Cameron was presenting the Finnish Legation in Washington with a \$2,000 bracelet. There were a few dissenters. Members of the Workers Alliance were singing:

The Hoover Boys are on their way,  
Herbert C. and Edgar J.,  
Edgar's witch-hunt soon begins,  
While Herb sends snowballs to the Finns.

The American Youth Congress supporters assembled in Washington, applauded appeals for "suspended judgment" on the Finnish war, listened glumly when President Roosevelt told them that 98 per cent of the nation favored the Finns. On Broadway turmoil was precipitated by a few producers and actors who tried to shun pro-Finnish benefits. Among left-wing groups, apart from the Communists, only the Trotskyists steadfastly upheld Stalin against his capitalist enemies, urging Finnish workers to submit acquiescently and unite against Stalin later. But even the Trotskyists were split on the subject. In general the dissenters to the pro-Finnish crusade were noisily outshouted and socially snubbed. The American Institute of Public Opinion reported by March 10, that 73 per cent of those interviewed would sanction flotation of a Finnish bond here—a move

**Two-Day Benefit For Finns Opens At Palm Beach**  
F. C. Henderson Estate Has Aspect of Helsinki

**Finnish Relief Fund Will Benefit From Concert in Plainfield Friday**  
Dewitt D. Barlow, Chairman of Committee for Event; Muhlenberg Hospital Unit to Hold Annual Bridge Party and Fashion Show Tuesday  
A representative group of Plainfield, N. J., citizens, headed by Mr. Dewitt D. Barlow, chairman, is sponsoring a concert in the high school gymnasium for the benefit of the Finnish Relief Fund. The concert will be given by a group of Finnish artists, including Mr. Barlow, a Finnish violinist, and a group of Finnish singers. The concert will be given at 8 o'clock on Friday night. The Muhlenberg Hospital Unit will hold its annual bridge party and fashion show on Tuesday night.

**Mannerheim Ball In Westfield to Aid Relief in Finland**  
March 30 Benefit Planned  
Miss Walker, Bride-Elect, Honored at Gift Party

**Exhibit and Sale for Finnish Relief To Be Held Today at Yonkers Museum**  
Members and guests of the Auxiliary of the Hudson River Museum, Yonkers, N. Y., are holding an exhibit and sale of Finnish relief items today at the Yonkers Museum. The items include Finnish handicrafts, tapestries, and other items. The sale is for the benefit of the Finnish Relief Fund.

**Finnish Singers To Be Heard at Port Washington**  
Relief Fund Benefit Taking Place Next Saturday at Yacht Club  
A group of Finnish singers will be one of the entertainment features at a supper dance in Port Washington, L. I., for the benefit of the Finnish Relief Fund at the Manhasset Bay Yacht Club on Saturday. Mrs. F. W. Wright is general chairman. Reservations include Comdr. R. W. Fraser and Mrs. Fraser, Mrs. E. P. Alker, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Alker, Mr. and Mrs. C. S. Anderson, Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Kelly, Mr. and Mrs. Edward Gilney, Mr. and Mrs. William K. Kerr, Mr. and Mrs. Roy Lincoln, Mr. and Mrs. D. M. Rugg, Mr. and Mrs. P. Kendall Thayer, Mr. and Mrs. P. W. Wright, Mr. and Mrs. Harry Rebeck and Mr. and Mrs. Harry Rebeck.

**Finnish and Russian Songs Heard At Davies' Dinner in Palm Beach**  
Icons and Tapestries Collected by Former Ambassador Are Displayed at Mrs. World's Fair Benefit  
Special to the Herald Tribune  
MRS. JOSEPH E. DAVIES, former U. S. Senator, entertained at a dinner for the benefit of the Finnish Relief Fund at the Palm Beach Club on Tuesday night. The dinner was given for the benefit of the Finnish Relief Fund. The dinner was given at the Palm Beach Club. The dinner was given at the Palm Beach Club. The dinner was given at the Palm Beach Club.

**Parties Precede Westport Benefit For Finnish Fund**  
Mrs. G. H. Clisbee, Herbert Baldwins, Franklin Baileys Are Dinner Hosts  
Special to the Herald Tribune  
WESTPORT, Conn., March 2.—Several dinner parties were given here Wednesday preceding the performance for the Finnish Relief Fund, for which Mr. Charles Baldwins was chairman of arrangements, held in the Pine Arts Theatre. Mrs. George H. Clisbee, of Church Lane, had as dinner guests Mrs. James Melton, Mrs. B. M. McClure, Miss Janet Speer, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Hendry, Mr. and Mrs. Reuben H. Maury, Mr. and Mrs. Norman McGee, Count Veil Hino, Dr.

**Club Stages Play For Finnish Relief**  
Advance Parties at 2 Homes  
Junior Service League Meets Tuesday at Mrs. Taliaferro's  
More than 1,500 attended the performances of "Tovarich," presented last night and Friday night by the Cranford (N. J.) Dramatic Club in the High School under the direction of Mr. Leslie Crump. The performances were given for the benefit of the Club Dramatic Building Fund and the Finnish Relief Fund. Mrs. Harry Van Iderstine Jr. and Mr. J. Branch Darby, in the leading roles, were supported by Mmes. H. Zenas Homer, Helen Keeton, William J. Bradford Wilson and Messrs. Harry S. C. Folk, Carl H. Mason, Paul N. Crispin, Carl A. Mason, Richard Waterhouse, Richard H. Lackey Jr. and J. Webster Skerratt.

The student of propaganda had to read the society pages to find out what the partisans of Finland were doing, for it was through parties and benefits like those described in the clippings above that most of the pro-Finnish propaganda was carried on. The clippings, all from the *New York Herald Tribune*, give only the barest idea of the extent to which American society rallied to Finland's cause. In making this study, the Institute collected no less than 200 similar accounts.



which the Allies could not have contemplated in the face of "isolationist" resistance.

In this evolution of opinion lay perhaps the largest significance of the Finnish conflict to America. The campaign for Finland revealed the depth and intensity of the propaganda symbols which could be exploited against the Soviets; no other adversary could have united Rabbi Wise and Father Coughlin. Those who pleaded neutrality toward Russia could be

labelled "pro-Russian"; in 1940 the epithet was more inflammatory than "pro-Kaiser," as libelous as "pro-Hitler." The propaganda offensive did not save Finland because time fled too swiftly. But as the war drew to a close, one thing was plain: in the hearts of Allied propagandists Finland would be remembered—unless, through some new upheaval in the "ideological war," Russia reverted to the Allied camp.

## Propaganda Analysis Worksheet

**I**N TODAY'S headlines Helsinki, Ladoga, and Mannerheim are succeeded by Skagerrak, Narvik, Oslo, and Trondheim. The battle front of World War II has moved from Finland to Norway; with it goes the news front, and rival claims of victories and defeats again fill our newspapers and reverberate through the ether. Many of us, knowing that honest, earnest newspapermen were helpless in reporting the Russo-Finnish warfare and that the channels of communication were unreliable, are at a loss to know how much of today's news we can rely upon.

Consequently, a great many Americans are lying down on the job. In effect, they are helplessly throwing up their hands, when they say: "It's all propaganda" or "I don't know what or whom to believe" or "I take the news I read with several grains of salt" or "I can't make heads or tails of anything I read in the papers."

True, things are pretty bad when even eyewitness stories are no longer reliable in this censor-ridden, propagandist-ridden world, but such conditions impose obligations upon all of us. They call for application of increased critical ability and discrimination on the part of newspaper readers and radio listeners.

This bulletin points out that our correspondents are often helpless in reporting war today and that for this and other reasons indicated, the channels of communication may be unreliable from time to time. These are facts pertinent to propaganda analysis. Pertinent to

propaganda analysis also is the building up of a body of practical knowledge and information which we can use in our day-to-day reading of war news. This body of knowledge must be as much a part of our reading equipment as is our ability to recognize familiar words. Dispatches from Berlin and London will have little meaning for us unless we read into such phrases as "official German sources said" and "the British Admiralty announced" their full significance.

We cannot expect to read our daily newspapers, or to listen to our news broadcasts, with any degree of competence if we do not possess background knowledge of how news is gathered and prepared, if we do not have some understanding of the meaning of commonly used newspaper phrases, if we do not understand some of the principles of wartime propaganda. Without these abilities we are as helpless as babes; headlines become a maze of charges and counter-charges in which we flounder helplessly.

There is no one pat, easy formula to intelligent reading of wartime news, but there are a number of things which we can learn and which will help us to read as capably as does the cable desk and city editor or the trained newspaper reporter.

In cross-country driving the motorist reads highway signs: he watches for detour and mileage signposts, for train crossing warnings, for stop and go lights in urban centers. Thus, by vigilant observation he makes his journey



in orderly and safe stages across the country. Figuratively, in much the same way there are certain STOP and GO signs which we shall do well to observe in our reading. Some of these are indicated in the following brief guides to intelligent reading of war news: how many of these considerations were a conscious part of your reading of this morning's news from Europe?

## I. INDIVIDUAL PROJECT

### *Reading War News*

How can we know if a story is true?

Generally, we may put credence in a story if it follows the following formulae:

A story date-lined Berlin, quoting "official German sources" announces that X and Y, two German pocket battleships, have been destroyed. The story can be considered true in view of its date-line and source: Germany is announcing German losses.

If the "British Admiralty announces," story date-lined London, that a British transport has been sunk, this story may be given credence: official Britain is announcing its losses.

If Britain officially confirms losses which have been previously announced by the Germans, the story may be believed—and vice versa in the case of Germany.

Question the truth of stories if—

A story date-lined London, quoting the British Admiralty or Air Ministry, announces the destruction of German ships or troops; likewise, if German official sources announce their own victory over Britain.

Obviously, such stories as these may be issued for propaganda reasons—for reasons of maintaining morale in the home country and among their allies, and for the consumption of neutrals.

Always keep the date-line in mind, for stories are generally slanted, either deliberately or unconsciously, in conformity with the propaganda interests or the wishful-thinking of the country from which they emanate. An example of such a deliberate action is: while Finland negotiated her peace treaty with Russia, stories carrying a London date-line claimed that Norway and Sweden begged the Allies to send help to the Finns. Yet all stories carrying a Scandinavian date-line (and those stories,

obviously, would be more authoritative accounts of Scandinavian policy) insisted that Norway and Sweden would not allow Allied troops to cross their territory.

Or, these stories may be issued because of misinformation. For example, a British aviator in good faith may announce that he has destroyed three Heinkels. He may believe—but erroneously—that in his swoop to safety three thousand feet above the recent combat area he saw the three enemy ships, burning.

Guide: check date-lines, sources, phraseology.

Questions to ask as you read:

1. Is the correspondent an eye witness? Is his story filed from a city which is under rigid censorship? Whose censorship? Consider these factors *together*. A reporter may have been an eye-witness to the bombing of the Trondheim base—and have filed his story from Oslo which is under German censorship regulations. As a general rule, however, the eye-witness story is more trustworthy than a story from official spokesmen in the capitals of the belligerent countries. Example: eye-witness Leland Stowe's story of the early days of the Norwegian invasion *versus* Winston Churchill's address to Parliament in London.

2. Does the story quote a foreign newspaper? Newspapers of totalitarian and semi-totalitarian countries give essentially the same reports as official government sources. They reflect the same rigid censorship, and give out the same propagandas.

On the other hand, newspapers in democratic countries are published as business enterprises—for readers who have definite interests and sympathies, which, of course, tend to color news. The newspaper in a democratic country tends to give its readers what they want. Consider each country from which news of the present battle front comes: Holland may be considered neutral; Switzerland may be considered neutral, with a pro-Ally feeling; Sweden, neutral, with considerable Norwegian and pro-Ally sympathy, but often intimidated by Germany.

3. What is the probability of the story's truth? In reading and in listening to news reports it is important to relate knowledge



and information we already possess to what we read and hear. See current bulletin for reports of the instantaneous freezing of soldiers. This is a glaring instance of what happened when newspaper reporters, cable desk and city editors forgot their high school physics.

Relate your knowledge of geography, economics, history, science, and psychology to what you read.

4. Ask, what does this mean literally? In modern warfare as soon as a regiment enters a city, the city's occupation is announced. This is done for reasons of morale; its impact is strategic—both upon the besieged people and upon the home and allied fronts. Such an announcement may not literally mean that the city has been conquered; there may still be fighting in the streets (and usually is). In this connection, see the stories about the landing of the B.E.F. near Narvik.

5. Ask, why do certain stories pass the censor? What strategic, propaganda reasons are there for allowing the story to be sent out over the wires? In this connection, we shall have to draw upon our knowledge of the national interests and ambitions of belligerent nations; these are the yardsticks to their censorship rulings. Consider the economic and the psychological needs of these countries. What are their stakes in today's world, what are their fears? History, geography, economics can help us to understand the nature and the direction of their propagandas—and to understand their censorship regulations.

6. A story that is passed around the world, like a bit of gossip re-told many times, is usually distorted beyond recognition.

Example: On September 20 stories came from Paris that German troops were massing in the north. Unnamed "French military experts" allegedly expected an attack through Belgium or Holland. On September 21 a Paris correspondent said that German observation balloons were along the Netherlands border. On September 23 a five-column lead headline in the *New York Times* said: "Dutch and Belgians Open Dikes Seeing Threat in German Moves." The story, which came from Paris, not the Low Countries, was not true.

## II.

When we read and when we listen to reports of World War II we must keep in mind certain principles of wartime propaganda. Some of these are given here in thumb-nail sketches. There are others which you will want to discuss with your friends and in your study group. Consult the Minimum Reference Shelf which follows this section, using parts I and II of this Worksheet as an outline for group discussion and study.<sup>1</sup>

### *Principles of Wartime Propaganda*

1. To fight, the people of a country must think they are being attacked. The propagandist must prove that it was the enemy who started the war: the enemy is the aggressor—murderous, cruel, rapacious. The propagandist calls upon his people to defend themselves, and to defend their wives, their children, their mothers, their homes, their church, their King, their country. War is never the result of international rivalries, not if the propagandist can help it. Each country's first pre-occupation is with establishing the war guilt of the enemy nation. Recent illustrations: the Russian people were told that Finland attacked Russia; the German people, that Poland attacked Germany, that England sought to ruin the Fatherland.

2. To fight, the people must think they are winning. Then they can be persuaded to make sacrifices, to lose their lives. The war propagandist fights his most important battle on the home front: once the home front cracks, the war is over. Accordingly, he announces victories—enemy losses and strategic battles won—for propagandistic reasons. (See stories from official German or British sources.)

The propagandist must prepare his people for temporary reverses, but he must always insist that no set-back can affect the final outcome. As long as people are convinced that good eventually will triumph over evil, they are willing to suffer privation

<sup>1</sup> Individual readers, groups, and classes are invited to join with a number of the Institute's cooperating high schools, colleges, and adult group in building a practical, detailed *Guide to Intelligent Reading of War News*. Send in your suggestions to the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 40 E. 49th Street, New York City.



and death. Accordingly, the propagandist nourishes the illusion of victory, no matter what the facts may be. Victories must be exaggerated; losses must be denied. The armies of the Fatherland may "retire." British forces may retreat for "strategic reasons." The General Staff never blunders.

3. The propagandist must let the people know what is happening, without, however, destroying their will to continue the war. In World War I, Winston Churchill devised what is probably the most effective technique for doing this. He suppressed bad news until he could offset it with good. In the Russo-Finnish war, Churchill's technique was refined by the Finns, who suppressed news of victory in the north until it was needed to counterbalance the reports of Finnish reverses along the Karelian Isthmus.<sup>2</sup>

4. Propaganda must penetrate enemy territory. Here the objective is the destruction of morale. The propagandist has allies—the disgruntled, the discontented. Suffering and defeat strengthens them. In 1918 hungry German soldiers who knew that their wives and children and parents were undernourished too, learned from leaflets dropped by American planes that American troops were getting good food. It seemed useless to continue fighting, when surrender would mean that they and their families would have more to eat.

5. The propagandist must create discord between the enemy and her allies. Following her propaganda pattern of World War I, Germany has attempted to convince Frenchmen that they are fighting England's war.

6. The propagandist knows the importance of the neutral front. On September 3, 1939, as the Nazi German armies marched into Poland, the United States was again "the greatest neutral." Official stories are written with an eye on the newspaper readers of neutral countries.

<sup>2</sup>See forthcoming Institute publication, *War Propaganda and the United States*, by Harold Lavine and James Wechsler.

#### MINIMUM REFERENCE SHELF

*Propaganda Technique in the World War*, by Harold D. Lasswell (Peter Smith: New York, 1938)

*Propaganda in the Next War*, by Captain Sidney Rogerson (Geoffrey Bles: London, 1939)

*Words That Won the War*, by James R. Mock and Cedric Larsen (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N. J., 1939)

*Mein Kampf*, by Adolf Hitler (Reynal & Hitchcock: New York, 1939)

*War in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Willard Waller (The Dryden Press: New York, 1940) (See especially pp. 429-477)

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# Propaganda Analysis

*A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda*

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

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## The "Fifth Column"

THE other day, in Baltimore, a man parked his car across the street from a German restaurant. Its name is best left unmentioned. A passerby threw a lighted cigarette butt into the car. The butt set fire to the cushions. Somebody saw the smoke and called for help. The restaurant owner ran over with a fire extinguisher and put out the blaze. Police radio cars arrived. The restaurant owner chatted for a few minutes with some of the policemen. They left and he went back into his restaurant. Normally that would have been the end of the incident.

But the temperature of public opinion is now far from normal. Within forty-eight hours rumors had spread about the city that the restaurant had been raided as a center of Fifth Column activities. It was said that a police patrol backed up to the place and officers brought out no less than twenty-four big, square boxes, each of them containing a huge bomb. It was whispered that the restaurant owner had been subjected to a severe cross-examination in the local F.B.I. offices. People claimed to have heard these stories from eye-witnesses or from people who had talked with eye-witnesses. One woman phoned a columnist on a Baltimore daily<sup>1</sup> and asked in great fury: "Why do the Baltimore newspapers conceal the fact that the F. B. I. discovered a Fifth Column nest? Are they sympathetic to the Fifth Columnists?" A cigarette butt, as Louis Azrael, Baltimore *News-Post* columnist said, had ignited Baltimore.

<sup>1</sup> This account is taken from Louis Azrael's column in the Baltimore *News-Post* of June 10, 1940.

Fifth Column hysteria is not limited to Baltimore. One can pick up few newspapers without reading that somebody has called somebody else a Fifth Columnist. The President and his associates have been termed Fifth Columnists. New Dealers have called Lindbergh Fifth Columnist for advocating isolation. Congress has begun to pass legislation against Communists and Bundists as Fifth Columnists. From the far Right has come the cry that all liberals are Fifth Columnists. On the far Left Communists have applied the term to big business and to their own heretic sectlets. Fascists have applied the term to interventionists. Above all the feeling has grown that to be opposed to American aid to the Allies or to a more active "non-belligerency" in the present war is to lay oneself open to the suspicion of being a Fifth Columnist.

Propaganda's chief weapon in whipping up fear and hatred before America's entrance into the last war was the atrocity story. This time the same purposes seem to be served by stories of the Fifth Column. The atrocity story—the raped nuns and the Belgian babies with their hands cut off—were too thoroughly discredited after the last war to be effective in this one. This time the Fifth Column, sinister symbol of treachery and lurking danger, has seized on the popular imagination. It is effective as war propaganda because it creates fear, and fear stirs hostility far better than does sympathy with victims of the German blitzkrieg or animosity toward Nazi-Fascist principles. Pity is a luxury and ideology is subject for debate, but the shadow of the Fifth Column is a direct and



immediate menace to ourselves. We read little in the press about atrocities, much about the Fifth Column. "In the prosecution of this war," the Sons of the American Revolution declared at their 51st annual Congress in Washington, "military success is sought . . . by flouting international law, disregarding all neutral rights and inviting treason and by planting Fifth Columns within the confines of the countries attacked."<sup>2</sup>

*The Greeks Had a Word . . .*

The tactic represented by the Fifth Column is far older than the name itself. It is used interchangeably with the term, Trojan Horse, and that goes back, of course, to Homer's story of how the Greeks effected an entry into Troy by smuggling their men into the city in a hollow horse, presented to Troy as a gift. Fifth Columns operated in the Peloponnesian War, 500 years before Christ. The great Greek historian, Thucydides, tells us that the democratic Athenians depended on democratic sympathizers within the cities they attacked, while their chief enemies, the Spartans, relied on sympathizers with their own oligarchic and "National Socialist" form of government. The same tactic played its part in the World War. The Germans permitted Lenin to pass from Switzerland into Russia in the famous "sealed train" in the hope that he would act as a revolutionary Fifth Column to overthrow the Russian government and take Russia out of the war. The Wilson Administration established secret contacts with German democrats during the World War and sent the Hungarian pacifist, Rozika Schwimmer (later refused American citizenship because she wouldn't bear arms) on a Fifth Column mission into Austro-Hungary to contact democratic elements and give them copies of Wilson's messages.<sup>3</sup> At home during America's participation in the war travelling salesmen were warned, "throughout the land the Kaiser's paid agents and sympathizers are spreading by word of mouth rumors, criticisms and lies that aim to disrupt our national unity. . . ."<sup>4</sup>

The term Fifth Column originated when a Franco general before Madrid boasted in 1936, "We have four columns of soldiers and the

'fifth column' will rise up from within Madrid to help us."<sup>5</sup> But the phrase was given new prominence and the hysteria associated with it touched off by Leland Stowe's famous Fifth Column cable from Stockholm to the Chicago *Daily News* syndicate, April 15. "For the first time," Stowe cabled, "the story behind Germany's paralyzing twelve-hour conquest of Norway last Tuesday can be told . . . Norway's capital and great seaports were not captured by armed force. They were seized with unparalleled speed by means of a gigantic conspiracy which must undoubtedly rank among the most audacious, most perfectly oiled, political plots of the last century." Stowe said, "By bribery and extraordinary infiltration on the part of Nazi agents, and by treason on the part of a few highly placed Norwegian civilian and defense officials, the German dictatorship built a Trojan Horse inside of Norway. Then, when the hour struck, the German plotters spiked the guns of the Norwegian navy and reduced its formidable fortresses to impotence."<sup>6</sup>

*What Happened in Norway*

The full story of the German blitzkrieg against Norway will not be known until after this war is over. Whether Norway was the victim of a Fifth Column or of a surprise attack launched by a military machine that has proved too powerful for bigger countries remains to be determined. But there is evidence that the Stowe Fifth Column report was exaggerated. Before the guns of the Norwegian navy were "spiked" they took a heavy toll of the German navy. The Norwegian minelayer Olaf Tryggvason sank three Nazi cruisers, the Emden, the Karlsruhe and a third cruiser said to be the Blucher as the German flotilla came into Oslo Fjord. The forts of Oskarsburg and Seierstein were reported to have sunk a battleship further up the Fjord before mysterious capitulation orders stopped firing.<sup>7</sup>

Were these capitulation orders the work of Norwegian treachery—of a Fifth Column—or of Nazi duplicity? On April 18 the Norwegian legation at Washington issued a statement saying that fake orders and not treason or sabo-

<sup>2</sup> *Washington Post*, May 22, 1940.

<sup>3</sup> James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words That Won the War*, pp. 276-78, Princeton University Press, 1939.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* p. 176, "The Kaiserite in America."

<sup>5</sup> *N. Y. World Telegram*, June 4, 1940. See also Ernest Hemingway's play, *The Fifth Column*.

<sup>6</sup> *Chicago Daily News*, *New York Post* and other papers, April 15, 1940.

<sup>7</sup> *New York Times*, April 16, 1940.





Fifth Column fears in St. Louis were revealed recently in the labeling of this German language newspaper office as pro-Hitler and "Fifth Column". The propaganda act of labeling the building is one of many such acts; more violent incidents have included the bombing of the Communist newspaper, the *Daily Worker*, an explosion near the German Library of Information in New York, and the death of two detectives who were killed by a bomb planted in the British exhibit at the New York World's Fair.

The photograph above was published in the St. Louis *Star Times*.

tage were responsible for the confusion in the defense of Norway during the first impact of the Nazi attack.<sup>8</sup> The Norwegian legation in Stockholm cabled, "Sensational rumors of treason and sabotage must be received with the greatest reservation."<sup>9</sup> General Carl Johan Erichsen, commander of the first division in southeastern Norway, denied stories of Fifth Column treason. "In these days when we Norwegians are living through such terrible happenings," he said, "it is to be deeply regretted that our burden should be increased by rumors which are entirely without foundation in fact. These rumors must be regarded as a part of a strong propaganda which is being conducted by the enemy in order to destroy us by such means as well."<sup>10</sup> Pulitzer Prize winner Otto D.

Tolischus cabled the New York *Times* on April 27 that unpreparedness rather than a Fifth Column was the cause of the Norwegian defeat. Tolischus reported that the German element in Norway was smaller than in almost any other country, with only about 500 German citizens, most of them Jewish refugees, in the country at the time.<sup>11</sup>

Much was made at first of the role played by Major Vikdun Quisling, head of the Norwegian Nazi party, in the conquest of the country. In a communique of April 15, the Norwegian government declared that on the first contact between itself and the invaders it was informed that Hitler's personal wish was that Quisling should head the government.<sup>12</sup> But two days after the attack on Norway Berlin had recognized that the Norwegian Nazis were "a

<sup>8</sup> New York *Times*, April 19, 1940.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> New York *Times*, April 28, 1940.

<sup>12</sup> New York *Times*, April 16, 1940.



hopelessly small minority" and was holding aloof from Major Vikdun Quisling's "opportunistic cabinet" in Oslo.<sup>13</sup> The last heard of Quisling was when the British Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Butler announced in the Commons on June 12 that the Norwegian Nazi's name had been stricken from the Order of the British Empire. Butler said Quisling was made an honorary commander of the order on November 22, 1939, in recognition of services rendered to the British government in Russia while serving in Moscow on the Norwegian legation staff.<sup>14</sup> The nature of the services was not explained.

### *Nazi Trojan Horses*

Whatever the true causes of the Norwegian disaster, pro-Nazi elements had aided in the seizure of Austria, the disruption of Czechoslovakia, and the annexation of Memel and Danzig. Fear of the Nazi Fifth Column became world wide. In Yugoslavia German homes were raided. "We want no Quislings, no Henleins, no Hachas, no Seyss-Inquarts in Yugoslavia," one official said, calling the roll of the Nazi Fifth Columnists who figured in Norway, the Sudetenland, Bohemia-Moravia and Austria.<sup>15</sup> On May 4 prominent Nazis and Nazi sympathizers were arrested in Holland and Belgium. On May 18 Hungary arrested 200 Communists as Fifth Columnists. On May 23 there was a roundup of Fascists and alleged Fascist sympathizers in England, Sir Oswald Mosley, British Fascist leader, and Captain Archibald H. M. Ramsay, Conservative M.P., being among those arrested.<sup>16</sup> In South Africa and the Phillipines, in Egypt and in Latin America there was talk of Fifth Columnists. "America's defenders," the Associated Press reported from Washington on June 8, "are watching warily the foreign agents operating in the lands below the Rio Grande. In national capitals from Mexico City down to Santiago and Buenos Aires, the governments are alert to the danger from within. They call it 'quinta columna'—the same old Fifth Column that be-devils the neutrals of Europe." Danger was seen "lurking in close-

knit German settlements of the Sao Paulo coffee district; in the German pilots who, even when their country is at war, guide commercial planes over the South American mountains; in settlements of Japanese farmers and fishing folk on land well-suited to air base uses—and close to the Panama Canal." In Canada, Adrien Arcand, Fascist leader, and many of his aides were seized by the authorities on May 30.

A flood of Fifth Column stories came from Mexico, to the annoyance of the Cardenas government. Dies proposed that the Monroe Doctrine be extended to cover Fifth Column activities in Latin America.<sup>17</sup> An unofficial spokesman for the Cardenas regime called these charges ridiculous. "The fantastic charges of Mr. Dies—who is from Texas, an oil state—are seconded by political groups and Mexican newspapers whose connections with the oil companies are well known, for which reason it is believed that the American Congressman is simply doing his part to increase the tension of the situation, in order to bring pressure on the Mexican government and to prepare the way for serious future events."<sup>18</sup> What these serious future events are is not explained but Paul Mallon, Hearst Washington columnist, reported recently that Mr. Roosevelt wanted authority to call out the National Guard in order "to cope with possible local disturbances" in Latin American countries.<sup>19</sup>

### *Fifth Column Classic*

Wildest of the Fifth Column stories was that reported in Ludwig Lore's column in the *New York Post* on May 18. Lore attributed it to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency and said he would not have reprinted it "if it were not given on the authority of the Dutch government." According to this story Nazi spies entered the Netherlands last February 16 in the guise of Jewish refugees "even taking the precaution of being circumcized." They were unmasked—so the report has it—when a rabbi determined that they had not been circumcized according to the Jewish ritual. The story appeared originally in the French newspaper *L'Oeuvre*: "The Gestapo had selected 16 men who looked

<sup>13</sup> *New York Times*, April 12, 1940.

<sup>14</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, June 13, 1940.

<sup>15</sup> *New York Times*, April 19, 1940.

<sup>16</sup> *New York Times*, May 23, 1940.

<sup>17</sup> *New York Journal American*, June 6, 1940.

<sup>18</sup> "The Crisis in Mexico." By Alejandro Carrillo. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Summer, 1940.

<sup>19</sup> *New York Journal American*, June 7, 1940.



Jewish, had them attend synagogue services for several weeks, furnished them with passports stamped with 'J' (Jew) and sent them into Holland. The Netherlands anti-espionage service, suspecting that they were spies, had them arrested." This may become a classic of Fifth Column propaganda.

### *Name Calling*

From the point of view of propaganda analysis the most important aspect of the Fifth Column is its use as the newest and most effective form of Name Calling. The extent and variety of those who have been called Fifth Columnists in the few weeks since the Norwegian conquest brought the phrase into prominence is amazing. It is noteworthy that although the Fifth Column originally denoted Nazi sympathizers and has been extended to Communists because of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, it is being used with ever greater frequency against the New Deal and its liberal supporters. This was first called sharply to public attention on May 15 when Hendrick Willem Van Loon announced his resignation from the Dutch Treat Club because its president, Clarence Budington Kelland, said, "The Fifth Column in this country is headed by that fellow in the White House."<sup>20</sup> Similarly on May 20 Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson and a frequent contributor to the Hearst press, told the General Society of Colonial Wars in New York City, "In Europe the Fifth Column is in disguise. With us, the Fifth Column is in office."<sup>21</sup> Congressman J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey, said over a nation-wide radio hookup, "The Fifth Column in the United States has flourished under New Deal rule. In some respects it is synonymous to the New Deal, so the surest way of removing the Fifth Column from our shores is to remove the New Deal from the seat of government." Borough President Harvey of Queens, in an address warning the New York Kiwanis Club against subversive elements in the city's educational and police departments, said "Fifth Column parachute troops" had been landing in the United States for two decades. "Our advance guards," Harvey

<sup>20</sup> New York World Telegram, May 15, 1940.

<sup>21</sup> New York Journal American, May 21, 1940.

explained, "don't wear uniforms or bristle with guns. They are disguised as so-called 'liberals'. . . ."<sup>22</sup>

Fifth Column Name Calling has not been limited to the New Deal or even to politics. Thomas F. Woodlock, Wall Street Journal columnist, attacked John Dewey's educational theories as "a dangerous 'Fifth Column' in the nation's life." Senator Norris made a four hour speech in the Senate denouncing J. Edgar Hoover as a peril to civil liberties and "the greatest publicity hound on the American continent,"<sup>23</sup> but the F.B.I. director told the New York City Federation of Women's Clubs that recent attacks upon him were a cover up for Fifth Column activities.<sup>24</sup> Wendell Willkie at Kansas City on May 24 declared that if the Republican party gave up its opposition to a third term it would become a Fifth Column.<sup>25</sup>

### *Communists Accuse Mr. Morgan*

The *Daily Worker* pinned the label on its old friend, J. P. Morgan: "There is a real Fifth Column in our country. . . . Their chief is J. P. Morgan, fattening like a vampire off the blood of young men."<sup>26</sup> William Z. Foster spoke of the wiping out of a "Trotskyite-Zinovievite-Bukharinite Fifth Column"<sup>27</sup> in the Soviet Union. Dorothy Thompson saw a Fifth Column "in our great industries . . . the line taken with them is that Nazism represents the logical quintessence of industrial—as opposed to financial—capitalism . . ."<sup>28</sup> Senator Barbour of New Jersey hinted that his Democratic opponent, James H. R. Cromwell, was a Fifth Columnist. He called Cromwell "an admitted seditionist" for making what Barbour interpreted as slurring references to the Constitution in a book called *The Voice of Young America*.<sup>29</sup> A speaker before the New York State Association of Young Republican Clubs, referring to the anti-Dewey bloc, said, "In this time of crisis it is our duty to see that no Fifth Column operates in the Republican party."<sup>30</sup>

<sup>22</sup> New York Sun, May 22, 1940.

<sup>23</sup> Congressional Record, May 7, 1940.

<sup>24</sup> New York Times, May 5, 1940.

<sup>25</sup> New York Herald Tribune, May 25, 1940.

<sup>26</sup> Daily Worker, May 22, 1940.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., June 12, 1940.

<sup>28</sup> New York Herald Tribune, May 27, 1940.

<sup>29</sup> New York Times, June 3, 1940.

<sup>30</sup> New York Times, May 18, 1940.



A Fifth Columnist, it soon began to seem, was anybody who disagreed with you.

More particularly, a Fifth Columnist was someone who did not wish to help the Allies or to enter the war. This, though rarely given open statement, was the implication of a growing volume of pro-Ally propaganda. "Fifth Columnists are already active in America," said Senator Byrnes in his reply to Lindbergh, "and those who consciously or unconsciously retard the efforts of this government to provide for the defense of the American people are the Fifth Columnists' most effective fellow travelers."<sup>31</sup> Colonel Frank Knox in a Chicago *Daily News* editorial called anti-New Deal die-hards among business men Fifth Columnists. "It is easy to spot these elements of the Fifth Column," he said. "Today they are unusually conspicuous because of attitudes and utterances that seem to show they would prefer to leave this country wide open to invasion rather than to support a national administration they do not like. . . ." <sup>32</sup> The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, in the full page advertisements it placed in the nation's press June 10, said, "The Fifth Column is led in this as in other countries by Nazis and Communists and their fellow travellers. . . . Their object is to destroy national unity . . . sabotaging all aid to the Allies."<sup>33</sup>

#### *America's "Peace Front"*

"Italian Pro-Fascists," said a New York *Post* headline after Italy joined the war, "In U. S. Join Peace Front. Two Newspapers Here Take Communist-Nazi Isolationist Line."<sup>34</sup> "Peace Front Here," the New York *World Telegram* discovered, "Linked to Communists."<sup>35</sup> War feeling, Senator Nye protested to the Sales Executive Club in New York, is at a stage where "if you are not ready to go the whole way you must be pro-Nazi, pro-Italian, pro-Communist, or anything except pro-American . . ." <sup>36</sup>

The Administration has warned against hysteria but has also warned against the Fifth Column. "We have seen the treacherous use of

the Fifth Column," the President told Congress on May 16 in his famous 50,000-planes message, "by which persons supposed to be peaceful visitors were actually part of an enemy occupation."<sup>37</sup> On May 24 he told a press conference that he considered the Dies committee records a good source of information on Fifth Column activities.<sup>38</sup> Two days earlier he asked Congress to transfer the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization from the Labor Department to the Department of Justice in order to permit a closer check on Fifth Columnists. Mr. Roosevelt said that this reflected no intention to deprive aliens of "their civil liberties" but that it would enable the government "to deal quickly with those aliens who conduct themselves in a manner that conflicts with the public interest."<sup>39</sup> And in his defense message of May 26 the President warned again against "The Fifth Column that betrays a nation unprepared for treachery."<sup>40</sup>

#### *The Supreme Court Acts*

The demand for national unity made itself felt even on the Supreme Court where Justice Frankfurter for the majority, with only Justice Stone dissenting, upheld the expulsion from school of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for refusing to salute the flag. When members of this sect were attacked in Maine a few days later the New York *Herald Tribune* protested, "We have the 'liberal' members of the Supreme Court to thank . . . the Supreme Court's recent decision that the Jehovah's Witnesses must salute the flag seems to have convinced several hundred Maine rustics that it is their personal responsibility to see this decree carried out. The national 'Fifth Column' hysteria has added fuel to the flames. . . ." <sup>41</sup>

In Texas and in Maine members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, anti-Nazi but also anti-war, were attacked by mobs. Legion posts organized to "fight the Fifth Column." The New York National Guard revived its Intelligence Unit, which ordinarily operates only in war-time, to watch for Fifth Columnists.<sup>42</sup> In Sparta, Mich-

<sup>31</sup> New York *Times*, May 23, 1940.

<sup>32</sup> Reprinted in *The Progressive*, June 1, 1940.

<sup>33</sup> New York *Times*, June 10, 1940.

<sup>34</sup> New York *Post*, June 11, 1940.

<sup>35</sup> New York *World Telegram*, June 4, 1940.

<sup>36</sup> New York *Times*, June 12, 1940.

<sup>37</sup> New York *Times*, May 17, 1940.

<sup>38</sup> New York *Journal American*, May 24, 1940.

<sup>39</sup> New York *Times*, May 23, 1940.

<sup>40</sup> New York *Times*, May 27, 1940.

<sup>41</sup> New York *Herald Tribune* editorial, June 13, 1940.

<sup>42</sup> New York *Times*, May 23, 1940.



# PUBLIC NOTICE

Some unscrupulous person or persons have spread malicious lies and falsehoods regarding my being Un-American and conducting Un-American activities. I deeply regret this and wish to take this opportunity to denounce these lies as untrue and unfounded for these reasons:

1. I AM A NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN. MRS. FELLEZ IS A NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN
2. MY PARENTS LIVED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS.
3. I DO NOT BELONG TO OR CONTRIBUTE TO ANY UN-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS.
4. I HAVE AT NO TIME HELD PARTIES AT MY HOME OR ELSEWHERE FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF CELEBRATING EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.
5. I HAVE NOT AT ANY TIME ARGUED WITH ANY PERSON REGARDING FOREIGN POLICIES.
6. I HAVE NOT BEEN ARRESTED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OR ANY POLICE DEPARTMENT.
7. I AM ALWAYS READY AND WILLING TO PRESENT MYSELF OR MY BOOKS AND RECORDS FOR ANY INVESTIGATION.
8. I CAME TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1906.
9. I WAS BORN IN HUNGARY, WHICH IS NOW PART OF RUMANIA.
10. I AM A MEMBER OF
  - A. THE LINCOLN LODGE NO. 748 OF THE FREE AND ACCEPTED MASONS OF NEW YORK.
  - B. BROOKLYN MASTER BAKERS PURCHASE ASSOCIATION.
  - C. THE ROTARY CLUB OF GLEN COVE.
  - D. GLEN COVE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.
11. I HAVE ALWAYS CONTRIBUTED FINANCIALLY TO LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS.
12. I HAVE NOT SOLD MY BUSINESS AND WILL CONTINUE SERVING CUSTOMERS IN THE SAME COURTEOUS EFFICIENT MANNER AS IN THE PAST.

Therefore, at this time, I desire to go on record publicly with my denial of all rumors regarding my so-called Un-American activities.

It is the intention and heartfelt desire of Mrs. Fellenz and myself to live with our brother Americans in the true democratic American tradition.

Signed,

*John Fellenz*

I PLEDGE ALLEGIANCE TO THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TO THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS, ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL.

Signed: John Fellenz

Dorothy Fellenz

SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS  
29TH DAY OF MAY 1940

DAVID G. COHEN,

Notary Public, Nassau County, N. Y.  
No 2221

John Fellenz of Glen Cove, New York, thought it necessary to insert this full-page advertisement in the Glen Cove *Echo*, although Warren Murdock, Commissioner of Public Safety at Glen Cove, announced that he had investigated the Fellenz case and found the rumors groundless. There are Fifth Column activities in America, as many previous Institute bulletins have shown. These may best be attacked by careful investigation and by proper legal procedure; they cannot be successfully attacked by hysterical methods.



igan, a foundry worker confessed that he shot and killed his neighbor because he suspected that the neighbor was a Fifth Columnist.<sup>43</sup> A Technocrat was jailed in Sapulpa, Oklahoma, as a Fifth Columnist.<sup>44</sup> A professional parachutist sent a letter to an Omaha, Nebraska, newspaper begging people not to shoot anyone seen descending in a parachute during the county fair season.<sup>45</sup> A group of fifty women organized an anti-parachutist rifle club in New York City with the acting regional director of the National Legion of Mothers of America as their head. A naval reserve lieutenant presented the women with two rifles to start practicing.<sup>46</sup> An Erase-The-Fifth-Column, Inc., was formed in Los Angeles. Jeff Davis, King of the Hoboes, announced formation of a group to be known as the Jungle Bulls headed by One-Eye Connolly to watch for the Fifth Column. "People don't realize it," Davis said, "but the hoboes are the best friends this country has. They're loyal."<sup>47</sup>

#### *Janitors Help Too*

Janitors were organized in New York City to spy on late parties<sup>48</sup> and the noted Italian anti-Fascist writer, G. A. Borgese, deplored the abuse of free speech by Fifth Columnists.<sup>49</sup> Volunteer firemen, in national convention at Philadelphia, pledged themselves to fight the Fifth Column.<sup>50</sup> Aliens were ordered registered in Georgia and New Jersey and deputy sheriffs were posted at the polls in Andover Township, New Jersey, to bar Bund members from the polls.<sup>51</sup>

A bill was introduced in the New York City Council to guard against the Fifth Column by forcing all aliens to register.<sup>52</sup> Harold G. Campbell, superintendent of New York City schools, told Kindergarten-6B teachers they must help fight the Fifth Column.<sup>53</sup> The Erie County, New York, American Legion mobilized to keep

Fifth Columnists from crossing the border at Niagara Falls.<sup>54</sup> The 300,000 members of the National Rifle Association were warned to keep a watch for Fifth Columnists along our borders.<sup>55</sup> On Long Island, Nassau County officials set up a clearing house for news of subversive activities because residents expressed concern over the county's proximity to New York City.<sup>56</sup> The Longshoremen's Union refused to permit the discharge of Italian members<sup>57</sup> and the House by a vote of 330-42 passed a bill ordering the deportation of Harry Bridges, West Coast longshoremen's leader, as a "symbol of the fifth column."<sup>58</sup> "Deluge of Tips On 'Fifth Column' Swamps the F.B.I.," said a headline in the New York *Herald Tribune*, May 30.

#### *The Associated Farmers*

Leading the hue and cry against the Fifth Column were some odd organizations and characters, not always associated in the public mind with devotion to American principles. The Associated Farmers of California<sup>59</sup> issued a press release in June declaring that they were "throwing every resource at their command into a fight against the Fifth Column in this State. . . ." This was too much for the New York *Times* which warned in an editorial on the Fifth Column on June 13: "It is highly important that no group should be permitted to act on the assumption that persons who disagree with it or stand in its way economically should therefore be treated as 'Fifth Columns'. . . ." The *Times* mentioned the Associated Farmers and said: "This country is likely to become a madhouse if anyone with an interest or grievance may use the country's danger to promote the interest or satisfy the grievance." Of the four "top men" who met to organize the Associated Farmers for action against the "Fifth Column" one Colonel Walter E. Garrison of Lodi has led attacks on strikers and another, Philip Bancroft, had many kind things to say of the Hitler regime after a visit to Germany a few years ago.

<sup>43</sup> New York *Times*, June 5, 1940.

<sup>44</sup> New York *Journal American*, June 7, 1940.

<sup>45</sup> New York *Times*, May 26, 1940.

<sup>46</sup> New York *Sun*, June 13, 1940.

<sup>47</sup> New York *Times*, June 14, 1940.

<sup>48</sup> See Institute for Propaganda Analysis Bulletin, Volume II, No. 12, "The Associated Farmers."

<sup>48</sup> Milwaukee *Evening Post*, May 28, 1940.

<sup>49</sup> *American Guardian*, May 31, 1940.

<sup>50</sup> United Press dispatch from Omaha in Milwaukee *Evening Post*, May 31, 1940.

<sup>51</sup> New York *Times*, May 23, 1940.

<sup>52</sup> New York *Times*, May 29, 1940.

<sup>53</sup> New York *Sun*, May 25, 1940.

<sup>54</sup> New York *Times*, May 22, 1940.

<sup>55</sup> New York *Times*, May 27, 1940.

<sup>56</sup> New York *Journal American*, May 22, 1940.

<sup>57</sup> New York *Herald Tribune*, May 25, 1940.

<sup>58</sup> New York *Times*, May 25, 1940.



Foremost in the ranks of those attacking the Fifth Column was William Randolph Hearst and on May 30 the New York *Journal American* took credit for pioneering in the battle. "The Hearst papers have for years warned the country against all forms of subversion, no matter under what mask it parades." The final reference was not explained, but readers may have recalled Hearst's frequent attacks on the New Deal as "Communistic." Another strange bed-fellow in the fight against the Fifth Column was Senator Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina. The April 14 issue of William Dudley Pelley's anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi *Liberation* devoted two full columns to praise of "the good work" being done by Reynolds. Reynolds' own native Fascist paper, *The American Vindicator*, is often sold at Silvershirt meetings. "There are many herds of Trojan horses grazing in the fertile fields of America," Reynolds said in asking for a broad Congressional investigation of Fifth Column activities on May 22. His words were echoed in the Stop Hitler Now advertisement run by the Committee to Help the Allies on June 10. "We cannot ignore the fact," the ad said, "that Trojan horses are grazing in all the fertile fields of North and South America."

#### *Mayor Hague Enlists*

Mayor Hague of Jersey City has also enlisted in the fight against the Fifth Column. The New York *Daily Mirror* on June 4 reported that Hague, recently rebuked by the Supreme Court for violation of the Constitution in Jersey City, was working with war veterans to "clamp down" on the Fifth Column there. Borough President Harvey of Queens, as we have seen, is also taking credit for having long ago warned against "liberal" Fifth Columnists, and Martin Dies left Washington on May 26 for Buffalo to begin an investigation of Fifth Column elements in New York State.<sup>60</sup> Ex-

<sup>60</sup> New York *Herald Tribune*, May 27, 1940.

Congressman John J. O'Connor, who has attacked the New Deal as "Communistic" in the past, announced organization of a First Column to fight the Fifth Column.<sup>61</sup>

#### *Protests Are Few*

Protests were made against the hysteria but they were few. "Before long," Raymond Clapper said in his column in the New York *World Telegram* of May 28, "any little pants presser will be able to put a competitor out of the way by turning him in as a Fifth Columnist. Any fellow who wants 30 cents an hour when the boss is paying 25 cents will be suspected as a Fifth Columnist. If this business goes on what will be the difference between a Communist criticizing President Roosevelt or a Republican criticizing him? They will both be stirring up dissension." Samuel Grafton in the New York *Post* of June 1 said, "There is a 4½ column in this country. The 4½ column consists of men who are trying to make political capital for themselves by exploiting the public's proper fear of the Fifth Column." And in characteristic vein H. L. Mencken in the Baltimore *Sun* on June 9 said of the Fifth Column hysteria, "Nothing could be better adapted to the uses of demagoguery. It gives every boob a chance to harry and defame his neighbors in the name of Service, and it secures him against any hazard of reprisal for most of his operations may be carried out in whispers, and whenever he is dragged into the open he will have a gang behind him and not only a gang, but the full force of the state." "My own fear," Jonathan Daniels, editor of the Raleigh *News and Observer*, said on June 9 in declining to sign a statement calling for an American declaration of war against Germany, "is that we may embrace fascism at home in the guise of defense against fascism abroad." America needs to be on guard against a Fifth Column. It also needs to be on guard against Fifth Column hysteria.

<sup>61</sup> New York *Times*, June 10, 1940.



# Propaganda Analysis Worksheet

TODAY'S most effective form of Name Calling is the use of the term, Fifth Column. In city, town, and hamlet the phrase is turned accusingly, and rumors spread like wild-fire along the Main Streets of the nation.

"So and So has been questioned by the F.B.I."

"Yes. Didn't you know? He was taken to the State Capitol for questioning."

In communities throughout the United States the national drama is enacted on small scale. In the public press, as the current Bulletin points out, all manner of persons and groups are called Fifth Columnists. A few: President Roosevelt, J. P. Morgan, the New Deal, Wall Street, the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, industry, labor.

As it is used at the present time in America the term, Fifth Column, is meaningless. In use it connotes everything—and nothing; certainly, nothing specific and concrete. Indeed, so indiscriminate has been its application that, as the Bulletin observes, a Fifth Columnist is likely to be anybody who disagrees with you.

Back of the almost frantic concern over the Fifth Column and the Trojan Horse, of course, are deep-seated anxieties and surface fears, as well as a universal feeling of insecurity. The war in Europe takes its toll, daily. No one knows what the future may bring to homes throughout the land, but all fear.

Meaningless as is the use of the words Fifth Column and Trojan Horse, these terms are already a part of our vocabulary. As such we must deal with them.

Our task in bringing critical thinking and analysis to bear upon these words is fourfold:

1. To understand the social pressures which seek outlet through the indiscriminate use of the label, Fifth Column. Only in this way can we understand the rising hysteria which manifests itself in this form of Name Calling.

*Question:* What are today's major fears in America? How do people act when they are afraid? What are the chief social and political pressures operating upon all of us?

2. To examine consciously our own habits of thinking and responses to the use of these names.

*Question:* How and why do I think and believe as I do? What are the possible consequences of my habits of thought and speech? To me? To others? To civil liberties enunciated in the Bill of Rights?

3. To detect and appraise the propaganda aims of many of those persons who brand others as Fifth Columnists.

*Question:* How are we, with our limited facilities for obtaining accurate information, with our limited techniques for weighing and evaluating evidence, to distinguish between real and so-called enemies of our democracy?

Possibly our first task, here, is to clarify our own thinking concerning the distinguishing characteristics of political and social democracy, as opposed to the totalitarian state. What does democracy, as a day to day way of life, mean to you?

4. To ask, when we have spotted the use of Name Calling, is the name true or false, and what is the meaning of its truth or falsity?

*Question:* What responsibilities are imposed upon us as citizens after we have ascertained its truth or falsity?

## I. GROUP WORK PROJECT

### *Truth or Falsity*

The detection of propaganda devices, or appeals, is a much needed skill—a tool of citizenship in a democracy—but obviously it cannot stand alone. Aided by this necessary tool (skill in detection of common propaganda devices) the student of propaganda must take a second step into the field of critical inquiry.

He must ask, in the case of Name Calling: Is the name deserved or undeserved? Am I offered proof of its truth or falsity? Does the proof I'm offered stand up under searching inquiry? What actually does the evidence I'm offered prove? Is there any counter-evidence? A



third step generally leads us to the collection of evidence ourselves and to its analysis in terms of "what does it mean?" Specifically, what does it mean in terms of my future behavior in the society of which I am a part? My behavior in buying, discussing, voting?

The analysis of propaganda must stem from the basic methods of thinking involved in all fields of learning which use an experimental, scientific approach. (See definition of concept of critical thinking as an expression of the scientific method in *Propaganda Analysis*, September, 1939, "Let's Talk About Ourselves.")

As a laboratory exercise, select three examples of the use of Fifth Columnist as a Name Calling device in the public press—or in your community. Apply to them the steps in critical inquiry listed above.

## II. GROUP DISCUSSION PROJECT

### *The Nature of Proof*

Propaganda analysis becomes a positive process when it contributes to our behavior. We may understand the nature of proof; we may know the kind of evidence which a county judge demands and accepts; and, still our way of life may not show that we understand it.

In group discussion, review the Fifth Column allegations you have read and heard.

Measure your own behavior responses to this Name Calling term by the following yardstick<sup>1</sup>:

1. You will select the significant words and phrases in any statement that is important to you and ask that they be carefully defined.
2. You will require evidence in support of any conclusion you are pressed to accept.
3. You will recognize stated and unstated assumptions essential to the conclusion.
4. You will evaluate these assumptions, accepting some and rejecting others.
5. You will evaluate the argument, accepting or rejecting the conclusion.
6. You will constantly re-examine the assumptions which are behind your beliefs and which guide your actions.

<sup>1</sup> *The Nature of Proof*, by Harold P. Fawcett. (Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University: New York, 1938), pp. 11 and 12.

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The Institute does not have all the answers: it lays no claim to infallibility. It will try to be scientific, objective and accurate. If it makes mistakes, it will acknowledge them. It asks those who receive its letters to check its work.



AUG 20 1940

# Propaganda Analysis

*A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda*

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

40 EAST FORTY-NINTH STREET: NEW YORK CITY

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## Propaganda for Blitzkrieg

HITLER'S smashing military victories have been preceded and accompanied by equally smashing propaganda victories. Nazi military successes in Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, and France would not have been possible without the preparatory and accompanying propaganda for Blitzkrieg.

Nazi propaganda techniques include no secret devices, no newly discovered psychological processes, no new channels of communication. What is new about the Nazi method and what has made it enormously effective is its co-ordination of old propaganda devices and psychological processes well-known to scholars and specialists, and the gearing of these to the political and military aims and acts of the Nazi totalitarian state.

Failure of Hitler's enemies and Hitler's potential enemies to understand his methods has made Nazi successes all the easier. Knowledge of why his propaganda works is as necessary to those who would combat him as any knowledge of military methods and materiel. Propaganda is an integral part of his total war.

The Fuehrer's inordinately skillful propaganda has blended the intuition of a genius, the experience gained in rough and tumble politics, and the discoveries of erudite psychologists. With Goebbels's assistance, scholarly findings, which might otherwise have remained on academic shelves gathering dust, have been translated into what thus far has proved a sure-fire method for bringing unity and zeal at home and demoralization and panic abroad. With brilliant success he has keyed common propaganda techniques to

basic human psychology. His propaganda prepares the way for every Blitzkrieg.

Those who would understand how Hitler operates must know how he employs the seven common propaganda devices. In May, 1938, in the bulletin, "Propaganda Techniques of German Fascism," the Institute presented a picture of Hitler, the propagandist, and illustrated his use of every common propaganda technique. This picture revealed how Hitler relates his propaganda to human hatreds, fears, aspirations, and traditions. To carry the analysis one step further, let's look more closely at these common mental processes to which Hitler has appealed. They are:

1. Custom
2. Simplification
3. Frustration
4. Displacement
5. Anxiety
6. Reinforcement
7. Association
8. Universals
9. Projection
10. Identification
11. Rationalization

### *Custom*

Most of us tend to feel, believe, and act in traditional patterns.

What we perceive is, to a large extent, dependent upon our previous ideas, upon the biases, convictions, ideals we have absorbed in habitual contacts with parents, associates, school, church, neighborhood. The successful propagandist keys his propaganda to these

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ideas, biases, convictions, ideals. That's the only way he can induce most of us to perceive and accept his message, to respond as he wants us to.

Hitler, the most successful propagandist of modern history, came to power in Germany because: (1) his propaganda was in terms of traditional German patriotism; (2) he didn't preach world revolution at first, he merely wanted to restore the German state to its former glory; (3) a nominal Christian and Roman Catholic, he did not preach atheism, but, on the contrary, associated himself and his program with God; (4) although he condemned big business and international banking publicly, after the manner of American Populists condemning Wall Street, he did not condemn them privately. He told big industrialists like Thyssen that such rabble-rousing condemnation was necessary to get the support of the masses, that back of the scenes, once he, Adolf Hitler, came to power, the industrialists could shape his policies; (5) he extolled small business men, not condemning their private enterprise but denouncing business-destroying Communism. Thus Hitler won the support of German patriots, of Protestants and Catholics. Big industrialists and financiers and little business men and factory workers and farmers joined or supported the Nazi party. He talked the language of every large group, professed to believe what they believed and to hate what they hated. He unified these groups, with their many conflicting interests, in a common hatred of Jews and Communists. His propaganda was tailored to custom; that is, to customary convictions, ideals, hatreds. Jews had been persecuted through long centuries of Christian civilization so that hatred of Jews was traditional, easy; Communism was anathema to most of the people of Germany and the western world so that hatred of Communism was traditional, easy.

Custom creates stereotypes, and Hitler early became a stereotype symbolizing defense of Christianity and private enterprise against atheistic Communism. His propaganda registered with Dr. Frank Nathan Daniel Buchman, founder of Moral Re-Armament, who, on August 26, 1936 was quoted in the *New York World-Telegram* as saying: "I thank God for Adolf Hitler who built a front line of defense against the anti-Christ of Communism." His

propaganda registered with Pope Pius XI, who entered into a concordat with the Nazi government on July 3, 1933, and it registered with Father Charles E. Coughlin, who became a popular hero in Nazi Germany by applying Hitler's propaganda pattern in the United States. Lord Lothian, Henry Ford, and other eminent political and industrial leaders indicated some measure of approval of Adolf Hitler.

It seems safe to assume that these men did not see in Hitler the revolutionary who was to knock Christianity and private enterprise into a cocked hat. Their vision was limited by what William James calls "a certain blindness in human beings."

### *Simplification*

Most of us try to make the world intelligible to ourselves by eliminating details which do not fit into the picture we find easiest to comprehend. We develop simple formulas to explain what has happened, what is happening. We ignore facts not in accord with the formulas.

The successful propagandist keys his propaganda to this psychological process of simplification. He eliminates if's, but's, and's. Hitler has proved himself a master of this technique. Germany lost the World War, the Fuehrer said, not because her army met defeat, but because she was stabbed in the back by Jewish bankers and by Communists. Actually, Jews did their full share to try to bring victory to the Kaiser's army. In 1917 the Kaiser helped the Communist leader, Lenin, enter Russia to make a revolution and then to make a peace that would give the Kaiser a better chance of victory on the Western Front. Hitler knew that most persons preferred the easy process of simplification, that most would ignore facts which didn't fit into a simple picture. Teachers, preachers, editors, business men, labor leaders, and finally everybody who didn't give at least lip service to the Fuehrer's simple formulas, were silenced by the concentration camp or the Gestapo. Hitler made his formulas fit a picture which millions of Germans had, or could easily accept. The picture appealed to simple stereotypes produced by custom—customary ways of thinking about Jews, Christians, private



enterprise, communism, German patriotism. The German defeat was caused by Jews and Communists. Good patriotic Christian Germans could save private enterprise only by banding together against Jewish Communism.

### *Frustration*

When we cannot achieve the goals we seek, we are frustrated. Some individuals who are frustrated become shy, lose their morale, "give up." Others express their frustration in being aggressive, or they seek other goals. To the successful propagandist, frustrated, dissatisfied people are made to order. He offers new goals for which they can pitch in and work—goals which seem to them to provide a way out of their troubles; or he shows them how to express their aggression and thus obtain a feeling of satisfying accomplishment. Both the aggression and the goals, naturally enough, are made to coincide with the purposes and aims of the propagandist. If people are not already frustrated, the propagandist seeks to make them so, to the end that he can harness their aggression and their striving for a new goal to his purposes and aims.

Millions of Germans were frustrated by the loss of the World War, later by ruinous inflation, and finally by depression and unemployment. Hitler gave them an outlet for aggressiveness: they should destroy Jews and Communists, destroy democratic civil liberties because these worked to protect Jews and Communists. He gave them new goals: the building of a strong Germany, jobs in the army, in armament factories, in building fortifications, in factories and on farms, in labor camps; he gave every young Aryan below working age something to do in youth groups; he created organizations to occupy the leisure time of workers and house-wives; he gave the individual German a feeling of importance in sacrificing and working for the new Germany which Hitler was building. Thus, by capitalizing upon the frustration of millions of Germans, he canalized their emotions, thoughts, and actions into aggressiveness toward goals which served his purposes and aims—first, the building of a strong Germany, and then a Germany which would dominate Europe and, perhaps, the world.

Fascism is dynamic for the very reason that

it is activated by frustration which demands aggression, seeks new goals. After Nazi Germany had liquidated Jews, Communists, democrats, after it had created a powerful German nation by building a great army, air force, and navy, the Fuehrer created a new frustration: the Germans were cramped. They needed living space, Lebensraum. Occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia were new goals attained to satisfy the newly created frustration.

### *Displacement*

Most of us, when things go wrong, seek satisfaction by shifting the blame to somebody or something. We need scapegoats. They serve the function of displacing the dissatisfaction produced by ourselves or some person or event on to a tangible though innocent victim.

The successful propagandist is alert to the possibilities of this displacement process. He is quick to provide scapegoats, to promote dissensions which will serve his purposes and aims. After France had fallen, Hitler blamed the British and encouraged the French to "get even" with them. The British, the German propaganda declared, had deserted their French ally. They had shirked, they had not done their part, and when the real fighting came in the Battle of France, they had shown their real colors by flight. And French leaders like Daladier and Mandel, said the German propagandists, were the warmongers who had caused the trouble in the first place. Thus dissension was caused between the British and the French and among the French people. The Petain government, with the backing of Hitler, was encouraged to bring to trial the French leaders who had opposed Hitler. Leaders like Georges Bonnet and Flandin had been friendly, were not disturbed. In his July 19th speech, Hitler named Churchill as the man responsible for England's troubles, sought to promote dissension which would replace him by a premier disposed to make peace with Germany.

### *Anxiety*

Most of us, when we anticipate some trouble, as a child, say, anticipates punishment, are anxious, worried. When we are anxious, we try to relieve our anxiety. If we can't find relief, we become despondent, lose morale, abandon hope.



Hitler has achieved spectacular success both in creating and relieving anxiety. To cause anxiety among those who comprise actual or potential opponents, he has employed, in Germany, various instruments of terror: Brown Shirt squads, secret police, concentration camps, death. Abroad, Hitler has preceded his Blitzkriegs with propaganda barages calculated to inspire terror, shatter nerves, and demoralize whole peoples.

The *New York Times*, on July 12, 1940, quoted C. J. Hambro, president of the Norwegian Parliament for fifteen years, as saying:

"Hitler works the Fifth Column idea for all it is worth. He wants to create the impression that there are thousands, even millions, of Nazi sympathizers everywhere . . . As far as Norway is concerned, I can prove that reports to this effect were spread by the Nazis themselves. Nothing demoralizes a people more surely than rumors that they have been betrayed by their neighbors, by members of their own government, even by officers in the defense forces. Such rumors are a most effective Nazi weapon."

Edmond Taylor, in his new book, *The Strategy of Terror*,<sup>1</sup> outlines the pattern of anxiety created by Hitler's propaganda in France. Many segments of this pattern are present in the American scene today: the presence of conflicting groups in our national life and the willingness of political leaders to exploit these groups for partisan ends; the "silent treatment" which the press has given to well-organized Fascist groups. Perhaps even official policy has been a factor. Sam Goldwyn, according to the *Christian Science Monitor*, states that the State Department asked the movie companies not to make such pictures as "It Can't Happen Here" and "The Forty Days of Musa Dagh" for fear of "offending the dictatorships."

As the creation of anxiety can break morale, relief of it can create morale. Hitler did both in announcing the Russo-German pact on the eve of the war. In Germany, the dread of war on two fronts, the Number One German nightmare, had been mounting steadily. It was now removed. On the other hand, France and England were dismayed at the loss of what had been a powerful, potential ally.

<sup>1</sup>*The Strategy of Terror*, by Edmond Taylor. (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1940.)

### Reinforcement

With most persons, a tendency towards action must be strengthened; otherwise it will disappear. It must be reinforced. This is accomplished by repetition. It is accomplished also by linking the tendency to "drives" already present within us—such as hunger, sex, security.

Courage, loyalty, confidence, and a feeling of solidarity are some of the attitudes which Hitler wanted to strengthen. He provided parades and mass demonstrations, including rhythmical saluting. Boys were transformed into soldiers by drill and uniforms. Glittering Generalities became slogans of purpose to restore Germany as a great power, to cause each German to take his place as a citizen in a conquering and expanding state. Name Calling provided an enemy who threatened the nation from within and from outside. Each attitude was reinforced when it was carried into action, in games and hikes, in street demonstrations, and in computing the cruising radius of bombers. German education became a continuous program of reinforcing tendencies to do certain things, and then doing them. Action became a part of thought.

Reinforcement has had an important place in Hitler's propaganda. Nazi slogans are endlessly repeated, the Swastika symbol constantly displayed. Above all, the injunction to follow the Fuehrer wheresoever he may lead is so dinned into the consciousness of the Germans that following finally gets into their spinal cords, becomes habitual. This habitual response to the commands of the leader has been Hitler's best insurance against loss of support on those occasions when he reversed basic policies—for example, his continued hold upon Germans despite the Nazi-Soviet pact.

### Association

Most of us, if we have certain feelings towards a person or thing, tend to have the same feeling towards similar persons or things. We tend to generalize. We like to say "They are all just about alike," or "Birds of a feather flock together." Thus some people tend to like or dislike all Negroes, or Jews, or Catholics, or Protestants, or Democrats, or Republicans. We express liking by labels, which are Glittering Generalities, and dislike by poison words—Name Calling.



The successful propagandist is alive to the possibilities of this process. Perhaps Hitler's greatest success in this connection has been to associate democracy with Communism. "Democracy," he said, shortly after coming to power in 1933, "is the foul and filthy avenue to Communism." That made democracy suspect. Stalin's endorsement of democracy in 1935 and the adoption of the new Soviet constitution (which sounded like the American Declaration of Independence) caused many to believe in all sincerity that Hitler was right.

Democracy, associated with Communism, came to be considered by many of the anxious rich in all countries as the enemy of free enterprise. This impression was strengthened by the propaganda of the Spanish Civil War, and, during the Munich crisis, conservatives in France and England were more hostile to their potential Russian ally than to the German aggressor against democracy. Even the Russo-German Pact failed to destroy the carefully built stereotype that democracy was Communistic. In the early months of World War II, anti-Nazis were imprisoned in France while men like Bonnet and Flandin, Hitler's friends and admirers, were free to come and go as they pleased. Meanwhile, the British authorities went to unusual pains to see that the Honorable Unity Freeman-Mitford returned to England from Germany with maximum comfort and freedom from annoyance. She had long been an ardent admirer of Hitler and an active worker in British Fascist circles. Sir Oswald Mosley jailed Fascist leader, has been giving champagne parties in his prison cell.

As Edgar Ansel Mowrer pointed out in the *New York Post*, some Frenchmen feared a Nazi defeat more than an Allied defeat.

Among the common people in England, however, the situation was different. They, who had approved appeasement by a substantial majority, turned against it; they came to dread war less than the loss of traditional freedoms with which democracy, in their minds, was still associated.

#### *Universals*

Universals are generalizations which have become set in our own minds and which we apply to all objects or persons of a class.

Most of us tend to believe we know why large groups of individuals believe and act as they do. This tendency finds expression in such sayings as "Every man has his price;" "It's natural for men to fight; we've always had wars and always will have them;" "You can't tell me a nigger won't steal;" "You can't change human nature." Thus most of us think we understand these "universal traits" of behavior.

Hitler utilizes Universals with astuteness. He has compiled a dictionary of terms and expressions of this type from his close association with the masses of the German people. He appeals to the core of human vanity with the Glittering Generalities and Bandwagon devices. By exploiting this process, he has sold the Germans on the Fuehrerprinzip, the leadership principle. A desire to believe that they really understand the behavior of others has lifted the German people on the Bandwagon with their leader in ascribing to the Jews, Americans, British, and others definite characteristics which can only be described as "Universals." The Aryan group enjoys the Universal, superiority. Everybody knows, Hitler keeps reiterating, that all Jews are parasites and that the plutocratic democracies are decadent.

#### *Projection*

Just as most of us think we know why large groups believe and act as they do, we also tend to ascribe our own desires to such groups; we think that if only they had our enlightenment they would see the truth as we see it. In consequence, we try to project our ideas upon others.

For centuries this psychological process of projection has been the secret of the dynamic, expanding power of revolutionary movements. It carried the French ideal of liberty, equality, fraternity through Europe, the ideals of British and American political democracy to many lands. The crusading zeal associated with the projection process has helped make Hitler master of Europe as once it made the British, French, and American democracies masters of the world. "One impression gained on a visit to Paris from the unoccupied zone," says a *New York Times* correspondent in a wireless dispatch, dated Vichy, France, July 31, "is that of passing under a power that is



sure of itself and is carrying out a carefully planned reorganization of the country according to German ideas. A second impression is that the German Army has something new in discipline. Inculcated in each soldier is not only the usual strict discipline, but also the idea that each of them is a personification of Nazi discipline and that any failure to live up to it is a disgrace."

The successful propagandist is effective in encouraging his converts to project their concepts of truth upon others. From the beginning, Hitler projected his desires. He made converts; they in turn projected the Nazi ideals. And so the German Fascist movement grew. It was not a matter of prime importance whether Hitler and his fellow Nazis were sincere or insincere, racketeers or honest men. The important fact is that Hitler, by masterful utilization of the projection process, won to his cause many earnest men and women who in their turn became zealous and effective propagandists for the Fuehrer.

Even outside of Germany, important persons in church, industry, finance, and politics, by giving tacit or open approval to Hitler or his policies, helped create converts for the Nazi movement. Such converts projected Nazi ideals in a Home Folks atmosphere. They commanded an appeal which no alien could match.

#### *Identification*

Most of us are inclined to take pride in identifying ourselves with persons who possess prestige. We like to be associated with "big shots." We like to be able to say of a president or presidential candidate, of a senator, or governor, or mayor, or famous author, or ball player, or movie star, "Oh, yes, I know him quite well." This is the psychological process of Identification.

Hitler, at the beginning of his political career, was a down-at-the-heels nobody, but he was nobody's fool as a propagandist. The handful of Nazis meeting around a table in a Munich beer hall had to have prestige, and Hitler knew it. They chose a "big shot," General Ludendorff, as nominal head of the movement. Thousands of Germans, uninterested in an obscure political party, rushed to identify themselves with Ludendorff. As Hitler's own prestige mounted, he no longer needed

the army general. American Fascists, copying Hitler's method, seek to enlist, for the Fascist cause in the United States, the prestige of Major General George Van Horn Moseley, U. S. A., retired.

After Hitler became the Nazi Fuehrer, he used the Identification process to gain prestige abroad; he bestowed Nazi decorations upon such popular Americans as Henry Ford and Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh. Hitler hoped that their millions of American admirers would acquire greater respect for Nazi Germany because these American heroes had indicated their respect by accepting the Nazi government's decorations. He figured Americans would say: "Look, the Nazis can't be so bad; if they were, Ford and Lindbergh wouldn't have accepted those medals."

#### *Rationalization*

Most of us tend to cover up our faults, mistakes, and inadequacies by justifying them in terms of principles (often excuses or alibis) which are acceptable to our own consciences and to our fellows. This is the process of rationalization. It is the process of kidding ourselves.

Rationalization gives us all the satisfactions of wishful thinking. The propagandist helps us to see our weakness as strength, our errors as the errors of others; our cruelties are justified as necessary. While the propagandist helps us rebuild our self-respect, he stacks the cards; he helps us reach conclusions which will be assets to his movement.

Adolf Hitler appealed to the wishful thinking of millions of Germans who said, "Oh, if we had not lost the war! If only our army had been better!"

"We didn't lose the war," said Hitler. "Our German army was victorious. We were stabbed in the back by Jews and Communists, and sold out by Woodrow Wilson. We won the war, but the fruits of victory were stolen from us."

By assisting and strengthening such rationalization at the beginning of his career, Hitler won his following. Nazi membership grew as the Fuehrer, by continued utilization of the Rationalization process, helped the Germans to "reason" away their feeling of inferiority; Nazi "education" taught them that they were members of the superior Aryan race.



Hitler "explains" every act which might cause his people to think ill of him. The Nazi leaders did not want to invade Norway, but they had to prevent the British from invading it. The Fuehrer doesn't want to kill helpless people in England, but the evil Churchill won't make peace. The German soldiers hated to kill refugees on the roads of France, but the cruel and heartless French generals deliberately put the refugees there to block the Nazi advance. Poor homeless souls, they had to suffer. Thus German pride in the Nazi army's swift and dramatic victories is not clouded by pangs of conscience. Somebody else is to blame.

### Conclusion

These common psychological processes interact; they can reinforce or cancel out one another. Hitler's incomparable success as a propagandist comes precisely from his ability to manipulate these processes in terms of predetermined goals. What were Hitler's goals under the Weimar Republic? Confusion, disunity, and discouragement among his opponents; high morale and unity within the party. Since January, 1933, as head of the state, his goals have been the building of German unity around the Nazi revolutionary ideal; the spreading of confusion and chaos in neighboring countries.

Hitler builds or destroys morale at will. When his goal is unity, he makes one psychological process reinforce the others; when it is disunity, he causes the processes to contradict and cancel out one another. Using the same psychological processes, he can bring about confusion and inaction, or he can create unity and dynamic drive.

Though Hitler does not succeed by propaganda alone, he, more than any figure in modern history, has recognized that propaganda is an integral part of war strategy and indispensable to the successful prosecution of total war.

### *If England Wins—or Loses*

The British need more than planes and ships to win against Hitler's army. They must win against his propaganda, too. They need to know why and how it has worked, why their own so often has failed. Can they prevent the final capitulation of England? If they

can—and do—it will be not primarily because of more ships and arms and men (they had those while France was an ally) but because they have discarded public policies and propaganda policies which have proved no match for Hitler, and they have replaced earlier policies by others to create a morale and a mobilization of power superior to the best the Nazis can offer. There are indications the British are beginning to do just this. In our next bulletin we shall analyze Britain's war propaganda — show how it relates to forces for and against democracy in and out of England, including the United States.

### NOTE

Rosika Schwimmer was referred to in the July bulletin as "a Hungarian pacifist (sent by the Wilson administration) on a Fifth Column mission into Austro-Hungary to contact democratic elements and give them copies of Wilson's messages." Madame Schwimmer writes that this statement "contains a mixture of facts and fancy." She states that hers was openly a mission of peace and can not be classified as Fifth Column activity.

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.  
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# Propaganda Analysis

*A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda*

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

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## Where England Stands<sup>1</sup>

UNTIL May 10, when the armies of Reichsfuehrer Adolf Hitler poured into the Low Countries, smashing their way past the Little Maginot line and down through Northern France to Paris, American public opinion, like the war on the Western Front, itself, was only half-awake. There was, of course, an overwhelming desire in this country to see the Allies win: nothing that Adolf Hitler or Hermann Goering or Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels could say would ever convince the majority of Americans that National Socialism was anything except the Four Horsemen come to life. If there was an equally strong conviction that neither England nor France could reasonably lay claim to unblemished virtue, it could hardly affect the essential fact: that given their choice between National Socialism and even the most imperfect democracy, most Americans would choose the democracy every time—if only because the democracies were more like us and spoke our language, not only figuratively but, in the case of England, literally as well. Still, this sympathy was less than militant. As the Institute for Propaganda Analysis was pointing out, the lesser of two evils is hardly the sort of Cause for which men are willing to die or even

to risk death; and there was then in the United States the widespread fear that further aid to England and France might involve the country in war.

The very nature of the war also caused fear and suspicion. Americans, raised on Sunday newspaper stories which for twenty years had predicted that World War II would mean wholesale horror, could not quite understand the *Sitzkrieg*; and many were inclined to agree with those isolationist leaders who called it "this phony war." There were two major reasons for this: first, Neville Chamberlain. Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy had made him suspect in the United States. As the days marched on, there were many who asked whether the stalemate on the Western Front did not mean that he still was hoping to quiet Adolf Hitler with someone else's territory. Newspapermen, returning from London and Paris, fed these suspicions with stories that appeasement still was popular among the upper classes there, with some aristocrats eager to make peace, and then, with Hitler as their ally, turn on the Soviet Union. Later the collapse of France was to show that most of the newspapermen had actually underestimated the extent of appeasement sentiment—in Paris at least. The war, it developed, was never popular with the French High Command, the very men to whom it was entrusted.

The second major reason for most of the "phony war" talk was that few Americans understood what the Reichsfuehrer had meant when he told Hermann Rauschning that he would unleash his armies only when the enemy

<sup>1</sup> In discussions of propaganda the fact is frequently overlooked that events shape public opinion no less than words. Not only do the events serve to dramatize what the propagandist is saying: even more important, their impact upon our ideals, our prejudices, our fears, and our desires is sometimes overwhelming. In this issue of PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, the emphasis is upon the *events* which have served to mold public opinion in the United States rather than upon the *propagandas*. For a brief discussion of the interrelationship between propaganda, events, and folkways, see "Propaganda Analysis Worksheet," page 5.



was already defeated. Not until weeks after the Reichsfuehrer had entered Paris in triumph was it clear that Germany had defeated France during the very nine months when nothing was happening on the Western Front.

If, during those nine months, the majority of Americans, despite their distinct pro-Ally sympathies, found it pleasant to entertain these suspicions of the Allies, the explanation may lie in the fact that few could even conceive of the possibility that England and France might lose. Why there should have been this certainty of eventual German defeat is difficult to understand since Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany, though numerically less powerful than Adolf Hitler's Germany, nevertheless had succeeded in fighting off almost the entire world for over four years; indeed, Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany had on several occasions come perilously close to winning. It took not only England and France but Italy, Russia, Japan, and eventually the United States to smash Germany in 1918; yet the probability of German victory in 1940 occurred to few Americans: many to whom it did occur could not talk, for either they were U. S. Army officers stationed in Paris or else they were Paris correspondents, silenced by the censorship.

#### *America on May 10*

The attitude which prevailed in the United States until May 10 could, therefore, be summarized as follows: most Americans were pro-Ally; on the other hand, they didn't believe sufficiently in the cause for which England and France were fighting to want to risk war themselves. Moreover, they were certain that England and France would eventually win anyway. So they went about their own business, joking occasionally about the war, sometimes debating it seriously, but rarely feeling it personally. In *War Propaganda and the United States*, which, incidentally, was completed during the very week the *Blitzkrieg* started, the Institute reported: "They neither clamored for war nor cried for peace. They waited, and the words rolled over them."

Against this sentiment the interventionists could make little headway. It was almost futile to ask what might happen to American democracy if Germany were to win: the question was "iffy," academic; it sounded like alarmism. When interventionists declared that Germany

might capture the Allied navies, as the Allies captured the German navy in World War I, that also sounded like alarmism. In June, when the French navy seemed almost certain to fall into German hands, the alarmism of February and March sounded like sober foresight.

Such was the effect of the *Blitzkrieg* upon public opinion in the United States, an effect which neither the Allied propagandists nor their interventionist friends had been able to achieve in nine months of propaganda. It brought the war home to America. On the day the Reich army entered Holland, America entered the war—emotionally—though, of course, not physically. The debate that ensued was not one merely between interventionist and isolationist spokesmen: the entire nation began to participate. No question was settled immediately. There were those who said that we must help England at once, even declare war if necessary: otherwise the United States would find itself face-to-face with four powerful enemies: Germany, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union—an unbeatable combination. Sentiment for war, as indicated by the various public opinion polls, rose from 3, 4, and 5 per cent to 14 and 15. Others depreciated such talk. Invasion of the United States was militarily impossible, they said. Anyway, the four great totalitarian nations had no such community of interest as the interventionists averred. Intelligent diplomacy could split the Soviet Union off from Japan; Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia had conflicting interests all through Central and South-eastern Europe. They decried the fears of the interventionists as lack of faith in the destiny of America. This skillful use of the bandwagon device the interventionists met by accusing the isolationists of being "pro-Soviet" or "pro-German" or both—"Communazi," in other words.

#### *Destroyers for Britain*

Among the most pressing issues was that of selling fifty destroyers of the U. S. Navy to England. The Royal Navy still commanded the seas, but it had become seriously depleted in destroyers: the United States had more destroyers than any other navy in the world, and could, so the interventionists said, easily afford to spare at least fifty, and perhaps twice fifty. Again both sides hurled their full repertoire of propaganda devices at each other: the most



common was the epithet "Fifth Columnists." Again, however, there were real questions at stake; and on both sides there were those who debated them without recourse to name-calling. The questions were: should we risk war to help England? And: *could* we help England? The interventionists said that if Hitler wanted to declare war on the United States he wouldn't need any pretext; or rather, he would seize upon any pretext, so what difference would it make what the United States did? The isolationists said that England might soon lose. In that case, if the interventionists were right and if Hitler did contemplate war against the United States, it would be dangerous to weaken our navy.

### *Complacency Shattered*

If the *Blitzkrieg* succeeded in bringing the war home to America, it had much the same effect in England. Germany's *Panzer* divisions shattered not only the French army but also the complacency that had characterized most Englishmen in their attitudes concerning the war. For they also had been almost smug in their certainty of Allied victory. Long after the war started men like Sir John Simon were still worrying not about the problem of achieving victory—for they were certain of victory—but only about unbalancing the budget as little as possible. Others like Sir Nevile Henderson, Lord Lloyd, and Viscount Halifax were praising the Nazis with faint damns. Still others, like Neville Chamberlain were apparently less worried about Hitler than about Joseph Stalin. The *Blitzkrieg* drove these men into the background. It made Winston Churchill the outstanding man in England, and Mr. Churchill's bulldog determination to smash the Hitler regime became England's determination. "You ask, what is our policy? I say it is to wage war by land, sea, and air. . . . You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word. It is victory." Thus did Mr. Churchill speak in his first speech to Parliament upon becoming Prime Minister. Not long before Mr. Chamberlain also had addressed Parliament—to sneer at Hitler for missing the bus. "Yes," said army men the world over. "Hitler missed the bus—and caught the next transport plane."

The effect of Germany's *Blitzkrieg* on the United States was, therefore, far-reaching. Not only did it bring the war home to America; it

also wiped out appeasement in England; and the spirit of appeasement was one which had served to arouse suspicion and doubt in America. In this way it helped to serve the cause of interventionist propaganda. It had another effect, however, an effect not appreciable at first but one which threatened daily to grow stronger. For the first time appeasement sentiment began to develop here. This was not unexpected: Germany's most effective propaganda had always been her armed might. Throughout Europe, the small nations, whose interests and sympathies naturally lay with the Allies, nevertheless had bent over backward not to help them, so much did they fear Hitler's wrath. This was equally true in the rest of the world. Turkey and Egypt both were friendly to England, bound to England by military pacts. None of Alfred Duff Cooper's propaganda was nearly as effective as Hitler's *Panzer* divisions, however; so they stood by while England fought alone.

### *Concessions for Hitler?*

So there were those in the United States, who, realizing for the first time Germany's tremendous might, began to ask if the United States could not become friendly with Hitler, grant him concessions, and thereby spare ourselves the fate of France. Others talked about revising the Monroe Doctrine so that it would not be necessary to defend South America "below the bulge." The desire not to help England further—with destroyers, for example—became especially strong among those who feared Germany: even if they did not believe in appeasement, they did not want either to "offend Germany" or weaken our navy. On Wall Street, appeasement sentiment began to develop among those whose business was foreign trade: if Germany is victorious, they said, we must either do business on Germany's terms or give up our foreign trade almost completely.

The major spokesmen for those who believed in appeasement were Charles A. Lindbergh; and James D. Mooney, of General Motors. Although they were not isolationists, as isolationism is generally understood in this country, they nevertheless could meet the isolationists on common ground, for they were in agreement on immediate problems. Unfortunately for the isolationists, however, these men created sentiment against their cause as well as senti-



ment for it. For they were suspected by many of being sympathetic to National Socialism and of speaking not from patriotism but from sympathy with the German cause. They had both received medals from the Nazi government, and some interventionists, among them Ralph Ingersoll, publisher of the New York newspaper *PM*, actually charged them with being traitors.

It was, naturally, impossible to determine the extent to which appeasement sentiment had grown, especially since New Dealers were inclined to exaggerate it for campaign purposes. They charged numerous Republicans with being pro-appeasement: Mr. Wallace ascribed pro-appeasement sentiments to Wendell L. Willkie himself, though he did not mention him by name. It was equally impossible to determine the future course of pro-appeasement propaganda, for that would depend on events in Europe. If the English were able to halt the German war machine until winter, it was almost certain to diminish, for Germany would then seem less than invincible. On the other hand, swift German victory was bound to make pro-appeasement sentiment grow.

#### *Propaganda and Events*

Indeed, the whole course of pro-Ally propaganda was dependent on military events; and this was true in Europe no less than in the United States. If the Nazis were to invade the United Kingdom, if the English were to drive them back with severe losses, the whole course of World War II would immediately change, and with it the whole course of World War II propaganda. England would have to launch an offensive, since wars are only won on the offensive. This would mean the establishment of bridgeheads along Europe's Atlantic coast, and that in turn would mean propaganda inciting all Europe to revolution against the Nazis. England would need "Fifth Columns" as much as the Germans had needed them: workmen and

farmers to engage in sabotage; Dutchmen, Frenchmen, Austrians, Czechs, and Slovaks to engage in espionage. At the same time England would need men, possibly Americans, possibly Hindus, possibly both, for with only half the population of Germany she could not hope otherwise to match the German armies. No propaganda for the *status quo*, no propaganda, like the memoirs of Sir Nevile Henderson, which praised the "great social experiment" that was National Socialism, could achieve this. It could only be propaganda that stirred hope everywhere in Europe, in the Americas, in such portions of the Empire itself as India. Neither Czechs nor Hindus would ever fight merely to exchange masters. And this, as the war dragged on, increasingly was realized by English publicists and statesmen. The liberals early were talking in that vein. In July, for example, the *New Statesman and Nation* said: "This war only makes sense as a social war of liberation in which Britain stands for the cause of liberty everywhere. . . . Subject to the iron demands of the war which we are waging against Hitler and all his works we shall try so to conduct ourselves that . . . all the oppressed countries in Europe may feel that each British victory is a step toward the liberation of the Continent from the foulest thralldom into which it has ever been cast." Again, the closing of the Burma road brought loud cries from those like the magazine *Time and Tide* who recognized that England could do nothing to keep the road open, but demanded: "Let Japan close it herself." Why should Britain, asked the magazine, "prefer to barter the friendship of China for the gloating contempt of Japan?"

These were only straws in the wind, straws which the next *Blitzkrieg* might blow away. It was naïve to overestimate their significance; and few did. Yet, the fact remained that just as military exigencies had led Britain to abandon the domestic policies of the Neville Chamberlains, so might it force her to abandon their ideology as well.



# Propaganda Analysis Worksheet

AMERICAN county seats are small towns where homey people live peacefully together. There is in most of them latent prejudice against some race, or class, or religious groups. Men and women may occasionally voice their prejudices, but they laugh at the village agitator who makes long, windy speeches of denunciation. And hundreds of these small communities have in their annals the story of a brutal lynching. In most of them a lynching could take place tomorrow. Three forces operating in a peaceful community may produce a lynching there. They are:

1. The latent (hidden) prejudices, fears, and frustrations which exist in all communities.
2. The propagandist who works upon these feelings.
3. Sudden events of violent assault and murder which produce a feeling of tension in the community.

The sudden event is the most important of these three. Without the event, or stimulus, the prejudice usually remains an undertone of village gossip; the propagandist who seeks to exploit it, usually impotent. The event strengthens every feeling of prejudice and amplifies the voice of its propagandist. Forgotten is the cornerstone of English jurisprudence and common law: A man is innocent until he is proved guilty. In times of hysteria, voices raised in defense of this principle are likely to be shouted down.

Violent events bring the same reaction in America as a nation. The destruction of the *Maine* brought a wave of hatred toward the "proud and haughty" Spaniard, who existed in American minds as a school book stereotype. The sinking of the *Lusitania* and the evidence of German sabotage in the Black Tom explosion created a temper which listened to only one propaganda. The destruction of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France have all been events which violate American notions of justice, fair play, and freedom.

In such an atmosphere of excitement, it is difficult to preserve the democratic way of free

propagandas. When emotion has replaced reason, speakers who normally receive a respectful hearing are shouted down as traitors if they express opinions contrary to those of their audience. Recognizing the dangers of this critical period, the Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association raises a voice of warning:

It is folly to propose that a citizen who in good faith offers critical comments with reference to public questions is, for that reason, to be stigmatized as an enemy of his country. There never was a greater need for a thoroughgoing public discussion of debatable issues than there is today. Far from being unpatriotic, such discussion, however sharp and penetrating it may be, is an evidence of good citizenship.<sup>1</sup>

Today the propaganda analyst faces his hardest, and most important task. He must not only uphold the democratic system of free discussion, but he must also help to speed up the discussion and improve the quality of the decisions. The most important time to analyze propaganda has arrived.

## I. GROUP STUDY AND DISCUSSION

### *Solving Problems*

A problem can be solved only when the problem is concrete. A problem can be solved best when the solution is based on established facts, events, and/or statistics.

Since the fall of France, discussion of concrete problems concerning national defense has taken precedence over other public issues: how much should Congress appropriate for mechanized equipment? As a precaution against Fifth Column activity, should aliens be fingerprinted? Shall the President be allowed to call out the National Guard?

Let's examine the most pressing debate now before Congress, the Burke-Wadsworth Bill. Let's examine the evidence—facts, events, statistics—until we have uncovered what seem the best possible solutions and the best possible alternatives.

### *The Problem*

Should the United States adopt a policy of compulsory military service in peace time?

<sup>1</sup> Educational Policies Commission, *Education and the Defense of American Democracy*, National Education Association, Washington, D. C., 1940.



### *Steps in Making Decisions*

1. How large an army is needed for national defense?
  - a. How many men are needed to defend the United States alone? North America? The Western Hemisphere? The Phillipines?
  - b. How large should the reserve force be if the United States plans to defend these areas?
2. What are the feasible courses of action?
  - a. Can we continue to depend on volunteers for the army and navy?
  - b. Could we increase the size of our volunteer forces by raising the pay of enlisted men?
  - c. Should all men between the ages of 18 and 64 register for military service so that the number needed could be selected by lot?
  - d. Should we register all men between the ages of 21 and 31 and select the number needed from this age group?
  - e. Should we adopt a European system and require all men who reach a given age (say from 18 to 21) to serve from one to three years in the army?
3. Where can we find pertinent information on the whole question? Congress, the press, and various adult and youth groups have spent most of the summer on this problem. Review the debates in the Congressional Record; go through your local newspaper files and read the articles by military experts; write to adult and youth groups for their data. Look through military magazines, such as the *Infantry Journal*, the *Military Engineer*. Although the problems in a democracy must be solved by laymen, only experts can supply the necessary information, and usually we must make decisions concerning the qualifications and judgments of the experts.
4. In the light of evidence uncovered, we must reach a tentative decision. During the summer the Burke-Wadsworth Bill has been changed by amendments: (1) Restricting the registration to the 21 to 31 age groups; (2) Raising the minimum army pay from \$21 to \$30 a month; (3) Exempting conscientious objectors. These

amendments, the products of compromise, suggest new courses of action; they are alternatives to the original decisions or "solution."

5. We Americans, a democratic people, must act in accordance with the decision of Congress. If the bill passes, registration, selection of men, and army service will follow. If the bill is rejected, the army will increase its recruiting activity.
6. After we have examined the evidence and made our decisions, and while we are doing our bit toward carrying out that decision, we, as citizens in a democracy, must remain alert to defects in our program. As experience points out errors in our plan, we must be ready to amend our decision.

The courts of law and the legislative bodies in a democracy follow the steps outlined above in coping with problems that confront them. Like the layman, they must listen to and appraise the testimony of experts before making a decision.

In hearing evidence and in meeting problems, judges and legislators do a great deal of our work for us. But in the last analysis, it is the mass of peoples in a democratic country who must make the decisions. Solutions to problems in a democracy can be only as wise as the people who make them.

Today there is a whole cluster of national defense problems which must be solved, one by one. Because decisions must be speeded up during a period of emergency, only the combined wisdom of the people in America can help bring the most satisfactory decisions.

Finally, the problem of national defense vitally affects every person in America. Within the next few years, many of the very students who work through this problem of conscription in peace time will be in the army—either as volunteers or as conscripted men. Their morale as soldiers may depend upon their understanding of the national defense problem and upon their carrying out a plan which they helped to formulate (Consult Minimum Reference Shelf.)

### II. GROUP PROJECT

#### *You—and Propaganda*

In the bulletin for August 1, 1940, *Propaganda for Blitzkrieg*, eleven common mental



processes were outlined and described. They are:

1. Custom
2. Simplification
3. Frustration
4. Displacement
5. Anxiety
6. Reinforcement
7. Association
8. Universals
9. Projection
10. Identification
11. Rationalization

The examples used in the bulletin were drawn from Nazi propaganda. Bring in new examples from your own experience.

Do you know people who identify themselves with prominent men, by saying: "Woodrow Wilson said to me. . . ."?

Have you ever felt that you had to smash something? You were all ready for the propagandist who knew how to utilize a feeling of frustration.

The seven propaganda devices are the sparks used by the propagandist to set off the processes. Opposite each process write in the devices which you think the propagandist would use in exploiting the process to get you to act for his program.

*Frustration and Aggression*, by John Dollard, Leonard Doob, and others; Institute of Human Relations, Yale University Press, 1939, deals with psychological processes. Recommended for college and adult readers.

### III. INDIVIDUAL PROJECT

#### *Current Youth Controversy*

In June Archibald MacLeish delivered a speech before the American Association for Adult Education in New York City. In this speech, Mr. MacLeish stated that a "profound distrust of words and of principles . . . would still seem to characterize a considerable part of the young generation today. That a large part of the responsibility for this state of mind in the generation of men and women now young" belongs to the post-war writers. Mr. MacLeish mentions Barbusse, Latzko, Dos Passos, Ford Madox Ford, Ernest Hemingway, Erich Maria Remarque, and Richard Aldington.

Many persons disagree with Archibald MacLeish, notably Harold J. Laski, writing in the *New Republic*, September 2. Laski believes that

"the American undergraduate of today is far more interested in, and far more serious about, the vital questions of politics than ever he was in Mr. MacLeish's time," but that college youth of America swallow slogans and propagandas with disturbing ease. Mr. Laski gives what he considers to be the reason for this gullibility; his reason, treated in its three aspects, is very different from Mr. MacLeish's explanation.

Have you read books written by any of the authors whom Mr. MacLeish names? Do you think reading the books increased your skepticism? Did these books, in your opinion, perform a useful service, or did they create a feeling of disillusion which weakened American morale? The bibliography of this current controversy is listed. Find the references in your public library:

- The Irresponsibles*, by Archibald MacLeish (Duell, Sloan and Pearce: New York, 1940)  
*The New Republic*, June 10, 1940, Archibald MacLeish, "Post-war Writers and Pre-war Readers"  
 July 1, 1940, "Archibald MacLeish and the Word"  
 September 2, 1940, "Letter to MacLeish"  
*Time*, June 3, 1940 (page 53); June 24, 1940 (page 92)  
*Life*, June 10, 1940 (page 26)

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.  
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The Institute does not have all the answers: it lays no claim to infallibility. It will try to be scientific, objective and accurate. If it makes mistakes, it will acknowledge them. It asks those who receive its letters to check its work.



MINIMUM REFERENCE SHELF

*National Defense*

*We Can Defend America*, by Johnson Hagood (Doubleday, Doran: Garden City, N. Y., 1937)

*Bombs Bursting in Air*, by George Fielding Eliot (Reynal and Hitchcock: New York, 1939)

*Defending America*, by George Fielding Eliot (Foreign Policy Association: New York, 1939)

*The Art of Modern Warfare*, by Hermann Foertsch (Veritas: New York, 1940)

Military Training Camps Association of the United States, 28 West 44th St., New York City. (This organization sponsored the Burke-Wadsworth Bill)

*The Infantry Journal*. U. S. Infantry Association, Washington, D. C. (Technical articles on national defense)

*The Military Engineer*. Society of Military Engineers, Washington, D. C. (Technical articles on national defense)

*The Congressional Record*

Write to your Congressman for copies of the original bill which was introduced. Read the reports of hearings and debates. Note each amendment to the bill. Compare the bill which was finally passed or rejected with the original. What have you learned about the democratic process from this study?

*In Europe*

*Why Europe Fights*, by Walter Millis (Morrow: New York, 1940)

*The Strategy of Terror*, by Edmund Taylor (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1940)

*They Wanted War*, by Otto D. Tolischus (Reynal Hitchcock: New York, 1940)

*Why England Slept*, by John F. Kennedy (Wilford Funk: New York, 1940)

*American White Paper*, by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1940)

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OCT 31 1940

# Propaganda Analysis

*A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda*

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, INC.

40 EAST FORTY-NINTH STREET: NEW YORK CITY

Volume III

OCTOBER 15, 1940

Number 12

## The Presidential Campaign

AMONG the Wall Street enthusiasts who rallied to Wendell Lewis Willkie in his pre-convention campaign were several of the most talented advertising men in the United States. This circumstance has impelled many New Dealers to attack the G.O.P. candidate as "synthetic." The Hoosier with tousled hair and rumpled clothes, the champion of civil rights, the small-town individualist who owns neither watch nor auto; in short, the Wendell Lewis Willkie to whom the newspapers have introduced us, sprang full-grown, they maintain, from the typewriter of Russell Davenport, who resigned from Henry Luce's *Fortune* magazine to help the Willkie campaign. The Democrats picture the real Willkie as related to the tousled-haired Hoosier only propagandistically; the real Wendell Willkie, according to this picture, is the Wendell Willkie of 20 Pine Street and upper Fifth Avenue—Wall Street's man, sugar-coated in Wall Street's advertising offices, and jammed down Main Street's throat with the same high-pressure methods that advertising men employ in selling face cream. Such is the Democratic image of the opposition candidate.

Official Democratic propaganda, as distinguished from the efforts of such New Deal sympathizers as the editors of the *New Republic*, is devoted almost exclusively to variations on this Wall Street theme. Mr. Willkie emerges from the pages of the Democratic Party's *Clip Sheet* as Wall Street's candidate. It was no spontaneous uprising of the rank-and-file which carried Mr. Willkie to victory at the convention,

the Democratic *Clip Sheet* avers. On the contrary, the *Clip Sheet* compares Mr. Willkie's nomination with the late Warren G. Harding's. According to the Democratic view, there was no difference except that the Philadelphia hotels now have air-conditioning; consequently no smoke filled the room in which the president of Commonwealth and Southern was chosen as the G.O.P. candidate.

Charles Michelson, publicity director of the Democratic National Committee, discusses "the curious development of that reasonably luxurious dweller in the citadels of wealth and power into the plain, if somewhat explosive, rustic from Indiana." Mr. Michelson points out that such transformations are common-place in politics. He recalls how political considerations turned gentle, soft-spoken General Charles E. Dawes into "Hell and Maria" Dawes, who coined epithets with vigor and enthusiasm. He also recalls the case of the eminent statesman who owned two cars: one, an expensive car, which he used only in Washington; the other, an old Model T, which he drove at home.

Like the *Clip Sheet*, Mr. Michelson's column, *Dispelling the Fog*, is sent without charge to newspapers all over the country. Though few editors reprint it, most of them do read it, for in 1933 Mr. Michelson was credited with having done nearly as much as the depression itself to ensure Mr. Hoover's defeat. His reputation is such among New Deal editors that hardly one will quarrel with his judgment of what is and what is not effective anti-Willkie propaganda. Among editors who oppose the



New Deal, Mr. Michelson is read with trepidation, mostly to discover what thrusts Mr. Willkie may have to fend off next. Mr. Michelson writes so many of the speeches which New Deal Senators and Representatives deliver that he not only sets the pattern for most Democratic propaganda; equally as important, he fills in many of the details.

The pattern is one which Mr. Willkie could easily have predicted, for, despite the circumstance that several of his earliest advisers were advertising men, while at least three others were editors, the philosophy which appears to guide all the Republican propaganda is Mr. Willkie's own. He expressed it first in his article, "We, the People," which appeared in the April issue of *Fortune* magazine, and which *Tide* was later to call "the keynote of his pre-nomination campaign." It was this article which is supposed to have induced Russell Davenport to resign as editor of *Fortune* in order to co-ordinate the Willkie campaign, then going along in seemingly aimless fashion.

#### *Mr. Willkie's Backers*

"We, the People" created much discussion in New York advertising circles: it also created many Willkie enthusiasts, who, at first independently, later cooperatively, were to devote their knowledge of propaganda and their resources to converting the one-time Democrat into the Republican candidate for President of the United States. Among the most prominent were Stanley Walker, newspaper editor; Steve Hannagan and Ned Stevenson, public relations counsels; Fred Smith, of Selvage and Smith; Harry M. Shackelford, of Johns-Manville; Chester La Roche and Ted Patrick, of Young and Rubicam; Thomas Ryan, of Pedlar and Ryan; Stanley Resor, of J. Walter Thompson; Raymond Leslie Buell, of *Fortune*; Robert L. Johnson, of *Promenade*; John Sterling and John Orr Young, of *This Week*; and Edgar Queeny, of Monsanto Chemical.

"The American people are not dumb," wrote Mr. Willkie in the *Fortune* article which captured their imagination. "The American people do not give their vote to policies; they give their vote to men. They vote for the man who, in their opinion, will not let them down."

However, the American people have never been disposed to give their vote to "Wall Street

men," so great is their antipathy to Wall Street, their fear and their mistrust. Many students of American government, among them Harold J. Laski, assert that no one identified either with industry or finance can ever attain the Presidency of the United States. Mr. Laski points out that no one ever has; indeed, Mr. Willkie is the first industrialist even to make the attempt. Even so, the success of his pre-nomination campaign indicates that Mr. Willkie's analysis of the American voter has some validity.

#### *He Divorces Wall Street*

Although there is somewhat less prejudice against Wall Street among the rank-and-file of the G.O.P. than in the Democratic Party, the prejudice does exist. In his pre-nomination campaign Mr. Willkie, therefore, attempted to divorce himself from the "Wall Street man" stereotype, to convince the rank-and-file Republican that, in spite of his office at 20 Pine, he was "just plain folks." He relied especially upon personal appearances, giving the country's Rotary Clubs an opportunity to look him over. Mr. Willkie didn't look anything like the "Wall Street man;" he didn't look anything like the "city slicker." He looked and talked like Elwood, Indiana; he sprawled in his chair and fiddled with his glasses. He was an expert at swapping wisecracks.

It wasn't so much what Mr. Willkie said as the fact that he could have come right from their own home towns which impressed so many home town people.

The official Democratic propagandists charge that he was dissimulating. This is also the impression which the independent, yet pro-New Deal *New Republic* supplement, "This Man Willkie," attempted to convey. (It was, in fact, the *New Republic* which characterized him with the epithet "synthetic.") On the other hand it hardly seems necessary to assume that any Wall Street man who doesn't fit into the "Wall Street man" stereotype is play-acting: few Wall Street men do, just as few politicians wear fat, gold watch chains across their chests. The war profiteer with the inflated stomach and thick, greasy hands; the Prohibitionist with elongated face and nose; the confidence man who calls himself "Colonel" and talks with the South in his mouth—such characters are found more often in newspaper



cartoons and in vaudeville than in real life. There are just as many small-town-solid citizen types in New York's financial district as there are Groton and Harvard men: indeed, those who look most like Groton, Harvard men often come from the smallest towns via Kansas City or Chicago.

#### *Thomas Lamont Shunned*

This much is true: Mr. Willkie's campaign managers did everything in their power to suppress any independent action on the part of his sympathizers which might have interfered with the studiously cultivated impression among the G.O.P. rank-and-file that he was "plain folks, just like you." During the convention they induced the Philadelphia *Evening Public Ledger* to reject several pro-Willkie advertisements, fearing that delegates might ask: what sort of friends did Mr. Willkie have who could afford to spend thousands of dollars for ads? According to *Newsweek*, Thomas W. Lamont was asked please to stay away from Willkie headquarters; that, also, might set delegates to wondering. Several Willkie enthusiasts who attempted to launch an inspired telegram campaign to delegates gave Mr. Davenport many another headache, for, as *Tide* magazine has pointed out, he remembered only too well "the mess the utilities got themselves into back in 1935 by that very method."

Mr. Willkie's nomination has affected little change in his propaganda technique. He continues to emphasize the Plain Folks device, to sell the American people on his personality, instead of his ideas. One reason for this, perhaps, is that his success in the pre-nomination campaign convinced Mr. Willkie that his theories concerning the American voter, as expressed in his *Fortune* article, were right. Another, even more important, may lie in the fact that Mr. Willkie has little to offer except his personality. For he presents few issues: he agrees with Mr. Roosevelt on foreign policy, on farm relief, on conscription, even on power developments already started. If anything, his stand on the National Labor Relations Act is even more forthright than Mr. Roosevelt's: on September 24, conferring with nine Idaho workers, Mr. Willkie announced his unqualified approval of that controversial measure, thus splitting with the G.O.P. platform again.

As Doris Fleenon, of the New York *Daily News* put it, Mr. Willkie favors the Wagner Act without amendments; the G.O.P. favors the amendments without the act.

A Presidential candidate who expresses his approval of every measure which leaders in his party have opposed for nearly eight years cannot hope to escape the charge of duplicity. Consequently Democratic propagandists have questioned his sincerity. They have attempted to convince independent voters that Mr. Willkie is simply hoodwinking them, and that he really doesn't mean what he says. Mr. Willkie again is relying upon the Plain Folks device to overcome these suspicions and to convince the American voter that, in his own words, he "will not let them down." He now supplements the Plain Folks device with another technique, however: Name Calling. He says, in effect, that while Mr. Roosevelt and he agree on most of the leading issues which face this country today, the people can't trust Mr. Roosevelt; they can trust Mr. Willkie.

#### *The Democratic Machines*

The G.O.P. candidate seems especially anxious to identify Mr. Roosevelt with the corruption that characterizes so many of America's great cities. Although he does not accuse the President of personal involvement, he does point out that some of the most notorious machine politicians in the country are working for his re-election, among them Edward J. Flynn, of New York, who succeeded James A. Farley as chairman of the Democratic National Committee; the Chicagoans, Ed Kelly and Pat Nash; Crump, of Memphis, Tennessee; and Hague, of Jersey City. This is Name Calling by Transfer: without ever actually making the charge, Mr. Willkie endeavors to associate Mr. Roosevelt with political corruption in the minds of the American people. The democratic machines are supporting Mr. Roosevelt, and he has not disavowed such support.

Useful to Mr. Willkie in this connection is John T. Flynn's series on Chicago which appeared in *Collier's* magazine shortly before the Democratic convention. The Republicans have distributed more than 1,000,000 reprints.

It was immediately after his nomination that Mr. Willkie made his most dramatic attempt to identify himself with "the common people



of America." He announced that he would set up his personal headquarters at Elwood, in the heart of the country, and this he did, in spite of the protestations of professional G.O.P. politicians, who complained that Elwood was much too small, and, though central geographically, was less so politically. Mr. Willkie made side-trips from Elwood to Coffeyville, where he once taught school, and to Rushville, his wife's home town, where he remained for several days. New Dealers hastened to deride these side trips.

Mr. Michelson grew increasingly caustic. He sneered at the "ingenuous, simple, Hoosier boy, taking his first timorous steps in the wilderness of politics." Ironically he spoke of his "blue jeans philosophy." The whole thing was curiously reminiscent of Alf M. Landon's campaign, he wrote, adding: "Well, the Kansas Governor did carry Vermont and Maine."

#### *Mr. Roosevelt, the Aristocrat*

At Chicago, Mr. Willkie again was "just plain folks." He was not so much the small town solid citizen, however, as the vigorous, two-fisted working man, tough in mind and spirit. Mr. Roosevelt was really the aristocrat, Mr. Willkie said: it was he, Wendell Willkie, not Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who truly represented the common man. At nine he was selling newspapers; later he sweated in the fields with threshing crews, worked in steel mills and in the sugar lands of Puerto Rico, moved abandoned town houses out to farms. He came from an ordinary American family, not from landed gentry. He went to Elwood High School, not to Groton. Mr. Willkie repeated this speech, although with variations, throughout his tour of the West. At Treasure Island he recalled that he was riding the rods when he first hit San Francisco; in the Dakotas, that he once washed dishes in Aberdeen, graduating to assistant cook. "I was pretty good," he admitted.

Not only was Mr. Willkie distrustful of Mr. Roosevelt's Hyde Park, Groton, Harvard antecedents; he was even more suspicious of the President's advisors. He agreed that Mr. Roosevelt had no desire to make himself dictator. At the same time he questioned the motives of "the little group around the President," Thomas Corcoran and Harry Hopkins, especially.

Mr. Willkie argued that Mr. Roosevelt's re-

election would result in totalitarianism; so the effect, if not the intent, was Name Calling: the effect was to smear Mr. Roosevelt with the name "dictator." The epithet is one which ordinarily is quite effective, for, as Harold J. Laski points out in his most recent study of the United States, *The American Presidency: An Interpretation*, there is nothing that Americans fear so much as dictatorship: the very word excites them.

#### *Ideas Overlooked*

Although there is somewhat more emphasis upon this charge of dictatorship, in general official as well as unofficial pro-Willkie propaganda closely parallels Mr. Willkie's speeches. There is the same attempt to "sell" the man, rather than his ideas. Stanley Walker's biographical introduction to *This Is Wendell Willkie* glows with admiration of the man's personality, his charm, his democratic instincts, his friendliness, his simplicity, his courage, his frankness, his political "savvy." The book gives none of Mr. Willkie's ideas, except the assurance that he loves democracy.

In much the same tenor was the full-page advertisement which the independent pro-Willkie organization, We, the People, inserted recently in the *New York Times*. The advertisement depicted the American people as saying: "We want one of *us* in the White House for a change. We want, in fact, we *demand*, our own candidate Wendell Willkie!" Discussing Mr. Willkie's stay in the Midwest, the advertisement continued:

He's the same Willkie who was born there—not the pet of Wall Street, as was sure to be charged. Indiana likes him and recognizes him as a true Hoosier.

He has won over the farmers in that section. They liked the honesty of his admitting that John and Jim and the other hired men did the work on his own farm. He won many friends out West when he said that he was a "conversational farmer."

... Yes—Willkie, with hate in his heart for no one, can bring about the co-operation that will unite us for defense, prosperity, and the abundant life such as no people in history has ever known.

The efforts of the Democratic Party to ridicule this picture of Mr. Willkie as the common man have aroused Willkie enthusiasts to vigorous counter-attacks, most of them directed against Mr. Michelson. Thus George Van Slyke, writing in the *New York Sun*, of September 26, attacked what he called "Michelson's smear



technic." Mr. Michelson, he said, "makes the mudballs," which Edward J. Flynn "throws." He described the Michelson campaign "of personal invective" as follows:

Smear Mr. Willkie as the exponent of Wall Street, the utility interests and the big money power; accuse him of covering up for the selfish industrialists, and with being the enemy of the honest working man.

The description of Democratic tactics was accurate enough. On the other hand, the *Sun*, in the past eight years, has denounced almost every New Deal measure including the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the Securities and Exchange Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act. The *Sun* even opposes the Sixteenth Amendment—the Federal income tax. Independent voters have asked what the *Sun* is doing in Mr. Willkie's camp if Mr. Willkie really means what he says. Mr. Michelson's answer—that Mr. Willkie doesn't mean it—seems inevitable under the circumstances.

#### *Mr. Michelson's Accusations*

Mr. Michelson is not content merely with pinning the Wall Street tag on Mr. Willkie. He also is attempting to demonstrate that Mr. Willkie's conversion to many New Deal measures dates from his nomination at Philadelphia. The implication here is that Mr. Willkie's conversion was more political than real; that once elected he would return to his "normal self." Again Mr. Michelson's moral is that independent voters should not trust Mr. Willkie, that he will "let them down." Official Democratic propagandists, and especially Mr. Flynn, have drawn rather heavily upon the *New Republic* supplement in support of this contention. Against Mr. Willkie's protestations of sympathy for unionized labor they place the alleged labor record of Commonwealth and Southern, as described in the *New Republic*: against his pledge to extend rural electrification and to administer sympathetically as well as efficiently such projects as TVA, they match the record of his fight against TVA. Particularly do they attack the sincerity of Mr. Willkie's attempt to co-operate with TVA in 1934. They cite the *New Republic* charge that while Commonwealth and Southern was talking co-operation, the Edison Electric Institute was financing the so-called Ashwander suit to block TVA extensions. The suit, if successful, would have prevented co-operation, and, since Mr. Willkie

then was on the executive board of the Institute, he was in the position of conniving against the TVA while pretending to defend it, the New Dealers say.

Mr. Willkie's answer is that he did not attend the executive board meeting at which the decision to finance the Ashwander suit was taken: in fact, he told Marquis W. Childs, of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* on September 14, he was then closeted with David Lilienthal, TVA director, at the Roosevelt Hotel. At the very next meeting, he protested against the decision, and ordered the Alabama Power Company, the subsidiary of Commonwealth and Southern involved, to withdraw at once from the Institute, Mr. Willkie says. The New Deal rejoinder is that, even if Mr. Willkie's hands are clean on the Ashwander case, the fact remains that he fought TVA tooth and nail during all the years that he was president of Commonwealth and Southern.

Mr. Willkie explained in his conversation with Mr. Childs:

They forget when they criticize me on the power issue that I was trustee for a number of stockholders. What did they expect me to do? Give the company away?

If I were a public official, then I would have the Government's interests as my interest and I would work on behalf of the Government's interests. The only test that could be logically and fairly applied was whether or not I was an effective representative of the people whom I was hired to represent.

Look what I did for them! I got \$25,000,000 more than the Government offered me for the Commonwealth and Southern properties in the TVA area. I was a special pleader, yes. I was getting \$75,000 a year to be a special pleader.

With regard to the dispute over the constitutionality of the TVA, why I was a party to that dispute. It was my duty. I helped to develop the issue. That was my social function.

#### *Mr. Childs Comments*

"In other words," commented Mr. Childs upon this statement, "Willkie has confidence in his skill as an advocate. He would represent the Government's interest with the same craft, the same persistence, the same energy that he brought to his defense of private power interests." If Mr. Childs' comment is to be taken seriously, say New Dealers, then the utility interests have no more business supporting Mr. Willkie than does the *New York Sun*. He would work against all they believe in.



Mr. Roosevelt's position in this war of propaganda avowedly is that of the bystander. He stated in his acceptance message that he would be too busy with affairs of state to participate in the campaign, and thus far his speeches have almost ignored Mr. Willkie's existence. In one sense, this attitude has itself been propaganda, for by holding aloof from partisan considerations, by presenting himself in all his speeches and in all his actions not as the Democratic candidate for President but as the spokesman of the American people, Mr. Roosevelt virtually has made any criticism of his policies seem like an attack on the government itself. Thus he declared in his acceptance message that it was originally his intention to retire from public life. His decision to run was based solely upon "public duty," and he considered it best to postpone all "partisan debate until the latest possible moment," he declared. The statement was crowded with Glittering Generalities, for example, the words "public duty." Critics maintained that it was Mr. Roosevelt's public duty to announce whether or not he would run for another term at the earliest possible moment, that by delaying his announcement he made it virtually impossible for anyone even to contest his re-nomination. However, if Mr. Roosevelt is right, anyone who criticizes his delay is saying that he should have betrayed his public trust.

The statement, moreover, was Card Stacking. For Mr. Roosevelt did not postpone partisan debate. On the contrary, he added still another question to the multitude of questions which troubled America: will he run again, or won't he?

#### *America's Foreign Policy*

If Mr. Roosevelt took any cognizance of the fact that he was running for office it was in the rather oblique statement at the end of his message in which he said: "If our Government should pass to other hands next January—untried hands, inexperienced hands—we can merely hope and pray that they will not substitute appeasement and compromise with those who seek to destroy all democracies everywhere, including here." The sentence meant nothing unless it meant that Mr. Willkie could not be trusted with the nation's foreign policy, that he might, if elected, betray his later campaign promise "to outdistance Hitler in any contest he chooses." Mr. Roosevelt was saying in effect that

his opponent was the sort of man who might "let the voters down."

This accusation was echoed by Henry Wallace in his speech accepting the Democratic nomination for the Vice-presidency, and has since appeared in many of Mr. Michelson's columns. It always is made by indirection: Mr. Willkie himself is absolved from the charge of being "pro-appeasement," but the Republican Party is charged with being the "appeasement party." The device is the same as that which Mr. Willkie himself used in absolving Mr. Roosevelt of dictatorial ambitions, while questioning the motives of his advisors: Transfer. Just as the effect of Mr. Willkie's assertion is Name Calling, so, too, is the effect of Mr. Wallace's prediction that Hitler would rejoice at Mr. Roosevelt's defeat.

#### *Words and Deeds*

At first Mr. Willkie endeavored to overcome the appeasement charge by reiterating his detestation of "Hitlerism." This was ineffective, for, while Mr. Willkie talked, Mr. Roosevelt acted. Mr. Willkie merely *said* that he would give all possible aid to England: Mr. Roosevelt arranged the destroyer-bases deal. More recently Mr. Willkie has confined himself to attacking Mr. Roosevelt's past record on foreign affairs, which, as PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS has on several occasions pointed out, has at times been rather puzzling and seemingly contradictory. In *Spain: A Case Study*, for example, PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS indicated that Mr. Roosevelt's application of the Neutrality Act to the Spanish civil war aided the fascist powers. In "*The Munich Plot*" it was suggested that Mr. Roosevelt had been maneuvered into lending his prestige to the cession of Sudetenland to Hitler. Several other contradictions were discussed in *Mr. Roosevelt's Foreign Policy*.<sup>1</sup> PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS has offered several explanations for these contradictions. Mr. Willkie, in his attacks upon Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy, has chosen in each case to disregard all explanations but the one that would make the President seem incompetent. In no case so far as we know, has candidate Willkie made an issue of Mr. Roose-

<sup>1</sup> *Spain: A Case Study* and "*The Munich Plot*" are contained in VOLUME II of PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS. *Mr. Roosevelt's Foreign Policy* was the November, 1939 issue, and will appear in the forthcoming VOLUME III.



velt's Spanish policy—a policy which coincided with that of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, although, as the Gallup poll revealed, it was opposed by many American Catholics. In the Spanish policy, which helped to achieve the aims of the fascist dictators, Roosevelt paralleled Chamberlain's appeasement policy.

Among Mr. Willkie's charges one especially is worthy of mention, and that is his assertion that Mr. Roosevelt was at least partially responsible for Munich. Speaking at Joliet, he said that Mr. Roosevelt had "telephoned to Hitler and Mussolini and urged them to sell Czechoslovakia down the river." Lem Jones, his press representative, immediately explained that Mr. Willkie had "misspoken;" and in his later speeches Mr. Willkie simply accused the President of telephoning Hitler and Mussolini and Chamberlain and "urging them to Munich where they sacrificed Czechoslovakia." This brought indignant denials from Democratic propagandists, and the *New Republic* commented: "Mr. Willkie lost his voice during his campaign tour; but for his own good he should have lost it sooner and it should have stayed lost longer." Yet the record shows that New Deal spokesmen were quick to claim the credit for Munich in September, 1938. Soon after the agreement was consummated, Harry Woodring, then Secretary of War, and Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State, went on the air to assert that Mr. Roosevelt had saved the peace of the world.

#### *Facts Omitted*

Along these lines the campaign has run to date. In the conviction that Americans vote for men, not for issues, Mr. Willkie has endeavored to sell himself on his Plain Folks personality, and to create mistrust of Mr. Roosevelt. The Democrats have met this challenge more by attacking Mr. Willkie than by defending their own candidate. Neither side has presented an all-around picture of Mr. Willkie: both have employed Card Stacking. If the Republicans have ignored the part of Wall Street financiers in Mr. Willkie's life, the Democrats have disregarded those aspects of his career which sharply distinguish him from the average corporation executive. They have interpreted the fact that many fascist groups support him as indicating that Mr. Willkie is not completely

in favor of democracy, overlooking his disavowal of those groups.

Actually, Mr. Willkie has long been outspoken in his defense of tolerance and civil rights. Fifteen years ago, in Akron, Ohio, he was fighting the Ku Klux Klan. At the Democratic convention of 1924 he supported Alfred E. Smith when the Klan was the issue. His latest defense of civil liberties was in his article, "Fair Trial," which appeared in the *New Republic*, of March 18, 1940. There he warned against railroading men to jail for their views on flimsy legal pretext. Nor was his warning couched in generalizations. He charged that Fritz Kuhn and Earl Browder were thus being persecuted, pointing out that Mr. Kuhn had been sentenced to from two and one-half to five years in jail for mulcting \$500 whereas "the most notorious defaulter of recent years received only five to ten years in the same penitentiary for stealing several million dollars." Of Mr. Browder he said: "If you truly believe in the protection of civil liberties you will wonder whether Browder was sentenced to four years in jail and a \$2,000 fine because he made a false statement on a passport application or because he was a Communist Party member."

#### *Willkie Stacks the Cards*

The Democrats have stacked the cards against Mr. Willkie, but Mr. Willkie is guilty of Card Stacking, too. In charging that Mr. Roosevelt has dallied with our national defense, the Republican candidate ignores the fact that an overwhelming majority in his party has opposed most of the President's measures. It was the *Republican* chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee who, explaining his opposition to repeal of the arms embargo, assured the nation that no immediate danger of war existed. The question is not whether Mr. Borah's isolationism was preferable to Mr. Roosevelt's internationalism. Mr. Willkie supports an internationalist policy himself, yet he attacks Mr. Roosevelt for neglecting to accomplish the very things which the Republican party opposed. He has not attacked the Republican party for such opposition.

One characteristic of the campaign which deserves mention is the relative paucity of smoking car stories. In 1928 the country was alive with rumors that Alfred E. Smith intended



to invite the Pope to move the Vatican to Washington, D. C. Foul, slanderous jokes, which passed from mouth to mouth rarely achieving the dignity of print, distinguished the '36 campaign. This year there have been few such whispers: the most prevalent is that Mr. Willkie, speaking off-the-record before the National Press Club, praised National Socialism, bracketing himself with Adolf Hitler, and saying: "I'm German myself." The whisperers point out that Mr. Willkie's father was born in Germany, never mentioning that he was three years old when he came here. Of course, the assumption that Mr. Willkie's ancestry makes him suspect is racist nonsense, worthy of Julius Streicher himself.

In this campaign, humor and ridicule have largely replaced the dirty story. We have already mentioned Charles Michelson's ironic references to Mr. Willkie's "transformation." Harold L. Ickes has also sought to destroy the Republican champion with ridicule. It was he who coined the phrase, "that simple barefoot Wall Street boy," which lesser Democrats have since used in speaking of Mr. Willkie. In New York, the pro-Roosevelt newspaper *PM* runs "Our Daily WW Special" each day on its "opinion page." The "Special" is the day's best wisecrack about Mr. Willkie. A column by Walter Winchell, consisting of typical Winchellese swipes at Mr. Willkie, also runs in *PM*. It appears under the pseudonym, "Paul Revere II."

#### *He'll Get It "Wholesale"*

Among the most popular anti-Willkie gags is one coined by another New York newspaperman, who, referring to Mr. Willkie's oft-repeated assertion that he will run the New Deal more efficiently, not scrap it, laughed: "All Mr. Willkie said is that 'I can get it for you wholesale.'"

If the campaign has been tame, the reason, according to Socialists and other non-intervention critics of Roosevelt and Willkie, lies not so much in their agreement on fundamental foreign and domestic policy as in the fact that this harmony has been achieved by a propaganda campaign which had as its chief end the preservation of the British Empire. To such critics the whole presidential campaign, to quote from Oscar Ameringer's Socialist *American Guardian*, is a "ghastly hoax." In this vein, *Uncen-*

*sored*, non-interventionist weekly newsletter, writes:

Willkie has not only accepted the President's foreign policy, he has also adopted his domestic program. As the Willkie crusade continues it looks less like a campaign for the Presidency and more like an effort on the part of its leader to qualify for a cabinet post in a third term. If Dorothy Thompson's version of national unity cannot be achieved before Election Day, there is no reason why it cannot be adopted after the formalities are over. Stimson and Knox were never as acceptable to the New Deal insiders as Wendell Willkie must be today.

Says *Uncensored*, "The clearing house of this bi-partisan concern for Britain is the William Allen White Committee, which includes enough influential Democrats and Republicans to make the absence of any open conflict . . . inevitable."

#### *Both Seek National Unity*

Critics of the conspiracy theory, with its implications of Card Stacking, say of course it is true that both Roosevelt and Willkie are seeking national unity—with each sincerely desiring four years of leading the nation in such unity. New Dealers hold that Roosevelt's implication that Willkie is an appeaser and the Republicans an appeasement party does not square with any conspiracy theory. In this connection, Raymond Clapper has pointed out that it is foolish for Roosevelt to stamp Willkie an appeaser if he hopes later to include him in his cabinet.

Whatever the truth of the charges and counter-charges involving Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Willkie, and the William Allen White Committee, the fact remains that the cataclysm of World War II has subordinated press and radio news about the presidential campaign. Even the much-publicized issue of the third term seems forgotten in the crash of events in Europe, China, the near East, and in conscription and vast war preparation at home. Because Mr. Roosevelt *is* the president, and because he does have a part in some of these events, his acts comprise a power of persuasion denied to the G.O.P. candidate. As the Institute has pointed out, events can have a powerful conditioning effect on propaganda, and frequently they may be propaganda.

Along this line, the Gallup poll avers that Mr. Roosevelt's popularity has increased from 227 electoral votes on August 4 to 499 electoral



votes on October 6. Mr. Willkie's electoral votes during the same period fell from 304 to 32. With the Fortune poll corroborating the Gallup figures, anti-New Deal propagandists, such as General Hugh S. Johnson and the New York *World Telegram*, have been quick to attack Dr. Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion. They have given nation-wide publicity to the findings of the little-known, "non-commercial" Dunn Survey, which, by October 15, was predicting a substantial Willkie victory. The pro-Roosevelt newspaper, New York's *PM*, says that the Dunn Survey is backed by the G.O.P. and that its polls are non-commercial simply because no one will buy them.

### *Dunn Survey Criticized*

In other words, these critics are saying that the Dunn poll is deliberately stacking the cards for Mr. Willkie against Mr. Roosevelt. They declare that few Americans heard of it until the Republicans and General Johnson made its prediction of a Willkie victory page one news.

*PM* quotes Mr. Dunn as saying that the cost of the Dunn Survey is met by private subscribers who "chip in" from \$25 to \$200 each. This year, the *PM* story continues, Mr. Dunn was given \$100 by the Republican party. New Dealers say that most of the private subscribers are

Republicans who are using the Dunn poll figures as an argument to get money from Wall Street.

It would seem that Dr. George Gallup is right, however, when he says, in effect, that if the Gallup poll goes wrong on the presidential election, its fate will be that of the Literary Digest; there will be no more Gallup polls. He declares he sells his findings to newspapers, and, if they are egregiously out of line with election results, he will be so discredited that his market will disappear. It is obvious, Dr. Gallup believes, that his poll cannot be a deliberate propaganda understanding.

Dr. Gallup has not been wrong in his five years of polling in predicting an election winner. While the Dunn Survey had Mr. Landon elected in 1936, it has worked out since then a "corrected formula." Had this been applied in 1936, declares Mr. Dunn, the findings on that election would have been correct in 44 out of the 48 states. The Dunn Survey is now using the corrected formula.

Already each poll has been accused of using the Card Stacking and Band Wagon devices to gain votes for the nominee whose election it is predicting. When one is proved wrong on election day, justly or unjustly, that poll will be accused of having engaged deliberately in propaganda.

## Propaganda Analysis Guide

The successful propagandist knows that most of us try to make the world intelligible to ourselves by eliminating details which do not fit into the picture we find easiest to comprehend. Accordingly, he paints his picture either all black, or all white. He attempts to eliminate all if's, but's, and's: he understands how our minds work.<sup>1</sup>

So, once again in the pre-Philadelphia days which led to Mr. Willkie's nomination for the Presidency of the United States we see the question of men and issues and organizations being cut to fit a simplified pattern. Thus, Mr. Willkie

was pictured to Republican delegates as the grass roots candidate, the small town leader just like themselves. In order to get this impression across, Willkie enthusiasts partially, and sometime completely, suppressed factors which might have indicated that Mr. Willkie was also Wall Street's candidate.

As this PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS bulletin points out, Republican party chiefs suppressed those things and persons which they believed would jeopardize Mr. Willkie's chances: Thomas W. Lamont was steered away from the candidate, his support deemed prejudicial rather than beneficial; the Philadelphia *Evening Public Ledger* was requested to reject pro-Willkie advertising; and an inspired telegram campaign

<sup>1</sup> See "Propaganda for Blitzkrieg," August 1, 1940 for analysis of common mental, or psychological, processes to which the propagandist appeals.



which might also have aroused suspicion concerning Mr. Willkie's supporters was blocked. Republican leaders, again, were sensitive to the ways in which our minds commonly work: they knew that we tend to generalize, to associate things and persons which seem alike.

Since then, Democratic propagandists have been equally anxious to suppress facts which might interfere with *their* picture of Mr. Willkie as "Wall Street's candidate." They have publicized widely the fact that several of the 500 or more fascist organizations in the United States are in favor of Mr. Willkie, but they have attempted to disregard the fact, first, that Mr. Willkie has repudiated these organizations; second, that Mr. Willkie has been outspoken in his support of civil liberties, even to defending such unpopular figures as Earl Browder and Fritz Kuhn; third, that Mr. Willkie's record in defense of civil liberties goes back at least fifteen years to the days when he was fighting the Ku Klux Klan in Akron, Ohio.

Thus, we find both sides suppressing many factors which if known might have served to change the attitude of the man in the street about the men, issues, and organizations involved in the election campaign.

One aspect of this problem is particularly troublesome; and that is the suppression of facts concerning *organizations* formed to promote one cause or another. During the current Presidential campaign, for example, as during every Presidential campaign, literally dozens of new organizations have been launched, some in behalf of Mr. Willkie, others in behalf of Mr. Roosevelt. Most of them are directed toward enlisting the support of specific interest groups in our society. Thus, both parties have inspired the formation of writers' committees; both have established labor committees; both have special organizations for Negroes and for the unemployed. Among the most highly-publicized of these groups are the various Democrats-for-Willkie clubs. Another case in point is We, the People, to which reference is made in this issue of PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS.

There is nothing unusual about this. Nor is there anything unusual about the problems which such organizations present to the people who, asked to join him, wonder if they are really what they seem. Until quite recently, for example, there was the problem of the "Com-

munist front" organizations which tens of thousands of non-Communists joined in the impression that they were New Deal organizations—only to find themselves very much embarrassed. Again, during the labor troubles of 1937 we found many people joining various citizens' committees under the impression that these committees were precisely what their names would lead one to believe. Later, the La Follette investigation revealed that many of these organizations were inspired and financed by large scale industry in its fight against labor organization.

During its three years of work the Institute for Propaganda Analysis has received hundreds of queries about organizations, new and old. Questions run: What is the "real purpose" of *blank* organization? Why is *such and such* organization backed by *so and so*? How can we tell a "front" organization? Should I remain in *blank* organization? Is Mrs. Roosevelt correct when she assumes that she can do more good within *blank* organization than outside it?

This raises the question: *how can we tell just what an organization is, or is not?*

In an attempt to meet this problem the Institute has devised the following yardstick. It is not presented as complete, as definitive. Test it yourself by applying it to organizations which you know, by applying it to organizations which you wish to know more about. Ask: wherein is this yardstick practical? Wherein is it not practical? Then, add to its questions and measurements.

#### ORGANIZATION YARDSTICK *How to Apply It*

I. What is the stated purpose and avowed functions of the organization? According to its own platform statements, what is the special interest of the organization?

If the organization is incorporated, check with its incorporation statements. Or check with agencies, such as a community organizational clearing house, library registry, or service directory to see whether the organization is listed and how it is listed. (Sometimes organizations do not have offices at the address they use.) Go to the office, or send for promotional literature and general information. Examine this literature carefully for stated purpose, function, activities, membership dues, and



privileges of the organization and its members.

Seek out local chairmen of national organizations and groups.

II. What is the organization doing? How often does the group meet? Are its actions in keeping with its stated purpose? Can you distinguish between its program activities and its promotional (public relations) activities carried on, possibly, to increase membership or financial aid, or to promote cooperation with other groups?

With information gained from following through Question I, interview an officer of the organization; ask him questions not covered by the group's literature. Check against the information you get by an interview (and literature) with an officer of a counter organization, or possibly a competing group.

III. Are all of the organization's affairs a matter of public record? Who organized it? Who are its officers? How long have they held office? With what other organizations are they associated? What are their qualifications for leadership? What are their past records?

It may be necessary to check, in the same manner outlined here, attacks upon an organization. Investigate sources, weigh evidence against Name Calling. Find out if the name is justified—and if it is, its implications.

IV. On what basis is the group organized? Is it a federation of organizations? Does it have direct membership? How much autonomy does the individual organization (or member) have? What actually is the role of its advisory or executive boards? Are they "window dressing" or functioning persons? (Even though advisory groups may enjoy membership in an organization, they may relegate all affairs of the organization to a small committee, staff, or person who actually "runs" it.)

V. Who belongs to the organization? Do members help to make decisions for the organization? How? If not, how are decisions made? By a board of directors? By the membership as a whole?

VI. Who gives the organization money or other help? Why? Do donors have any control? Is the organization run on the principle of a holding company, financially or otherwise? Does a committee, or secretariat, decide upon certain programs and policies upon which the membership is called to note?

Does the organization spend more money

than would seem to be warranted by its stated income?

VII. To whom does the organization sell, or give, services or publications? Does it "service" organizations or individuals? If so, for what purpose, stated or unstated?

VIII. What methods does the organization use in carrying out stated (or unstated) purposes or programs? Do these methods square with the avowed goals of the organization?

Examine PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS bulletins and guides, notably: *How to Detect and Analyze Propaganda*; *Propaganda for Blitzkrieg*; *The Public Relations Counsel*; *Propaganda in the Schools*; *The A. & P. Campaign*; and *Mr. Dies Goes to Town*.

IX. How is the organization's work evaluated by persons who are qualified to evaluate it?

Check with an expert, or authority, in the particular field in question. This person may be expected to be qualified because he has: knowledge of the organization's work; access to sources of information not available to all; previous training and experience in the field.

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*Note:* By its charter the Institute is a non-profit corporation organized to assist the public in detecting and analyzing propaganda, but it is itself forbidden to engage in propaganda or otherwise attempt to influence legislation.

The Institute does not have all the answers: it lays no claim to infallibility. It will try to be scientific, objective and accurate. If it makes mistakes, it will acknowledge them. It asks those who receive its letters to check its work.



(A person may be an authority in one particular field, but wholly incompetent in another.)

X. What are the implications of the organization's activities? How do these affect your interests? How do they affect the welfare of other people throughout the nation, specifically, for example, in terms of livelihood, civil liberties, health, education, et cetera?

The citizen, in a consumer role, asks: what do I want from this organization? Do I want membership? A speaker for my community forum, or church group? Are the organization's publications—books, pamphlets, radio broadcasts, motion pictures, and the like—of use to me? As a whole? In part? These may be pertinent considerations in appraising a new group.

In considering an organization in which he already holds membership, the citizen in his consumer role re-appraises the group. Whether he resigns from the organization or fights it with counter propaganda may depend upon whether the organization's goals are desirable, and upon whether, although certain weaknesses are apparent, there is sufficient flexibility within the organizational set-up to warrant staying in (or

joining, as the case may be) the organization to work for its improvement.

XI. Check *your own* reactions to the stated platforms and goals of an organization. To what degree do you react to "virtue words" that fit into the pattern of your prejudices and ideals? Are your checking efforts (inquiry and processes of critical thinking) halted midway by your own likes or dislikes? Do you find yourself rationalizing concerning groups which are to your liking? Or, does application of this yardstick serve merely to strengthen your preconceived ideas—on war, on peace, on presidential candidates, on any number of groups organized about controversial issues?

See the *Group Leader's Guide to Propaganda Analysis*, pages 84-104, and the Propaganda Analysis Worksheet of *The Attack On Democracy*, January 1, 1939, PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, Volume I.

XII. So complex are many of these considerations that possibly a person can, in some instances, know an organization and effect real thinking concerning it *only by working within it*. Realistic thinking may occur only as a part of action, of experience.

## Propaganda and Foreign Policy

SINCE 1933 the foreign policy of the United States as seldom before in American history has affected the life liberty and pursuit of happiness of the American people. Foreign policy is inseparable from propaganda and censorship. Particularly significant, therefore, are the Institute's bulletins on this subject, found in VOLUMES I, II, and III of PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS.

VOLUME I contains the basic approach to propaganda techniques and the channels of communication. *Propaganda Techniques of German Fascism*, included in this volume, reveals how and why Hitler's propaganda "works" at home and abroad.

VOLUME II includes bulletins that are the touchstones of today's world-wide conflict: *Spain: A Case Study*; *War in China*; and "*The Munich Plot*."

VOLUME III carries the changing picture of foreign policy and propaganda forward. *The War Comes*; *Mr. Roosevelt's Foreign Policy*; *Russia, Finland, and the U.S.A.*; *Where England Stands*; and *Propaganda for Blitzkrieg* are outstanding bulletins in this volume.

These studies help give a clear understanding of America's role in world politics today. Ordinarily retailing at \$2, they are available to subscriber-members of the Institute at \$1 each.

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